

C. W. M. D. C. M. L. C.
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THE
Grand ESSAY:
OR, A
Vindication of REASON,
AND
RELIGION,

Against Impostures of *Philosophy*
Proving according to those Ideas and Con-
ceptions of Things Human Understanding is
capable of forming to it self.

1. That the Existence of any *Immaterial Sub-
stance* is a Philosophic Imposture, and im-
possible to be conceived.
2. That all Matter has Originally created in it,
a principle of Internal, or Self-Motion.
3. That Matter and Motion *must* be the Founda-
tion of *Thought* in Men and Brutes.

To which is Added,
A brief Answer to Mr. Broughton's *Psycholo. &c.*

By, W. C. M. D. C. M. L. C.

*Beware least any man spoyl you through Philosophy,
&c. after the rudiments of the world, after the
Traditions of men, and not after Christ, Coloss.
2, v. 8.*

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

I F I have proved what I pretend to, in the following Papers, I presume I may without Vanity say, that Now is the Axe laid to the Root of the Tree; For if the Existence of any Immaterial Substance be proved, a Contradictory Conception in General, I am sure it cannot be applicable to any Species of Beings in the whole Creation. Therefore, Kind Reader, it is that I submit the following Reasons to your deliberate, and unprejudiced Determination. That there are contained in this Essay several New Notions of Philosophy, which have in them a great Verisimilitude, if not verity it self, and of which scarce ever any One before me, have treated, It ought not in my opinion to be wondered at, seeing a Desire of farther Knowledge stimulates almost all Mankind to pry and search into Common Received Notions, whether they are adæquate with Truth, or

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not, and Therefore, I hope I in particular may not be debar'd publishing my real Sentiments in Philosophy, so they but conform to sound Reason, or True Religion; from which, as yet, I am not conscious to my self that I ever erred one tittle, I know a Learned Gentleman talks high of deserting one of the Grand fundamental Principles of Religion, by a terrible Dereliction of Grace, in denying the Immortality of the Soul; (vid. Dr Nicolls his præf. to his 5th Conf: with a Theist) I should be heartily glad if such a Gentleman could but inform me How I shall, or may be sensible of this terrible Dereliction of Grace, as He calls it, If I were but well instructed How, I do assure Him I would quickly recant my Opinion, But in the mean time, it doth appear to me, that He, by a terrible Dereliction of Common Sense and Reason, has deserted one of the most fundamental Principles of Truth in the World viz: Never to believe the Existence of Things which involve in their suppos'd Natures a Contradiction, or impossible Conception. Such noisy clamours have very oft pass'd for Argumentation in others, as well as in him, so I excuse them here, especially seeing I may perhaps provoke the Gentleman, now already irritated, I fear, by the disappointment of
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the Good old Warden of Merton College's Recovery, just after the Dedication of his Learned Piece to Him, and to the Christian Electors Senior, and to the No-Christian Junior, Fellows of the said College, at least such as do not appear by his learned Dedication to have or deserve Christian Names, to be affixed to their Surnames, because they had no Power to elect a new Warden in the room of the Deceased, had it then been his fate to go to sleep with his forefathers. But a full answer to this 5th Conf: perhaps time may produce.

What I have said here in this Treatise concerning Matter and Motion, I do not presume will have any effect on such, as consider not the Power of God to actuate, and Regulate this Matter and Motion to such Ends, as his Almighty Wisdom proposes, and Ordains; but think Matter and Motion unable to do any thing, from whence Order, Beauty, or congruity of Action may result. This they do averr from the visible Motion of Matter in several things in the present Universe. v. g. The 24 Letters by chance thrown together seldom, or never, make a line of sense; An Heap of Stones, Sticks, and Dirt by bare Motion will ne-

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ver make a Regular frame of Building; Its unconceivable how the Animal Spirits (being the Purest part of the Bloud, and, Material) should by Motion produce Thought, &c. All this I readily Grant Philosophically considered, without the Power of an Omnipotent Agent, but-certainly It implies no impossibility for God to endow Matter with Principles able to produce such effects, notwithstanding Mr. Broughton tells us, we can have no Idea of such a Power conjoin'd with Matter. For my part I do own, that I can have an Idea plain enough of such a Conjunction; For He that can have an Idea of Life superadded to the Pen, I now write with, may undoubtedly have another of Thought added to that Material Pen, if God should please by his Omnipotence to make it a Living Man. Let but any Man consider seriously the Power of Matter and Motion, and I don't doubt but that He will judge more favourable of this Opinion, That all Matter by Original Creation is endowed with a Principle of Self Motion, than otherwise. I'll conclude this paragraph with these single Questions. Has the Wind in it a Principle of self-Motion, or not? What Power raises a Storm, and what Power causes it to cease again? I doubt the Philosopher

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sopher must recurr to God's Power to make it cease, if Omne quod movet in æternum moveret, nisi impediretur ab alio, be a true proposition, If not, I very much doubt any Mans ability to explain the Phænomenon, of the Ceasing of the Stormy Wind, and Tempest of a sudain as it frequently happens (notwithstanding the materia Vaporosa which is perhaps the pabulum of that storm, as visibly fills the Atmosphere as before, and is apparently not exhausted) without recurring to God's Power giving it a principle of Self-motion by Original Creation, which He permits on occasion to exert it self, and again causes it to cease, at his Almighty Will and Pleasure.

*As to Mans Animal Spirits being the foundation of Thought in him, I see no inconsistency in it, in reference to Reason or Religion. The Arguments I leave the Reader to judge by in their proper place, and Man's perfection is as well asserted and Vindicated by making Matter and Motion the foundation of his Actions, as by making an Immaterial Substance the only Principle thereof. Therefore Those who shall brand such a Doctrine with the Ignominious character of Atheistic (as some men dare say
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any thing to caluminate, what they cannot confute) I will only bid them turn the Glass, and Know that longer Latranti non oblatrabo, nec calcantem recalcitrabo, sed quicquid Recta Ratio, et Religio Dictaverit, vel in Ipsius Invidia contemptum, fari non verebor.

Lastly what doth the Existence of this Spiritual Substance in Man but cast a Grand Reflection on the whole Faculty of Physick, as Cheats and Impostures in many cases? For, Madness, Deliriums, Melancholy &c. are Diseases of the Mind, or Soul, properly speaking: Now, who can put a greater cheat on Mankind, than He that attempts by Medicines to rectifie the Disorders of an Immaterial Substance? If such Medicines afflict the Body it is still but a Delusion to attempt thereby to cure the Mind, and you may as well damm up a Current to stop the Fountain head. Therefore seeing Experience testifies such Diseases frequently curable and cured, and Reason confirms the Impossibility of the Existence of such an Immaterial Substance, I hope, Reader, that

*—veteres avias tibi de Pulmone revulsi.
and so
Farewel.*

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Vindication of Reason,
AND
RELIGION
Against
Impostures of Philosophy.

THE notion of *Immaterial Substance* has so universally prevail'd for several Ages, that to contradict it, will favour of no less than *Hobbism*, in the Opinion of many sober well meaning Men, I believe, as well as of all furious Bigots. However this Essay, or *Tentamen de Immateriali Substantia* as I may call it, I hope will meet with better treatment, than what a *Prejudic'd* zealot usually affords; if it do not from all, yet I cannot doubt a candid reception from *some few*, and those also very Good Christians, if that notion shall be made evidently appear, to be a plain *Philosophic Imposture*, and a *derogation to the Christian Religion*, and that Human

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Understanding is not capable of forming such a Notion of *Substance*, and giving it *Existence* at the same time. I have always been and ever shall be, of the Opinion, that whoever writes in *Vindication of Reason and Religion*. as I here do, ought not to value by what Name He is characteriz'd, so He but give grounds for the Truth He asserts, and endeavours to prove. For Railing against a man never amounts to an Argument, nor Branding him with an Ignominious Character undeservedly, to a confutation. Therefore I shall proceed to shew,

1. That according to the Ideas, or conceptions of Things Human Understanding is capable of forming to it self, it is impossible there should be any such Being in *Rerum natura* as an *Immaterial Substance*.

2. That those Operations and Proprieties which are said to belong to God, Angels, Devils, or Evil Spirits, and Human Soul; are incompatible to the nature of an *Immaterial Substance*, and consequently they cannot be *Immaterial Substances*.

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Now in order to make good the proof of these two Propositions, I take it for granted to be as undeniably true, as any Proposition in the Mathematicks, *That no man can form a true and adæquate conception of any Thing which is above the Reach of his Understanding:* which is as much as to say, a man cannot comprehend, what He is not in his own Nature capable to comprehend, and that the Notion of *Immaterial Substance* is such, I doubt not but to make appear in the following Paragraphs, at least thus far, that if it be granted by the Omnipotent Power of God, that such an *Immaterial Substance* may possibly exist, yet it is impossible for Human Understanding to conceive how it can exist. Therefore when I say, *The existence of an Immaterial Substance is impossible,* I mean that it is above the Reach of Human Understanding to conceive, the possibility of its existence; whereupon I beg leave to lay down certain Rules, or *Postulata*, which I presume may very reasonably be granted to be true, by all the learned World, to ground a proof on as,

1. *Reg.* Whenever there occurs an unintelligible Idea of any Being *i. e.* incomprehensible by our understanding,

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the Existence of that Being must be wholly a matter of Faith, and we can have no true Idea of it but from Divine Revelation.

2. *Reg.* Where we have the certainty of of the Existence of any Substance, we can positively assert that the Proprieties, or Effects we by our Senses find to come from, it, flow from the Nature of *that* Substance, and not of another.
3. *Reg.* When the Nature of two Substances are incompatible by a great Repugnancy, contrariety, or contradiction (take the Word in a large Sense, as usual) they cannot be united without some proper medium.
4. Whatever is brought as an exception to all things else in the whole frame of the Universe, ought to have such proof of the singularity of its nature, as will admit of no doubt of its Existence.
5. The difficulty of our Conception of the Existence of a Thing doth not necessarily infer the Non—Existence thereof. But if this difficulty involve
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A Philosophic Imposture. 5

in it an *Impossibility in Nature, or a contradiction*, as far as Human Understanding is capable of Determining, that Thing may justly be pronounced to have *no Existence* at all.

6. A *Supposititious Existence* of the same Thing, different from such Existences, which to the Evidence of our Senses, and Reason appears manifestly *Real*, ought to be look'd upon as false, and an Imposture.

I hope I need not here add, that Man is of a Finite Understanding, and that whatever Knowledge He may have of Sublunary Bodies, yet He can have no *certain Knowledge, or Idea* of the nature of Invisible celestial Beings. He may conceive them to be This or That, yet his conceptions may be wrong, as to their nature, tho' they may be right enough as to their Existence in the General. Because *Reg. 5th.* I take to be true. But then if He adjoyn such properties to those Existent Beings, as would destroy that very Existence He supposes, He forms a Conception of those Beings incapable to be Exerted by Human Understanding. v. g. I can easily conceive

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that an Angel doth *Exist*, tho' an Invisible cælestial Being, yet I can have no *certain Knowledge* of the nature of that Angel, whether He be a Material, or Immaterial Substance: But if I form a conception of Immateriality belonging to this Angel, and the same be proved by some medium or other, wholly to be incompatible to, or tending to destroy, that Angelick nature, I form the conception of a Thing above the Reach of Human Understanding, and I can as soon conceive a *BlackWhiteness* in both the extreme degrees of Quality, or an *unextended Quantity*, as frame such a conception in my mind. Now that such must be the Idea of *Immaterial Substance* to every Thinking Man, I shall endeavour to prove from those conceptions we have of *Body*, or *material Substance*, as it is contradistinguished from *Immaterial*, according to that known Rule in Philosophy, *opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt*; That when we have formed a True conception of the nature of *Matter* or *Body*, we may divest the same by the Power of our Understanding, if possible, of those Properties which essentially belong to Matter, and then see what our Conceptions, or Idea of Substance, so divested, must be,

I. *Ex.*

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1. *Extention* is the first Essential Property (Essence, if you please) of *Material Substance*, or *Body*. Therefore these Propositions must be both true.

Every Material Substance has Extention.

No Immaterial Substance has Extention.

2. *Divisibility* is another essential Property belonging to *Body*, therefore these two propositions must be true.

Every Material Substance is Divisible.

No Immaterial Substance is Divisible.

3. *Passion*, or Passiveness, or Patibility &c.

Every Material Substance, as Matter, is Passive.

No Immaterial Substance, as such is Passive.

4. *Impenetrability of Dimensions*, *i. e.* The parts of any Material Substance cannot so penetrate another such substance

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stance, as for both to be in the same place at once, Ergo.

Every Material Substance hath Impenetrability of Dimensions.

No Immaterial Substance hath Impenetrability of Dimensions.

These Propositions seem to involve more difficulty in our Conceptions than the former, because of the ambiguous signification of the Word *Impenetrability*, which is in a Philosophical Sense, different from the common acceptation of it, for *Penetration* tho' it signifie a *Peircing*, or *Entring into*, v. g. any soft or hard substance; yet here it is an *Union* as it were of two Substances in one bulk and in the same place, without augmenting, or Extension of the Bulk by *their conjunction*. So Angels, and Human Souls, and all Spirits are said to *penetrate*, and unite themselves to Bodies.

5. *Succession of Motion, Time and Place* belong Essentially to material Substance. Ergo.

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A Philosophic Imposition. 9

Every material Substance must move in Succession of Time and Place, from one Extream to the other, and is not *self-movent*.

No immaterial Substance moves in Succession of Time and Place, but may move from one Extream to the other, without passing a medium successively, and is *self-movent*.

6. *Insensibility, or Insensation* belongs Essentially to material Substance. Ergo.

Every material Substance, as such, is Insensible.

All Sensation arises from immaterial Substance.

7. It is Essential to matter to be directly the *Object of some one of our Senses*. Ergo.

All material Substances are visible, tangible, &c. directly and *per se*.

No immaterial Substance is visible, tangible, &c. directly and *per se*.

I shall not here mention *Gravity* or *Gravitation* a Propriety that necessarily attends Matter, or an *inability to move it self* (as believed) upon which Account *Immaterial Substances* are call'd *ἀτομικά*, because these Properties are *secondary ones*, and are some way or other couch'd under the former, at least may be *reductively* treated of under one of those Heads: I do not pretend that I have made the two Propositions under every head strictly contradictory, but yet I have made them so directly Opposite, as plainly shows the Incompatibility of the Natures of each Substance, unless a medium, apposite to cement them, can be found out, which I take to be sufficient to prove what I design, *viz.* to show the unconceiveableness of the Existence of any Immaterial Substance by Human Understanding. As,

1. The first thing we must do to conceive *Immaterial Substance* aright, that is, form a true Notion and right Idea of it in our Mind, we must strip it of all *extension*, if we can, because that is an Essential Attribute of *Matter*, ergo, an *Immaterial Substance* must be an *unextended Substance*, which I at present think impossible for one of the most-refined thinkers in the World

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World to conceive, But here says the Philosopher give me leave to interpose, and let you know that *Extension* is either *Quantitative*, or *Entitative* and we do not say absolutely that Immaterial Substance has no *Extension* at all, but it has no *Quantitative Extension*, called *habentia partiam extra partes cum penetrabilitate dimensionum*, but it has *Entitative Extension*, that is, it has *partes extra partes, ita tamen ut se possunt mutuo penetrare*. What is meant by *Penetration* I have before explained, and therefore this Philosophical Iargon, I hope will be the easier understood, and the meaning of the whole amounts to this: That Immaterial Substances have a *kind of Extension*, but it is such, that the parts of them can penetrate each other, and all material Substances too, and yet not augment their bulk. By this distinction the Philosopher thinks himself safe, and so impregnable, that no Battery of Argumentation can possibly do him any hurt. But why? If it has *Partes extra Partes*, it has still *Extension*, and that Attribute of *Penetration* hinders not, but that it must be of a limited and circumscribed Existence, notwithstanding its Power to *Extend*, or *Contract* it self, as it pleases.

ses. Now whatever is of a limited and circumscribed Existence cannot, I boldly aver, be conceived without *Extension*, and it must be circumscribed by some Bounds or other, if *Substance*; be those Bounds never so large, or never so small, yet still they are such as make it impossible for Man to conceive an *Unextended Substance*, be that *Extension* either Quantitative, or Entitative, those verbal Amuserments of the crafty Philosophers. But again what is *Entitative Extension*? can it signify any more than that, *every Being* (as the word *Entitative* denotes) *has partes extra partes, which has that Extension*? Now that all Substances are Beings which have *Partes extra partes* I think no one will demand me to prove, unless they will quibble upon the Word *Partes*, in relation to Immaterial Substances, which they may say have not properly *parts*. Very good! But the Question lyes not in that nicety, what they are compounded of, as I may so phrase it, but what Human Understanding is capable of conceiving them to be. Doth not any man that conceives *Substance*, form to himself the Idea of some Thing that has *Bulk* to give it an *Independent Existence*? I appeal to you yourself,
now

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now reading this Treatise, if that be not the first Idea of *Substance* that occurs to your mind, altho' you have by a previous conception divested it of Materiality? Pray but consider a while, whether that very Conception doth not return and will go, in spite of your Will, along with you in your Thoughts of Immateriality, attributable to *Substance*? certain I am materiality, tho' conceived to the utmost degree of Refinedness, will accompany every man, that strives to form a Notion of *Substance* in his Mind, it being the necessary Fate, and Frailty of a Finite understanding. For as to the abstracting Lines, and Angles, in the Mathematicks, where the Mathematicians *Formas ab omni materia separant*, as the Learned Grotius says *lib. 2. cap. 23 de Jure Belli, &c.* that comes not up to the point, supposing it possible for the understanding to consider them abstractedly from all Matter. For the Existence of those Lines, and Angles, are but Notions in a Man's Brain, and exist by *pure thought*, but when I come to consider of *Substance*, that it must contain in it self an *Independent Existence, and self Subsistency*, tis this I aver, impossible to be conceived by Human Understanding, without *Extension* conjoyn'd to it.

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it: Unextended Substance being as impossible to be conceived as an *Eternal Creature*, or *Dead Animality*, and consequently the Notion, or Idea of a *Non Quantitative Extension* is incomprehensible. Thus much for the first Essential property of Matter. The next Head that comes to be considered is ;

2. *Divisibility*. That every material Substance is Divisible, is readily granted on all Hands, nay not excepting even a mental Division of the first Atom, or Indivisible part of Matter. Human Understanding, endeavouring oft to pry into things it cannot Comprehend, is apt to stretch it self so far, as that it loses frequently its very first Thought in thinking, or else it terminates it self with a kind of unquietness and uneasiness that it can go no farther, nor be better satisfied in its quest after a more perfect Knowledge. And this happens not only when we strive to pry into the Nature of Infinity, but also when we endeavour to erect to our selves a scheme (as it were) of *Immaterial Substances*; nay even in *minimis hallucinamus*, we are plung'd even in searching into the least Things of Nature imaginable, tho' material. This I men-

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mention because the Doctrine of the *Divisibility of matter* is so plain, and easy to us, when we consider the Aggregate of Atomes to make up a *Body*, or *Substance*, and so intricate when we come to the *Divisibility* of the first Atom of a *Material Substance*. And indeed it infers as much, as this absurd Question amounts to, *whether an Indivisible be Divisible or no?* Which Question I leave to be answered by the *Refined Thinkers* of the World, it being not my Business to state the Nature of a material Atom, but to suppose them conjoyned, so as to forme a Body, and if they may be conjoyned, it necessarily follows that all Material Substances are undoubtedly Divisible,] or separable from each other, which is the same; for I speak not of *Notional Division by the Mind*, but what is conceivable to be practicable by the Power of some Agent or other. But what shall we do then with these *Immaterial Substances*? Whether they are made up of tenuous Atomes, as v. g. of Fire, or Air, I must not put, as a Question, because those pratically, though never so subtle, and Firme, yet have *materiality*, which will be a kind of a Contradiction to attribute them to *Immaterial Substances*, to make up their Being, or be Ingredients

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(as it were) of their Composition. Here I must beg my Readers pardon that I am forced to use unphilosophical Expressions, to explain my self by, which I must do, because I would willingly be understood if possible, in so nice a scrutiny after the Nature of this *Immaterial Substance*. However I think I may with very good Reason put the Question in Words of a larger Extent then Atomes or Particles, *whether Humane Understanding doth not conceive these Immaterial Substances to be made of some things or other (we will not call them Atomes,) unible amongst themselves according to the Nature of an Immaterial Substance.* Or whether these *Immaterial Substances* are made, like an indivisible material Atom, all of a piece, as it were, without the Union of any other Immaterial Atomes to make up the Composition of an immaterial, or Angelick Substance: I will not pretend to limit the Power of an Omnipotent Agent, to say, *He cannot forme v. g. an Angel, So pure, and Simple, like an Atom, as not to require the Union of somethings to make up the Bulk of that Angel, but I do say, and I think may justly say so too, that it is impossible for Man to conceive an Angel not made of Unible somethings,*

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things, therefore *Divisibility* which is another Essential Affection attributed to matter, must necessarily accompany Union for I take it to be an undeniable *maxime quicquid unitur est Divisibile*, and consequently Immaterial Substances must by us be conceived *Divisible*. What Dr. Hen. More talks of *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* as being the Essence of Angels, I shall have Occasion to speak of elsewhere. Thus I make good Reg. 5. aforementioned. Again, *Extension* being proved to belong to all *Immaterial Substances*, *Divisibility* necessarily follows, because the very supposition of a Being to have *partes extra partes*, concludes those very parts to be distinguishable one from the other, and consequently separable, or *Divisible*. But,

3. *Passion, Patibility, or Passiveness*, is another Affection of Matter, and it is agreed on by all the Philosophers in the World, that *materia est pure passiva*, Matter is purely Passive, in its own Nature. For it doth not mean, that Matter cannot act on Matter, because we see that contradicted every Day, one Body protruding another, but it signifies that *matter in it self is utterly incapable of Act-*

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ion, but it must be excited into Action by some *Immaterial Agent, or Power*: Now how this *Immaterial Agent* can affect Matter, seems to me an unconceivable Riddle, because all *Action* denotes Contact either *mediatione suppositi*, or *Virtutis*, as Philosophers are pleased to express themselves, and what *Contact* can be devised between an *unextended Indivisible*, &c. *Substance*, and an *extended one*, I profess, my Imagination cannot reach it. I know I shall here be a little reprimanded for enquiring *how a Thing may be done*, and be told also, that there are many Things we visibly see done in the World, yet we cannot tell *how* they are done; as the Union of Material with Material is inexplicable and unconceivable too, yet we cannot deny it to be done every Minute. To whom I answer,

What Man is capable of Understanding, at least what he thinks himself capable of, he gives a ready assent to, and believes he can give some Reason or other to unfold what he Ocularly sees done every day, whether that Reason be conclusive or no, I will not pretend to determine, yet it may be such as may
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satisfy his own *Disquisition*, and that will be sufficient. But when I come to enquire how a *Contact* can be made between two such Opposite Natures *Material and Immaterial*, I cannot satisfy my own *Disquisition*, and therefore if I cannot believe a thing or assent that it is done, it is but reasonable that I should ask, How is it possible to be done? according to the Truth of Reg. 1. If I was as infallibly sure of the Existence of *Immaterial Substance*, as I believe, I am of *Material*, I should make little scruple to believe its Power of *Contact*; but then I must tell you, that this I must believe only as an Object of Faith, for by Philosophy, or the Power of Reason I could never be able to comprehend it. But grant that the *modus* of *Immaterial Substances* acting on *Material*, be unscrutable, yet we may surely imagine them to act on Matter? Undoubtedly it is possible, granting the supposition of their Existence to be true, but there must be so many Postulata's yielded to, to make that good, that it's next to an Impossibility for Man to conceive it to be done. I will give you one single instance. Suppose an Angel be an *Immaterial Substance* and he moves a Mountain out of its

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place.

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place. If that Angel touch it, there must be a Renitency to Motion in the Mountain as being nothing but Matter, unable to resist an Angelic Power. Now the Idea we have or can conceive, must be, that nothing can move so great a Body without touching it, and if so, we presently fall into another Labyrinth of perplexity, how it is possible for that Immaterial Substance to touch a Mountain, and how it is possible to move it without touching? And all this arises, because we have strip'd and denudated our Angel of that Receptacle of Power he ought to have, and have cloathed him with *Immateriality*, which makes him in our Conceptions an Incompatible Agent with all sublunary beings. Having thus stated the *highly incredible*, if not *impossible Agency* of any Immaterial Substance with Material, I come now to show you from the very Nature of Substance, that *Passion*, or *Patibility*, which is usually appropriated solely to *Matter*, must also be a necessary Concomitant of *Immaterial Substances*, if they did, or do exist; at least it is impossible for Human Understanding to conceive an *Impatible Immaterial Substance*, Matter being as it is said, in it self a dull heavy unactive lump,

lump, cannot of it self produce any Action; but if it doth, that Action must proceed, as some say, from some *Immaterial Substance* actuating it, whose Nature must be directly opposite to matter, *i. e.* always Vigorous and Active. Now if so, and it be a Created Being, or Substance, it cannot be of long duration; because for any Substance to be in perpetual Motion argues a sort of a Violence, & *nullum violentum est perpetuum*, says the Philosopher, therefore those who have devised this *Immaterial Substance*, should have also added to its Nature an *Interchangeableness of Motion and Rest*, or else *Immortality* would not by the Rules of Philosophy necessarily have followed *Immateriality*. By what appears to our Senses we may guess of Things which do not appear to them, especially if those Non-apparent Entities have such manifest Attributes and Proprieties assigned them, as we visibly knew applicable to others. So when there is *motus particularum rapidissimus materiæ primi Elementi* as the Cartesians express themselves, the Subject, in which that Motion is, lasts not long, but the fiery particles devour it, until no more be left to supply a pabulum for the constant Rapidity of its Motion. Now

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if it be the Nature of an *Immaterial Substance* to be in perpetual Action, it must be in a State of *tendency to destroy it self*, which is hardly conceivable to be the Nature of any living Being in the World. I am sensible here that my Adversaries will tell me that *God has given to all Immaterial, and Angelick Substances, a perpetual Active Nature*, and therefore this Activity being the very Nature of them, can by no means tend to the Destruction of themselves. If such a Nature doth appear to be given to all *Immaterial Substances* by God Almighty (say I) then what you say must be true, but it seems not to be consonant to his Almighty Wisdom, tho' by his Power he may do it. Because to all immaterial Substances God must be suppos'd to have given according to your Doctrine also, *a free Will and Power to move, or not to move themselves*, that is, suspend their Motions not only local, when united to Body, as the vulgar Phrase is, but even the determination of the very Motion of the Mind, call'd Thoughts. Hereupon if an *Immaterial Substance* had no Power to rest it self from Action sometimes, and then again to excite it self according to its Will, it must be a necessary Agent, and could never Act

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Rationally, *i. e.* produce Regular actions suitable to the Thoughts and Designs it had præviously conceived ; *Ergo* it must for some time be eased from Action, if a Rational agent, and then consequently undergo *Passion*, or *Patibility*, inasmuch as Rest implies *Emphatically Passion*. Nor will it avail to say, *Immaterial Substances*, may cease from local Motion, but *Cogitation* is their Essence, and they can no more divest themselves of Thought, which is a Motion in the Mind of Man, than they can cease to Be at their own Will and Pleasure. All this I grant where *Thought* is known to be in a Subject as in Man, who perhaps could *not think*, had he not *Body*, by that manner of Operation, as we conceive the Motions of the Mind to be done : But when we come to the Estimate, what those Motions are in an *Immaterial Substance*, we are mightily at a loss what to call *Cogitation* in them, *quatenus*, the Result of an *Immaterial Substance*, so that if you will stick close to your Text, you must first resolve me what *Cogitation* is in those *Immaterial Substances*, and then I'll tell you, whether it be the Essence of their Beings, or not. For *Cogitation*, and *Knowledge Intuitive* seem to be in-

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compatible, as I have before observed : The former requiring succession of Time, and Place, to fathom Causes and Effects, in order to find out what is sought for, but an Angel with Intuitive Knowledge, *can* and *must* see all these Things at once, needs no such way of thinking, as we are conscious to our selves of. He may be endowed indeed with some Supereminent or Supernatural Power, as I believe all Angels are in different Degrees, to enable him to act in himself *in some such way*, as we exert Thought, nay to act above the reach of our Thoughts by the Power of an Omnipotent Agent, (for what cannot Omnipotence do ?) and we may call this *Thinking* in that Angelic Being, tho' it may be a *Supernatural faculty* given him, above that Power of Thinking, conceived and known to be in Man. But why should I insist any longer on this Head ? Is it not universally own'd that *Body and Soul*, suppos'd to be the *Immaterial Substance* in Man, acts reciprocally one upon the other; that is, the Body, if diseas'd, affects the Soul ; and the Soul again, if troubled, the Body ? Is not this *Action and Passion* according to the strictest Notion of it in Philosophy ? I am sure I think

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think it is, and so shall leave it to the consideration of my Reader, whether *Passion or Patibility*, one Essential attribute belonging to Matter, be not applicable also to *Immaterial Substances*, especially that Imaginary one in Man.

4. *Impenetrability of Dimensions* is another necessary consequential Property belonging to Matter. What I mean by *Impenetrability* I have already explained, and those Properties, or Qualities are call'd *Dimensions* which belong to Quantity, viz, *Longitude, Latitude, and Profoundity* or Depth, every one of them Depending upon Extension. Wherefore He that conceives Body, conceives *Longum, Latum, and Profundum*, but if you Conceive *Substance* (say they) you may Conceive it without any of these Properties, or Qualities belonging to it. How is this possible! If I conceive *Extension*, how can I possibly Conceive it without *Latitude, Longitude or Profundity*? If I do endeavour it, I am sure I must pretend to Conceive it by the *help of those very Ideas, which I before had divested it of*, which amounts to no less than a contradiction even in our thoughts or Conceptions. Again, in the example of *Human*

*man Soul coextended essentially, as some call it, to every part of the Body: How can I conceive Coextension without Extension, how Extension, without Latitude or Longitude, or Profundity? Certain I am never was there such a Riddle Devised as this Notion of Immaterial Substance to perplex Human Understanding with. Dr. Hen. More in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul makes Spirit, and Body to be of two Species, so that they are of one Generical Identity, but that which distinguishes Spirit from Body, is Penetrability, and indiscerpibility. What is meant by Penetrability, I have already defined, but why that Learned Spiritualized Gentleman should add Indiscerpibility to make a Spiritual Nature, I do not well comprehend; unless He means they are such Substances, as close immediately, if Divided by any external force; So indeed doth Water, and Air return to their first Union, if separated by any Solid Body interposing, but yet this is no consequence that they are Spirits; nay, is a Material Atom Discerpible or no? as we cannot conceive a Bulky Substance to Exist without those *prima principia compositionis*, so I am sure we must not call it Spirit, because indiscerpible.*

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discerpible. Besides, if we attribute *Indiscerpibility* to Spirits, it cannot be upon good ground of Reason, but upon meer conjecture, because we know not how it is possible to divide the Substance of an Angel into pieces; neither do we know how to divide the Sun, Moon, and Stars, yet I hope we cannot necessarily therefore conclude them to be *Spirits*. This impossibility of *our knowing a way how to tear them in peices*, is by no means an argument that in their own Natures they are not divisible Substances, tho' by the Power of God they are protected in their existence from being torn in pieces by any Violent force whatever that we know of.

Again, as for *Penetration*, or Penetrability, there are many Bodies which can and do *pierce one another* and not augment the Bulk by their union; as where the Body is Porous, and capable of receiving another into it without Visible Augmentation, or Distension of it. Thus have I seen a Man blow spittle through the solid Substance of a Cane, and Quick-silver, and strong distilled Spirits will penetrate Bones without Augmentation of Bulk.
Bo-

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Bodies Rarified, and Bodies condensed, come not under the same consideration, because those beforementioned preserve their *site and distance* in relation to the places where they are, but these latter do not, so that I think they may be said to have *Penetration*, as much as the Immaterial Substance coextended to every part of the Body. I know here the Philosopher will come on me briskly, and tell me that two Bodies cannot have the same *Longitude, Latitude and Profoundity in the same place at the same time*, tho' a Substance and Body may, for a Body so *penetrating*, as I here express it, will drive out other Bodies, as Air, Water, or the like, from those cavities they now fill, as in Rarified, and condensed Bodies. But Substances so united by *Penetration* have quite different Dimensions, altho' they seem to Occupy one and the same place. All this I readily grant, but then the Question returns, as insolvable as ever. How is it possible for a Man to conceive (for what you tell me I *must* believe, is another thing) that an *Immaterial Substance* by its Penetration doth not do the same, *viz.* extrude some Body, or other, which filled the said Vacuities, if it enter into Body? The Ingenious Mr. *Boyl* hath taught

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taught us, that all Bodies are in some measure or other Porous, insomuch that in solids no *vacuum interspersure* can be allowed; therefore if an *Immaterial Substance* penetrate one of the most solid bodies in the World, I cannot but conceive it (so gross a thinker am I) to fill the Vacuous places by protruding some other tenuious Bodies out of those (never so minute) cavities. For it is no satisfaction to me to hear a Philosopher talk, That it is the Nature of an *Immaterial Substance* (whose very Nature he cannot know) to penetrate Bodies, and retain the same Dimensions with them; which *Material Substances* (whose very Nature he confessedly owns to be as unintelligible, as that of *Immaterial*) cannot, by Reason of their different Extension. All these are but Words of Amusement, if neither I, nor any one else can be capable of forming a right Idea thereof, and it be Doctrine plain above the reach of Human Understanding. He may as well talk to me of a crooked Rectilinear line, or dependent self-subsistency, as to talk of such a Penetration of Substances as he means, unless a repletion of those Vacuities by the Admission of something into those Bodies be likewise conceived.

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It is very fine, I must own to be able to think *nicely*, and *abstractedly* in every Science, but then let no Man think to put an Illusion upon me by endeavouring to put me in a way (as he may call it) to comprehend *Non-sence*, *Absurdities* and *Contradictions*, or be angry, if I publickly own, I am not able to comprehend them by spinning out my Thoughts into the most elaborate fineness imaginable.

5. That *Immaterial Substances* do move in succession of Time and Place, has been denied by abundance of great Learned Men in the World, unless they assume to themselves the clog, or load of *Body*. In a seperate State, say they, these *Immaterial Substances* move as quick as thought, and a Soul if it were not for the clog of the *Body* might move into a fixed Star, as soon as it can Think it self there. Vid. Dr. Nicholls 5th. Conf. with a Theist. It is upon this account these Learned Gentlemen have given that supereminent Property to Angels, that they can move *ab uno extremo ad alterum non pertransito medio*, i, e, (to rant a little in their own Dialect) they can move with the Wings of a Wish, and fly with the Impulse of a thought to the third Heavens
if

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if they please, without passing che Aerial medium at all. I confess this is one of the most refined *Abstractissima Abstractissimarum notio* I ever met with, and He that would convince a Diffident Disciple in the case, ought to have a power to Spiritualize himself first, and then let him try his flight. But seeing I have in the beginning of this Treatise laid it down as a certain undeniable maxime as true as two and two make four, *That a Man cannot comprehend, what he is not able to comprehend, Or, which is the same thing a Man cannot form a Conception above the Reach of his Understanding.* I do averr that a finite Understanding is not able to form such a Conception, For at the same time it thinks of this *Unsuccessive Motion* It must conceive the Distance of space and place to which this *Immaterial Substance* is to pass, and if so, Distance doth necessarily infer Succession. Therefore I think this is sufficient to demonstrate that *Immaterial Substances*, in a state of Separation must move in succession of time and space, be that time and space never so small. But give me leave to ask how doth matter clog an *Immaterial Substance*? what Burden can it lay upon a Substance

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unquantitative? as I may call it, what load can affect an *Impassive Substance*? I profess such Doctrines seem to me to be more the Rants of a Metaphysical Mad-man than dictates of a Wise sober Philosopher. Thus much may serve in this place, and as to this head because I shall have occasion else where, to discourse of the *ævolonivnois* of *Immaterial Substances*.

6. *Insensibility* or *Insensation* is an Attribute of *Material Substance* only, say all the Grave and Refined thinkers of the Nation, so that if it is impossible that any thing but an *Immaterial Substance* should be capable of *Sensation*. This is usually the Ground of these Platonick sayings, *The Soul hears, The soul feels The Soul Tasts smells sees*, all operations of the five senses being centered in the Soul. That worthy learned and indefatigable Scrutator of Antiquity Dr T. Burnet of the Charter-House, speaking of the fallen Angels, *si nulli materiæ uniti fuissent Angeli nullam inde voluptatem aut Perceptionem habuissent*. Archolog. Philosoph. p. 302. seems also to make *sensation* redound on a Spiritual Nature not on matter properly. Therefore when he talks of the Opinions of several of the Fathers of the Church in a-

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nother place in relation to the Corporeity of Angels, he says in excuse for them, *Non id volunt [Patres] Angelos esse corpora, sed habere corpora, ut habent Animæ Humanæ, pag, 302.* So that Matter being in it self *Insensible* may be made the Medium of Sensation. But say I, How is that possible without *Contact*? As I have before observed. For if my Immaterial Substance be affected with pain from a fire, and that pain be communicated by my Body, *mediante corpore*, yet still here is an *Immediate Contact* of the caldified Body to press the *Immaterial Substance* with, and if that burning come immediately from the Fire, or from my Body, it is all one, for it is still *immediately* from *Matter*, which to me seems impossible. How can the particles of Fire divide the *continuity* (from whence pain arises) of a *Non-extended, Discontinuous, Indivisible, and Indiscerpible Substance*? Now Riddle me, Riddle me again: How can any Substance void of Quantity receive Pleasure? *Uniri debent materiæ ut Voluptatem capiant Angeli*, may be a tolerable Surmise, but it requires proof; I am sure, to satisfy a Reader who is inquisitive, whether that Notion we conceive of Angels, assuming Bodies

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(which I shall have Occasion to speak particularly to elsewhere) in order to be Visible, Tangible, &c. be not precarious, and comes under Reg. 6. before mentioned. If Pleasure be meer Thought, and not a real Impression of Particles upon the *sensoria*, yet it cannot be denyed, that those emotions of Pleasure are caused originally from Particles affecting the Body, as a Quantitative Substance capable of receiving those Impressions from the Objects, whereby that Imaginary Substance, divested of all Matter, is excited to embrace the Pleasurable Object, or *Objectum delectabile*, so that the same difficulty recurs still, about the *conceiveableness* by Human Understanding, how an Immaterial Substance can be moved, or excited into the Desire of a delectable Object. But more of this in the following Paragraphs.

7. And lastly, The Notion of an *Immaterial Substance* being the object of our Senses, has been discarded by all the learned in all Ages, since Philosophy was taught in the World, I mean *directly and Per se*, as the Phrase is, but we may conceive it united to a *Body*,
or

or it may converse with us by the *Assumption of Human Body*, be Tangible, Visible, &c. and not otherwise. This we do confess and own forsooth, because *Body* cannot move it self, nor has it an *Autokinesy*, or self Motion apparently to us, yet doth See, Feel or Touch, Taste, (as Angels have eaten) &c. Therefore we wrap this Insensible Body round about, Outside and Inside with a *Spirit* (else we could not well Answer for the Sense of feeling in every part) or else we plant an *Imaginary Spirit* in the Body, or some particular part of it, which like a Porter to a House, hears every little Impulse of any Object whatever, and judges whether it be fit to be received under Covert of the *House of Clay* (as the Apostle calls *Mortal Bodies*) as grateful, and acceptable to the whole *Syltasis* of Man, or rejected as a troublesome Guest. This is the whole series of it, and one would think the most Grave Reader imaginable would cry, — *Quis talia fando, Temperet a Risu?* — How am I sure, or can be, if I see any thing move it self, as it seems to me to do, that a *Spirit* moves it, seeing none of my Senses are, or can be Judges of the Existence of this Spirit? May not

an Artificer by his Skill make a *movent Engine* (for a time at least, as one did an Eagle to *Maximilian* the Emperor) and I at the same time apprehend it Self-movent: Therefore I would gladly know how I shall pass a Judgment; if *an Angel touch my Lips*, whether that Angel assum'd the Corporeity of an Hand to do it, or no. I saw it was an Angel, I saw him move, was sensible of the Touch, yet I must renounce all these Evidences of Sense, and tell the World, that it was only an assumed Body that *I saw and touched me*. Sure I am, the very strickest Doctrine in all the Papal Systems, never taught us such a *positive abandoning and dereliction of the evidence of our senses*, as this doth, and that without Grounds, or any Contest in relation to a Matter of Faith. For *Zanchy* in his Dispute about the Nature of Angels, says, *Certum est ex ijs quæ scripturæ tradunt de Angelis probabiliorem esse Patrum sententiam [qui corporeos asseruerunt] quam scholasticorum; Utrum tamen sequaris, non multum peccaveris, nec propterea inter Hæreticos haberi poteris*. This I find recited by *Mr. Webster* Chap. 10. in his display of Witchcraft, and should insist longer on it in this Place, but that I shall

shall have more Occasion elsewhere to treat of Angels, as conceived to be *Immaterial Substances*,

Thus I have gon through the Principal parts of all those Affections that belong to Matter, and having strip'd and disrobed it of those *Gross Attributes*, or Proprieties which must be Incompatible with an *Immaterial Substance*, I give you this Description of it, ——— Conceive it existing if you can ——— That it is an *Unextended, Indivisible, Impassive, Penetrable, Sole-Sensible, Invisible, Untangible, Non-Locomotive in succession of Time or Place, Independent Entity. Bone Deus, in quæ Tempora reservamur*, who do and will believe this Notion of *Immaterial Substance*, to be comprehensible by a Rational Nature? All these very Notions or Ideas we conceive by, if we will rightly conceive a thing to exist, are as Mediums to direct us how to judge of the Existence of any Being; yet we are told, we must first empty our selves of them before we can apprehend what *Immaterial Substance* is. What a strange Method of Argumentation do even most of the Soberest and most Judicious Part of the World comply to? Upon this ac-

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count. The Rank of *Immaterial Substances* are reducible to four Classes, as they say,

1. God is an *Immaterial Substance* in the highest Degree, void of all Affections belonging to Matter.
2. Angels in the next Degree, and Spirits, be they Powers, Thrones, or Dominions, &c. are *Immaterial Substances*.
3. The Devil, and all Evil Angels, or Infernal Spirits, are *Immaterial Substances*. ———
4. Human Souls, if conjoyn'd to Bodies, or separate, are *Immaterial Substances*: and till this Age, I thought the lowest in Degree of Opinions. But because I will gratifie some curious Virtuoso's, I will add something about the,
5. *Immaterial Substances* of Brutes, falsely so called and imagined to be.

Having laid down these Heads of Discourse, in Order to make Good the two Grand and Principle Propositions, I first
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mentioned ; after I have explained what is generally meant by the Word *Substance*, and what by *Immaterial*, I will proceed in my intended Method from the Grounds of *Solid Reason and Divine Philosophy*: i. e. from those Notions of Things, and of their Natures, which are suggested to me from the *Holy Scriptures*, or rightly deducible from them, to make good the proof of my Assertions. For barring Divine Revelation, we cannot have any true Idea of the Nature of *God, Angels or Demons*, and but little glimmerings of Light from *it* neither, that we may depend upon. Would I indeed recur to the various *Qualitys and Qualifications* ascribed by the Heathens to their Gods, and Demons, sometimes plainly taught, sometimes wrapt up in mystical Mythology, it would make perhaps a tolerable Romance, but not be a Ground Work for a Rational Argumentation. Therefore I shall set them aside upon the verity of this *maxime*, *That where Philosophy, (or School-divinity) cannot be reconciled to solid Reason and the Holy Scriptures, it ought to be totally rejected; or, if it seem dubious, to be so interpreted, as may suit best with the intent and meaning of the Holy Scriptures, and not the*

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Scriptures to be wrested so, as to be made conform to either.

The first Notion I ought to explain, in relation to the better comprehending my Discourse, is that of *Substance*, which *Aristotle* defines to be *Ens per se subsistens & substantia Accidentibus*, i. e. A Being subsisting by it self and sustaining Accidents, That is, such a Being, as is independent in respect of its existence of all other Beings, but God, and which has always some Accidents or Properties belonging to it, which it sustains. This last clause is added because the *Aristotelians* had a notion of *real inhaerent Accidents*, as well as *Denominations*, belonging to every Substance, which our late Philosophers have questioned. However I think it such a nicety of dispute not fit here to enter on, but I shall only say, that this seems to be one of the best Notions of *Substance*, I have met with, at least, that at present occurs to my Mind.

Another definition of *Guess* is brought by the Reverend Mr. Broughton in his *Psychologia*, viz. That, to us, unknown Nature, upon which all that we know of
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the Nature of any Thing, depends as to its Being: And what is, as to its Essence in General, Independant of every thing but God. This seems to be such a Metaphysical complex of Words, that if a Definition was meant by it, it ought to have been Definiti explicatio but I much doubt whether any Body can unfold its meaning, whether it relates to substance or not, but more of this elsewhere.

A Third Definition is that of the *Democritical Tribe*, or Atomists, deducible from the writings of those Gross-Thinking fellows of the World, who can never be brought to strip Matter of its due and genuine cloathing, as Extension Divisibility &c. This Substance is a *Complex, or Congeries of Indivisible Atomes united together by Motion or Rest, and their various configurations.* These men I believe may be made good Rational Philosophers, with a little Divinity super-added to them, and recurring sometimes to the *Power of God*, which perhaps *Leucippus* or *Democritus* never would, to explain some Phænomena's in Nature: and this must be done in all the Christian Philosophy in the World; and that is only the best Philosophy which
can

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can shape out; and give the most probable Reasons for its foundation, by the Power of Humane Understanding; yet there are in every scheme of Philosophy whatever, some considerable Difficulties which are not resolvable but by the Power of an Omnipotent Agent. Therefore say I to the Inquisitive Virtuoso, That God made at the Original Creation, Atomes of several figures, unible by Motion or Rest, and their own figure conjoyn'd, by which all visible Material Substances are made or composed. For altho' it may be urged that the first material Atom, being as much Substance as a whole Bulk, and consequently must be as divisible as the whole Bulk it self. All this I readily Grant in the Nature of the thing to be true, but there are Atomes out of the Power of Man to divide, and that is sufficient: For when you speak of *Immaterial Substance* as reduced to the four Classes abovementioned, it falls not under the consideration of the Nature of the first Atom, That relating only to the Composition of Material; But I think *Substance in General* rightly enough defined, as above, even in relation to an *Immaterial One* also, excepting the Word *Atom*, for indivisible something must also

also make up the Nature of an Immaterial, as much as Atomes a Material Substance, as I before have hinted at.

Another notion of Substance is taken from the judicious Dr. *Glisson*, who with his Master *Suarinus* is not pleas'd with the *Perseitas* as its fundamental, or Essential Distinction, but returns to the *Subsistentia modalis & fundamentalis* &c. what this Gentleman means by His metaphysical Division of Substance, and his frequent attempt to prove *supposita* the Principle of individuation, and his asserting *Omnes Substantias vivere* p. 217. *De Substantiæ vi energetica* and the like, will be too tedious a task in this little Treatise to unravel. Only thus much I shall here observe from his opinion. That it will give me some light into that Philosophical Doctrine, I shall hereafter insist on viz. *That All Substance, or Materia Informata has in it a Principle of self-motion, and would always exert it self, did not the Almighty restrain it to Preserve the Due frame and order of the Universe.* His short proof is this—— pag. 230.——

Quic-

*Quicquid naturaliter operatur per idem
Principium operatur per quod est.*

*At omnis substantia proprie dicta per In-
ternum principium est.*

*Ergo per Internum Principium opera-
tur — Et consequentèr per Idem move-
tur.*

But more of this elsewhere. What he asserts in relation to *Substance*, as *material*, seems to be included in the Word *Moles quod rem duram et gravem, difficultèr mobilem insinuabit* p. 390 as if *Substance* and *Weight* were the same, and *Grávyty* the specific Difference of all material Substances. And this supported by a new coined Distinction of *Extensio Spiritualis & Materialis quarum prima nihil aliud est, nisi presentia Spiritus quassum Ubi occupat.* pag. 396. What sort of Metaphysical Notions these are, and how manifestly erroneous, I could easily show, if it were here requisite. But by *extensio spiritualis*, meaning no more than the *Presence* of a thing in its *Ubi*, you may guess the rest. Hereupon, saith he, cap. 27. p. 379 I assign
A two-fold difference between the Substance
of

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of Matter and that of Spirits. The first is taken a Substantiali mole Materiæ, from the substantial heap, or weight of the Matter which is denied to Spirits. And the sign of this weight is from its condensation, or rarefaction, or to use his Words, if Matter be duplicated, triplicated or centuplicated, it will be made more dense, twofold, threefold, or hundred fold. But they are both of a Finite Extension, only Spirits, if so contracted, or dilated are not made more dense and rare, but Bodies are. This is the Summary or Abstract of what he conceives to be the Difference between Body and Spirit, and very ingeniously formed too, if there was as much Reason as there are Words, to explain the difference by. If by *Moles*, he mean Gravity, he may be right enough in a relative Sense, i. e. Spirits are less heavy, than Matter (because Gravity, and Levity are relative Terms between Bodies) but that doth not infer but that they may be Matter, and consequently no *Immaterial Substances*. Again, if any thing be condensed, it occupies visibly a lesser space than it did, and if Rarified, a greater; now altho' this learned Gentleman has spun the Cobweb verry fine, yet I would have it visible at least to the Eyes of our Understanding,
for

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for to conceive a Substance more expanded than before, and then again more contracted, and yet not to occupy a greater or lesser space, is in my Opinion an Idea, or Conception out of the reach of Human Understanding, because it involves in it an *uncondens'd condens'd*, or a *rarified condens'd Substance*, in as much as it is conceived to occupy no greater or lesser space, rarified, or condens'd, so that altho' it cannot attain to *Infinite magnitude*, or *Infinite Minuteness* by its Power, (as he agrees well with me) yet that Expansion of parts cannot be conceived possible without the same Idea we have of Rarefaction, and by consequence a *Moles Substantialis* must attend every Substance whatever.

The next Notion I am to explain in relation to Substance, if I can, is *Immaterial*. And that is usually stated to be twofold. 1. A thing is said to be *Immaterial* in as much as it is not compounded of Matter, but divested of all those proprieties above mentioned that necessarily accompany Matter. 2. A thing is said to be *Immaterial* which doth depend on Matter for its Being, Make, or Operations, but in its composition

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sition hath nothing of Matter in it. The former of these significations relate, as we are told, to *Spirits and Human Souls*, and is the Genuine Sense of the Word here meant; the latter to *Brutish Souls*, and all forms and the like. In the former Sense then we mean the *Immateriality of a Substance*, because it is of an Independant existence in a State of separation, which Forms are not, except the Rational Soul, the form of Man, as some will say. These Explanations at first sight may seem well enough, but when we come to examine into them, we find at the first Step a gross Error in Philosophy maintained, to uphold the Notion of Spirit by, *viz. A Negative Definition: Definitio non debet esse Negativa*, says the Philosopher: And the reason of this Axiom is plain, because a *Definition* is accounted an Explanation of the Thing defined; now he that attempts to explain any Thing by Negatives, tells me not *what it is*, but *what it is not*, by which I am left in the dark, almost as much as ever, nay I am sure in the particular I must be, tho' perhaps a little enlightened in the General. *v. g.* A Mountain is not Fire, a Tree is not a Horse, &c. Now what do I learn by this, concerning

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ing the Nature of a Mountain, or a Tree? Even just nothing at all to the purpose, only to be sure and cautious, that if I have Occasion to *Define* what a Mountain or Fire is, not to call the one a Tree, and the other a Horse, neither of which can satisfy even a Modest Inquisitor.

Having premised this in General, in relation to *Immaterial Substance*, I come now to examine whether, 1. *God Almighty* may be properly, and according to the Doctrine of Christianity, called an *Immaterial Substance*, or no. I must confess and own that the Notion of it seems so Incomprehensible by Human Understanding, as were there not some other Reasons moving me to think the contrary, I could think it the most proper Idea for the Godhead, and no Being else in the World, because he is in his Nature Incomprehensible. But because I have here attempted by way of Essay, to find out a *Positive Nature* more suitable to the Godhead by the Rules of Divine Philosophy, than what I have met with from the Heathen Philosophers, I shall presume to assert,

I. That

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1. That a *Negative Nature* is not the Proper Idea we ought to have of God, if it be not conform to all those Divine attributes we give him.
2. That a *Positive Nature* tho' inexplicable by Human Reason as to its self-subsistency, is a more Rational Idea of God.
3. Therefore God Cannot in the Christian Philosophy be called an *Immaterial Substance*.

But say you, *so Great, so Immense, so Super-eminent* are the Perfections of God Almighty, that it is not in the Power of a finite Understanding to comprehend the Nature of the Godhead otherwise, and therefore Mankind is forced to use Negatives to explain his Nature by, By divesting Him of all those Imperfections that necessarily we find incident to Things in this visible Universe.

This I own to be one Good, Substantial Reason, why we should use *Negatives* in Endeavouring to describe the Nature of God, but then our Inquisition ought in my Opinion to go farther, and search if there be not some *Positive Nature* which may

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suit better with that Idea we conceive of God, because *not to be this, or that, or the other Thing*, answers but in part, and leaves us to no conclusion, *what God is then, if he be not That we imagine*, i. e. what Idea occurs to us of the Godhead after we have strip'd him of those Imperfections which belong to *Material Substances*. Why then, say you, he is an *Immaterial Substance*. To which I answered, No; He is an *Immaterial, Indivisible, Infinite, Immense, Indivisible, (or simple) Immortal, Immutable, &c. Being*, but not *Substance*; for this likewise, in my opinion, argues as much an Imperfection in the Divine Nature, according to the Idea or Conceptions Human Understanding is capable of forming to it self, of the Notion of a God, and as much Derogatory to his Essence as any other doth. I grant withal my heart that these *Negations* ought to be used in our attempt to comprehend the Divine Nature, but what then? Is there not something *Positive* that will remain when these Imperfections of Matter or Body, are laid aside? Yes, *Substance divested of all Extension, Divisibility, Patibility, Local-motion &c.* This I could readily assent to, were it possible for Human Understanding

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ing to form any Idea of the existence of such an *Independent, Self-subsistent Being*, but that I think, I have already proved not only impossible as to the *Modus existendi*, but as to the very existence it self. And I am verily perswaded, that as God has in some cases given Man the Evidence of his Senses to be guided by, So has he not concealed the Conception of his own Existence from Human Understanding, tho' as to the *Modus* of his existing, it is utterly impossible to find it out. Tho' our understandings be finite, yet I must believe that God has not sent a *strong Delusion on all Mankind to believe a Lye*, as I may call it, that is such a Nature to belong to the Godhead, as is utterly inconsistent with the Divine Attributes we assign him; For this indeed would be to require us to Adore, and Believe a God and no God; As

1. *Infinity* is something that hath no Bounds, nor is circumscribed by any limits; suppose those limits to be, as *Thomas Aquinas* phrases it, either *Termini locales* or *Essentiales*, which He asserts properly to belong to Spirits. Now I say the Idea of *Substance* must contain in it certain limits or Boundaries

daries, and it is as impossible to conceive an *infinite Extended Substance*, tho' by *Entitative Extension*, as it is to conceive the Greatest Contradictions imaginable true. For it doth result in words to thus much, An *Interminated or Unbounded, Circumscribed Being*.

2. As *Infinity* is one of those Divine Attributes applicable only to God, tho' a *Negative* one, so there is another attribute which seems to come near the very *Positive Essence* of him *i. e.* his *Omnipræsence*. What Idea can possibly Man form of an *Omnipresent Substance*? I mean, by his *Essence*, as is usually agreed on, not barely by his *Power* present in every place at the same minute of Time? I do not here make a Question about the *Modus* of God being present Every where at the same time, But how is it possible for us to conceive or believe *Substance* to be *Omnipresent* as to its Self-subsistence in every place? There is a great difference between saying *God is Omnipresent by his Power*, and *Essentially Omnipresent*, but when we conjoin *Omnipresence with Substance*, it implies as great a Contradiction

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as the former. Now had reveal'd Religion taught me that God was an *Immaterial Substance*, as Philosophers had defined *Substance*, I should have submitted my Reason to my Faith, and believed it True. But finding the Holy Writ, as Dr. T. Burnet observes, *Archæol. Philos.* to be often penned, not *Philosophically*, but *ad Captum Humanum*, to instruct us in good Rules, to perform Obedience to God, to prescribe us Methods by which we may attain Everlasting Happiness hereafter, &c. It is in many Places forced in Style to Descend to our Capacities, and talk of God, as if he was a *Personal Substance*, as having an Arm, Gen. 49. 24. Eyes, 2 Chron. 16. 9. Feet, Psal. 110. 1. A Mouth, Jer. 9. 12. A Nose, Jer. 25. 32. Nostrils, Gen. 8. 21. &c. But by all this is expressed only an Infinite Condescension to us poor Ignorant Mortals, who are not able to form any other Idea of Him by the Power of Natural Reason.

3. Had that Idea of *Substance* been warrantable by the Holy Scriptures, as the Essence of God joyn'd with *Immateriality*, &c. The Jews, tho' blamable

for Idolatry, yet at least were not so reprovable so conclusively by the Arguments of Moses, and the Prophet Isaiah, for their Idolatry in erecting a Substance to be Worshipped, as otherwise they would have been. *To whom will ye liken God?* says the Prophet, cap. 4. v. 18. *Or what likeness will ye compare unto him?* Which is explained Acts 17. 29. *God is not like unto Gold, Silver, or Stones graven by Art or Mans Device.* And Moses says, *Ye saw no similitude, only you heard a Voice,* Deut. 4. 12. Now it is plain that stupid Generation of Mankind went and made themselves a Molten Calf in Horeb, and bowed down to it as to a God, and I believe they brought with them that Relick of Idolatry from Ægypt, who Worshipped the God Apis in the form of a Bull. Nevertheless they set up a Carved Substance, or Image to be Worshipped, and the Primitive Christians were ridicul'd by Heathens because, as they imagined.

Nil præter Nubes, & Cæli Numen adorent.

That is, they Worshipped, as those Idolators thought, nothing but the Clouds

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Clouds and an Imaginary Deity, So that both Jews and Heathens by forming to themselves a *Material Substance*, (for the Jews I dare swear never dream't of an *Immaterial* one) to be adored, were guilty of Folly and Idolatry at once, by carving out a God into any Similitude of Man, or any Creature else. 'Therefore *Moses* might expostulate, 'in such a manner: Why are ye so stupid 'to make a Representation of God by an 'Image carved from Wood, or Stone? Ye 'are in a very strange Error to make a Sub- 'stantial Image of him, whom the *Hea- 'ven of Heavens cannot contain*, much less 'the narrow boundaries of a Temple. 'Besides, why will ye make it, as if you 'could imitate the likeness of God? It 'must be a great Folly as well as a great 'Sin to do it, seeing you saw no *Similitude of God, but only you heard a Voice*. Go 'make the Similitude of a Voice, and ye 'may do it as soon as the Representation 'of the Immense Deity. A Substance 'with Form indeed, is that you apprehend 'God to be, but suppose he were a Sub- 'stance, what true Representation by the 'form can you make of that you never 'saw? I know ye to be an ignorant Peo- 'ple, and so I Use Words and Expressions

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'adapted to your Capacity, and therefore
 'tell you, that God has Feet, Hands, Eyes,
 ' &c. but yet you ought not to have such
 ' real Notions, or Ideas of God, nor would
 ' I consent you should Embrace these, but
 ' for the Weakness of your Understand-
 ' ings, and if you but abstain from Idola-
 ' try and Worship only the true God,
 ' this your Ignorance I'll Pardon ye. That
 this is the probable meaning of *Moses*, may
 be conjectured from the very Text above
 mentioned, *Acts 17*. Because on the
 same Account the Apostle says v. 30. *At*
the times of this Ignorance God winked.
 And Dr. T. Burnet says, *Operæ pretium*
fuisse Mose, aut dignum munere Prophetæ
aut Legislatoris has minutias Philosophicas
exponere Populo? Quinetiam surdis suis
cecinisset suam Philosophiam; neque enim
hi laterum doctores, spirantes adhuc Cæpe, &
Porum Ægyptiacum. Qui vitulum fusi-
lem a Deo Opt. Max. discernere non potue-
runt, potuissent unquam prima Dei Opera,
rerum principia, Leges & Motus Naturæ
recognoscere & ad veritatis normam exigere.
Asini ad lyram. Archæolog. Philos. pag.
 320. So that if any where Substance
 in Scripture, seems to be expressed in re-
 lation to the Nature, or Essence of
 God, it can mean no more, than to be an

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an expression adapted to the Weakness of our Understandings, for the better explaining the Use and End, and not the Philosophical meaning, of Christian Doctrines, which is now the Subject of this Discourse. Thus have I traced this Argument conform to Reg. i. and also a certain Rule mentioned in the beginning of this Discourse, *That Philosophy ought to be made conform to the Holy Scriptures,* and not, &c. Well, says my Adversary, what better Notion of the Essence of God do you give us to denote any *Positive Being*, seeing you reject that of *Substance*, as incompatible, and inconsistent with some of the principal Divine Attributes. If you are able to find out a better Ground upon Divine Revelation, I think the learned World will be obliged to you. But seeing his very Nature is incomprehensible, so I presume it impossible for you to define what it is.

This I grant, but I tell you and prove it too (in your way of Negation) that God cannot be an *Immaterial Substance*, which is the whole Design and Foundation of this Argumentation. So I can tell you, what *He is not*, tho' I may perhaps fail in Explaining to you what *He is*.

And

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And this before Hand I know I must fail in, if I pretend to give the World an *Adequate Idea* of the Essence of God, but I may upon better Grounds than all the Philosophick Learning in the World say,

God is a Spirit, *John 4. 24.* And they that worship him must worship him in spirit and truth. —

‘ That is, says the learned Dr. Hammond, God is especially delighted with
 ‘ their Christian Worship, which is
 ‘ taught to joyn the Soul (call’d the
 ‘ whole Affections *Matt. 22. 37*) with
 ‘ external performances, and to Worship
 ‘ the true God, now revealed by Christ,
 ‘ after that manner Christ revealed him.
 But if you take *Spirit* here from the
 Analogy of Nature, what an odd Explication must this Text bear, *v. 12. to worship God in Immateriality, because God is Immaterial*: No, they that Worship him, must Worship him with Zeal, Fervency, Purity and Piety; vid. Annor-on, 5. *Luke 9. 55.* which are Powers, Energies, or Virtues flowing from Living Man.

Here

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Here on my Word your Authority is Good, says the *Immaterialist*, but then, it is the same, as *Immaterial Substances*, or else you must tell us some other Notion, than what we commonly receive, of *Spirit*, and what you mean by it. And this is but reasonable, say I, and therefore I define *Spirit* by *Negatives* in Relation to God (as I hope you'll allow me the same Liberty you have) if it may be call'd a Definition, *some Being which has neither Flesh nor Bones*. According to St. *Luke* Chap. 24. 39. and *Isaiah* 31. 3. Now no Man can Imagine but that whoever attempts to discover the Nature of a *Spirit*, must unavoidably not call it *Flesh and Bones*, but he may assign it to be any thing else, provided it suit with the general Scriptural Sense and Operations of *Spirit*. Whereupon I take *Spirit* to signify no more than *Power*, and therefore I Describe God in Relation to these Attributes call'd Essential and Absolute. An Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent, *Power*, or *Spirit*, which is the same thing.

How can that be? Can any Power be *self-subsistent*, which ought as much to make up a Part of the Definition, as those

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Attributes you here named ? Sure God cannot be an Accident as the Word *Power* implies ; this is an High Derogation indeed to form the Notion of a God dependent on some subject or other, as *Power* must be. To which I answer ;

1 That what I pretend to prove is not the *Subsistence* of God Almighty according to *Aristotle's* Notion of *Substance*, nor is it reasonable I should be obliged to prove it. Because, 1. *Aristotle*, as an Heathen, had not that Idea of God which the Scriptures reveal to us. 2. His division of all things into Substance and accidents, ought to be restrain'd to all *Created Beings* only, and not to God, of whose Nature He was totally ignorant. 3. Neither is his division adequate in respect even of all *Created Beings*, as might be proved if occasion required. Therefore I shall think it a satisfactory Answer enough to say, 1. God is a *Self-subsistent* or *Independent Power* without calling it a *substantial* Self-subsistency. And I take it to be proper, when I am to explain the Nature of an *Omnipresent Being*, which has an *Essential Ubiquity* in Heaven, in Earth, and under the Earth, nay in Hell also, appositely expressed by *David*,
Psalms

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Psalms 129. to shew where the Omnipotent Power Reigns, essentially, and called *Spirit* by him. *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? and whither shall I go from thy Presence? If I ascend up into Heaven thou art there, if I make my Bed in Hell thou art there.* v. 9. 8. Now this *Essential Ubiquity* being Incompatible and inconsistent with a *Substance*, and not with *Power*, we may safely conclude, and believe its Existence, to be in such a manner as is conform and suitable to Omnipresence, tho' it come not up to our Idea of *Self-subsistence*, as Philosophers apprehend it.

2. Because nothing in the World can create in us a more adequate, tho' not a perfect perhaps, Notion of the God-head, than *Power* doth, to denote his Nature, even according to the very Rules of Reason, notwithstanding we shou'd be totally ignorant of the *Modus existendi* of that *Power*. For our very Senses and Reason tell us that in all Sublunary Beings, there is a *Latent Power*, which preserves them in their Existence, and by a continued Series of Generation, Vegetation supplys the Decrease of all Substantial Beings in the World, in divers Forms, Figures and Motions, for which you, nor I, or any Man whatever,

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ever, can give a rational full and satisfactory Account, *v. g.* Why Man generates the exact Figure and Proportion of a Man, or a Brute of a Brute? What should create these Forms in the *Semen*, and noother? Why Flowers grow with party coloured Leaves, or Trees, bear a specific or proper Fruit always, or the like: This Power Philosophers truly call the *Power of God acting by secondary Causes*, and as it flows by his Almighty Determination from his own Immense Essential *Fountainous Power*, (to use a Chaldaic Philosophic Word) and acts on all *super-mundane, medio-mundane, & In-fra-mundane* Beings, to continue them in their primitive created Occupation, may be called the *Ordinary Power of God*, whose Existence is as plain, and asevident, as any thing of such Nature can possibly be, nay the whole Series of the Universe, as well of Animate, as Inanimate Beings, are an evident Demonstration of the Existence of this *Power* from the first Creation. But

3. There is another Branch of the same *Immense Power* which is justly called the *Extraordinary Power*, or *Spirit of God*, and this may be termed so

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Kar' ἐξοίω, when he doth more immediately, and for Reasons best known to himself, out of his unexhaustible Fountain of Power communicate himself, as it were, to his Creatures. This is called in Scripture frequently the Spirit of God, as *Numb. 11. v. 17. I will come down* (saith the Lord to Moses) *and talk with thee there; and I will take of the Spirit* (or Divine Extraordinary Power) *which is upon thee, and will put it upon them* [the Elders] *and they shall bear the burden with thee.* So *v. 25th the Lord took of the Spirit that was upon Moses; and again would the Lord would put his Spirit, or Power of wisdom,* (as I may more fitly render it, *Uim seu virtutem sapientie*) *on all his People. v. 29. and it rested upon them v. 26. Such Power is call'd the spirit of wisdom, Exod. 31. v. 3. By such a Spirit, or Wise Power he garnished the Heavens, Job 16. v. 13. By such a Spirit or Power he renews the Face of the Earth, Psal. 184. v. 30. So in divers other Places, as if the Holy Scriptures had pointed out to us the very intrinsive Nature of God by an Omnipotence. By this Extraordinary power Elijah, ascended to Heaven, the Angel did the same which appeared to Manoah, Miracles are wrought,*
and

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and the whole Frame of the Universe shaken to pieces, if the Almighty Power of Powers please to exert it self. This supernatural and Extraordinary Power, as if one was exegetical of the other, is frequently conjoyn'd with Spirit in Scripture, as *John* the Baptist shall go before our Saviour in the Spirit, and power of *Elias*, Luke 1: v. 17. Jesus returned by the power of the spirit, Holy Ghost, as God, or Power of Powers into *Galilee*, Luke 4: v. 14. So Rom. 1. 4. I declared Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, with power according to the spirit of Holiness. This is that Power which is called the *Inspiration of the Holy Ghost*, and the *Gift of Inspiration*, &c. but more of this elsewhere.

4. As it is evidently plain from Scripture and Reason that God's essence consists properly in *Omnipotence*, so doth this Notion best suit with all the Attributes both *Negative* and *Positive*; Absolute, and Relative, which are usually attributed to God, who only is *strictly* and *properly* an *Invisible*, *Incorporeal*, *Infinite*, *Immutable*, *Immortal*, *Immenſe*, *Indivisible*, or *simple Spirit*, or *Power* in his own Nature, and Essence

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sence, and all other Created Beings else but **Comparatively Spiritual, &c. Powers,** so called in Relation to the more or less proportion of that *Supereminent Divine Power* they are endowed with by and from God, as St. Bernard well observeth, *Serm. 6. super Cant. As we render unto God alone true Immortality, so also Incorporeity, because he alone doth so far transcend the Universal Corporeal Nature of Spirits, That he doth not stand in need of any Body whatsoever in any Operation, being content with a Spiritual Mode [or Motion] as it were when he will to perform whatsoever he pleaseth.*

— And a little after adds — *By which Omnipotent Will He is immediately present at every Work* — This concurs so plainly with the Notion of an Omniscient, Omnipotent Power, That scarce any thing can be plainer, besides his Attestation of the *Supereminent Divine Spirit of God*, by which all other Spirits are but relatively *Spiritual*. Thus again *Damascen. lib. 5. Angeli quantum ad nos dicuntur Incorporei & Imateriales, sed Deo comparati sunt Materiales & Corporei.* But of the corporeity of Angels in its due place, and I shall only conclude here, what I propos'd to prove, That, no Idea

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of God is so Genuine and Comprehensible by Human Understanding, so truly apposite or adapted to his Divine Nature, as Power, both in respect of his Absolute, as well as Relative Attributes, his Negative as well as Positive Essence, as I presume to call it. How our Saviour came to add the Reason — *I am not Spirit, feel and handle me.* I will examine hereafter, because I take that Reason to relate only to *created Spirits*, or spiritualiz'd Bodies as the vulgar Jews then apprehended them to appear, and in peculiar Forms to exist.

But still I know I shall be pressed to tell, *what this Power is made of*, I speak according to the manner of Men by Reason of our Infirmitys, *i. e.* In what consists the Original composition, as it were, of this Power? So I am forced to express my self to be understood. What is that Power? Is it *Substance*, or *Accident*, or what? These will be the Questions, I know, demanded. To which I answer. That it is enough for me, that I state a *Comprehensible Idea* of the Existence of God, which involves in it no Contradictory Nature in its Conception, nor derogatory to other the
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Divine Attributes justly due to him : Which I have proved evidently, I presume, that that Nation of Immaterial Substance in most points doth. Therefore I think it no reasonable Question to demand of a finite Understanding what that Eternal, Omniscient and Omnipresent Power is made of? I have proved it demonstratively to exist, and that I aver it is impossible for my Adversary to prove *Immaterial Substance* to do so. Besides it not only includes a congruity between those *Negative attributes*, as *Infinity, Immensity, &c.* but also denotes a *Positive Nature* of God, applicable to such his Attributes, viz. To his *Æternity, Omniscience, and Omnipræsence*, those specific differences (as they may be call'd) of the Divine Nature. Nor have I less Warrant from Reason than Religion ; It being my Faith to believe *That God is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him*, Heb. ii. v. 6. And it is not required that I should give an Account, *What he is made of*, it's sufficient to me to know, that he is that *Spirit, or Power, in whom, and by whom, we Live, Move, and have our Being*, Acts 17. v. 28, and that there are manifest derived Powers from the supream Power of

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all. *The Spirit of the Living God*, 2. Cor. 3. 3. As therefore the $\tau\omicron\delta\ \delta\pi\epsilon\varsigma\iota$ is sufficient, to satisfy all reasonable disquisitions about the Nature of God, of those who require us to explain what we mean by *God*, and call it *Non-sence* to say he is an *Immaterial Substance*; so still must the *Modus Existendi* of that Divine Nature, be as inscrutable, and as *Mysterious* as ever. And it is as much impossible for Human Reason to comprehend the *Essence* of God, as to the *quo modo sit*, as it is for me to darken the Sun by the Breath of my Nostrils, or fathom the beginning of *Æternity*. The first *Absolute*, or *Positive Attribute* of God, I intend to prove *Adæquate* in our Conceptions to the Notion of Power. As,

- I. That Power must have no Beginning or Ending, which is the same Thing as *Æternal*, must be highly consonant to Reason, because if ever any Thing doth, or shall exist, Power must necessarily antecedently exist, to produce it, and therefore Power must be *Coævous* with God *ab origine* if the Word *Eternal* can bear such an Expression, however I speak according
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to the Weakness of Human capacity, in such Words as may discover my meaning, tho' not attain to a true Propriety of Speech, as indeed I think it impossible by Words to tell what Eternity is. Now if we compare the Notion of Substance, and its *Self-subsistency*, its plainly Subsequent to Power, because nothing can have Subsistence, but Power must be antecedent to make it Subsist. Again, That God is an *Eternal Power* according to the Tenour of the Holy Scriptures, and never styled *Eternal Substance*, I hope I need not be put to prove in a Christian Commonwealth.

2. This Idea or, Notion of Power better suits with that Attribute of Omniscience, than Immaterial Substance can possibly do; Our Knowledge is here such, as *that we see thro' a Glass darkly, we know but in part*, as the Apostle says, 1 Cor. 13. 12. All the Ideas of Things are communicated to us very imperfectly, and the only main proof of our Knowledge seems to be demonstrated from a sceptical Principle, *Scio, quia scio me nihil scire*. A frank acknowledgment of our g-

norance, especially in prying into such Myſterious Truths, is the beſt Demonſtration of our Knowledge. Now as in us, *Knowledge is a kind of a Collection of ſeveral Ideas of things repreſented to us by their Cauſes, or Effects*, it ſeems naturally enough to infer, that theſe Representations, of things be terminated in ſome *Subſtance*, or other, which is too narrow a comprehension of an Infinite, Omnipreſent Nature. But *Power* may be conceived as Infinite, and as interminate in its Original, as it is unconceivable in its diffuſiveness: *Power* in general has *Ubiquity* conceivable, but *Subſtance* never had, or can. But what will you ſay to *Omnſcience*, replies my *Antagoniſt*, whoſe Knowledge wants not to pry into Cauſes, and Effects, but it ſees with the Eye of Providence into the moſt Secret Reſſes of Nature at once, knows at firſt view (*Humano more loquor*) the moſt myſterious, and unconceivable things by Men or Angels? &c. *And why may not an Immaterial Subſtance do this?*

Anſw.

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Answ. Because tho' it may be possible for God to do, (as you only think, not prove) it is impossible for Man to conceive any *Substance* whatever able to do, for the Reasons above mentioned. God's *Essential* presence cannot be limited to the narrow Bounds of *Substance*, and if he be conceived as such, He must, in our weak apprehension have his *Knowledge* of Sublunary things either communicated to him by his Angels, which argues Imperfection in the God-head, or not be essentially present with Things, which argues a greater. Therefore *Omniscient Knowledge* is incompatible and inconsistent with *Substance*. *Wisdom, Knowledge, Mercy, Goodness, Holiness, &c.* are but relative *Powers* flowing from the *Fountainous Power* of All, God himself; and in the Scripture style they are therefore called, the *Spirit of Wisdom, and Understanding, of Holiness, a Merciful Spirit, and a Good Spirit, &c.* And we judging by our own *Knowledge, Mercy, &c.* what these *Powers* are, attribute the same in the highest degree, relatively to God Almighty, not as *Essential* parts, as I may call it, of his

Divine Nature, so that these relative Attributes are not incongruous with *Power* in reality, tho' they may not be the same in some Cases in the Abstract, or in others, in the Concrete; yet in one, or the other they certainly agree.

3. That *Power* is very conform to the Notion of *Omnipresence*, and that *Immaterial Substance* is not, I have already proved, so shall not insist upon the same again. — Yet I cannot forbear this Remark, that in Scripture, the first Attribute that manifests to us the Nature of God, seems to be his *Omnipotence*; nay, if we scan things narrowly, that *alone* seems to be the specific, at least the principal Difference, if I may so call it, of the Divine Nature. For altho' I have in my Description of the Nature of the God-head added *Omniscience*, yet considering that *Wisdom*, or *Knowledge* seem to be only *Powers* exerted by the first *Almighty Power*, and infer no more than a Regular, Conform, and Rational Execution of *Power* (*quoad nostrum conceptum*, as I ought always to speak with a most

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most humble limitation of my Expressions in relation to God) therefore *Omnipotence* is the first Notion of a God-head, that occurs to our Understanding, expressed in Scripture by *A mighty Hand, and Out-stretched Arm, &c.* I say, *Occurs to our Understanding*, I mean by the Knowledge of the Effects, we see can be produc'd by no other Power, but an Omnipotent one. For altho' *Wisdom*, or wise purposes of his Will, must antecede the Execution of his Omnipotence *quoad nos*, yet the Idea of that Wisdom is such, that we cannot form any Notion to our selves of it, until *Omnipotence* has exerted it self to discover its Infinite Agency, by the Effects of its Power. As had we not seen the Order, Beauty and Frame of the Universe, we should not have been able to adjudge it the Handy-work of an All-wise Creator.

Thus have I traced the conformity of that Notion of Power to the Nature, and Attributes of God, especially these Attributes which seem to infer *a positive Divine Nature*. There remains now nothing very considerable, but to examine
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ine whether Power be not something really distinct from the subject in which it is by the Comparative Significations of the Words *Spirit* and *Power* from the Holy Scriptures? For as to the first *Increated Being*, I think it safe enough to conclude with the School-men, *Attributa Dei non ab ipso Deo distinguuntur realiter. Omnipotence & God is the same Being.* And 2. Whether *Spirit* and *Power* are the same Things in Scripture meant, in relation to Angelick, Demoniack and Human Natures.

As to the first, It seems to me that *Power* has a Distinct Essence from the Subject in which it is, & sic magnis componam parva, not much unlike Motion to Matter, which is evidently plain not to be Matter, tho' if we come, to define it, we can hardly find Words to express its quiddity by, and that Philosopher, who denied the existence of Motion, was better confuted by his Adversaries walking, than he could have been by any Argumentation. Thus when God says frequently, *I will take of the Spirit of — And put it upon — The Power of the Almighty shall over shadow thee. — The Spirit rested on him. —*

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The *Spirit of the Lord* is upon me, *Luke. 4. The Power of the Lord* was present to heal them; *Chap. 5. 17.* called the *Gift of Healing. 1 Cor. 12. 9.* which our Saviour was sensible had parted from, *or gon out of him, Mark 5. 30. — The Spirit of Elijah* rested on *Elisba. — &c.* These Expressions and several such too numerous here to be mentioned, seem plainly to infer that Divine Power, superadded to Human Nature in all extraordinary Cases, is something really existent, and Distinct, tho' we call it *Power*, from the Subject where it resides, and cannot comprehend whether *Substantially* or *Accidentally* Existing, as Philosophers term it. But that it cannot be called *Substance*, I think manifest; because it is styled, *Gift of healing, and Inspiration, is a Power of the Holy Ghost, and of Working Miracles. — And* that it is more than an *accident* by the mighty Effects it doth capacitate the Subject to produce, and which departs from a Man as in the Case of *Saul*, which *Goes out from*, as above, I think my adversaries may grant, Philosophically speaking, because it passes from one Subject to another, *without Inhabitation on any in the conveyance, which an accident*
can.

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cannot do, for it would be as impossible as if we should endeavour to convey Motion *abstracted from the Body movent*, to fix the same, and not produce a New Motion, in a secondary moved, or Impelled Body. But say some, these are but *Literal Expressions*, and argue nothing of a transition of *Power* from one Subject to another. That they may be *Literal Expressions* only, is but a bare conjecture, but suppose they are, it is still a manifest argument that they are New *real Powers*, or *Gifts* superadded which Man had never before, and I think it not Warrantable to say, *the Personal Substance of the Holy Ghost*, was united to every Prophet or Apostle, but rather his power Influenced them, which is sufficient to answer the first Query, the second is, whether *Spirit and power* be the same thing usually called in Scripture.

Ans. No, It is not *always* the same Thing, because *Spirit* is usually applyed figuratively, where the Word *power* will not always do, *properly speaking*, yet this I think, I dare aver, That where *Spirit* relates to the Nature, of *God*, *Angels*, *Devils*, or *Men*, It includes a *power* in a more especial manner belonging

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ing to them, and it may be reduced to these following Heads.

1. In Relation to God, whose very Essence is *Omnipotence*, and whatever he doth, implies always *power*, as before observed.

2. In relation to Angels, or good Spirits, whom the Almighty maketh *Winds*, and a *flaming Fire*, Heb. i. 7. as the Word *Spirits* there denotes. That they are called *Dominationes*, *Virtutes*, by the Primitive Fathers of the Church, not as if they were Separate-existent Powers, but because they were Bodys endowed with Divine and supereminent Powers. Which makes me define *Spirit* in relation to all Created Beings, *To be,*

A Supereminent Power implanted in Matter, to enable it to act under certain limitations from the supream Power of All, above the Power of Human Nature, of which more elsewhere.

3. In Relation to Devils, whose chief is the *Prince of the Power of the Air*, can raise Storms, enter and possess Men (not Substantially as falsely conceived,

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ceived, but by their devilish Power communicated) &c.

4. In relation to Men, and Beasts, whose Principal Power [Life] is frequently called *Spirit*, in Scripture; and so are the facultys usually attributed to Man, the *Spirit of Understanding*, of *Knowledge*, &c. all which are but *Powers* emanant from the Subject, produced in it either, by extraordinary means, as the working of Miracles, &c. or by God's ordinary way of Providence, as the Passions, Will, Ratiocination, Locomotion, &c.

Having thus made a comparative examination of *Spirit with Power*, I now come to examine *Spiritual*, and *Spiritually*, frequently mentioned in Scripture by the same Rule, where the first Notion that I meet with of *Spiritual* is the same as *Divine*, or *Diviner*, called a Prophet, *Hos. 9. 7. The prophet is a fool*, and the *Spiritual Man*, or *Man of Spirits*, i. e. a Man knowing the *Mind* of the Gods, as *Dan. 4. 8. Is mad*. So *1 Cor. 15. It is taken for Divine things in opposition to Human Reason, or worldly Wisdom*. Again, *v. 16. He that is Spiritual, i. e. He that hath made*

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made use of Prophecies and Voices, &c. *vid.* Dr. Hammond, means afforded him by the Spirit of God, &c. delivered in the Demonstration of Spirit and Power, v. 4. &c. and divers other Texts, too long here to be insisted on, by way of comment. That which I am here more immediately to have reference to, is the Word *Spiritual*, as it may be attributable to an *Immaterial Substance*, and seems to denote a *Spiritual Substance*, which is but in one place of the New Testament. There is a *Natural Body*, and there is a *Spiritual Body*, 1 Cor. 15. 44. which I doubt no Antagonist will urge against me to prove *Angelick Natures* to be *Immaterial Substances*, because conjoyned with the Word *Body*. 2. *Spiritually*, as to be *Spiritually* (*Heavenly*) minded, Rom. 8. 6. *Spiritually Discern'd*, 2 Cor. 2. 14. *Spiritually call'd Sodom*, Rev. 11. 8. Those Significations all concur in the same as *Spiritual* or *Divine*, by the Inspiration or Influence of the Holy Spirit, as a power communicated from God.

But as a farther explication of the Word *Spirit* πνεῦμα I think it not amiss to recite the several Significations thereof,

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of, mentioned by Dr. *Hammond* a Person of undoubted Learning, Piety, and Integrity, in his Annotations on *Luke 9. v. 55. Spirit* (says he) is diversly taken in the New Testament. 1. For the Eternal Spirit of God, Θεὸς, κρείσσον, Ἅγιον the Holy Ghost [whose Essence consists in Power] 2. For the Gifts and Graces of that Spirit [Powers flowing from God] *Zach. 12. 10. Ephes. 6. 18. Jude. 20. Acts 2. 18. ζηλοῦται, τῶν πνευματικῶν* Zealous of Spirits or those Gifts of Tongues given by the Apostles. 3. For an Angel Good or Bad, *Revelat. 1. 4. Mark 1. 23. Chap. 5. 2.* hence πνευματικοί, Persons acted or *Inspired* [Powers conferred on them] with a good Spirit; as also Teachers and Pretenders to *Inspiration* from God, are called *seducing spirits*. *1 Tim. 4. 1.* Here the adjunct is taken for the Subject, as is frequent and common; so we say, you must obey Authority, i. e. Men in Authority. So *Rom. 13. v. 1. Higher Powers, and the Powers that Be, i. e. those Persons who exercise Power, are ordain'd of God.* 4. For an *Apparition* or *Spectrum*. The shape (says he) or seeming of a Body without any real corporeity. 5. For the Spirit of Man, [what we usually call Soul, tho' he

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He says] set in an higher degree than ~~Power~~ Common to Man and other Sensitive Creatures. [Here *Power* is still meant as before, only the question is whether an Active *Substance* void of Matter, or a *Power* only conferred on Matter, be the fountain of all those operations said to proceed from Spectrums, Sprights, and Human Soul's] 6 A Way of Dispensation, or course of Things, or Oeconomy [or a regular *Power* of Acting] thus the law is called the *Spirit of Bondage*. Rom. 8. v. 15. 1 Pet. 4. 14. 7. It denotes Temper, Disposition, Affections [Faculties or Powers belonging to Men] 1 Luke. 1. 17. 1 John 1. 24. Rom. 8. 9. So the *Spirit of Fear*, or Power, &c. are the Affections of Fear and Power, 2, Tim. 1. 7. &c.— In the Old Testament it is used, for skill and ability [Power or Faculty in Man] Exod. 28. 3. 31. 2. For a Commission, or office of Employment [executing Power] from God, Judges. 3. 10. ch. 6. 34. ch. 11, 29. ch. 13 25. still joined with Extraordinary Abilities, [a Word which intimates *Natural Powers*, or Faculties] as Judges. 14. 6. 19. Numb. 11. 17. 1 Sam. 10. 6. Thus Christ was declared to have a Prophetic Commission, by the *Spirit of God* Descending in a Dove.

Mat. 3. 16. and Isaiab. 61. 1. It is called the spirit of the Lord being upon him. by which he was anointed to Preach Luke. 4. 18, by the Spirit of Wisdom. Isaiab. 11. 3. which signifies a Commission of all other Extraordinary Gifts and Powers, &c. And then this Learned Gentleman concludes,] other uses there are of the Word Spirit in Holy Scripture, but are all reducible to one of these. How far he is in the right, I will not here make question, but I thought fit to recite him, as a Man of unquestionable Authority, to justifie me, as far as his Interpretation will bear, that the Word Spirit in Scripture doth always imply Power, and I think I prove it otherwise plain that it cannot mean Immaterial Substance.

This Subject in Relation to the *Essence of God* is not yet exhausted, Because some may Object that it favours of Socinianisme. making the Holy Ghost only a Power not Person of the God-head, but that I utterly deny : and when I speak of God's Essence consisting in Power I refer it to every Person in the Trinity, as God, and I use the word *Person* to them all, because we must use some one or other to be understood by, tho' *personality* in

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a strict sense I Imagine can be no more appropriated to an Omnipresent Being, than *Substantiality* or *Substance*. However I will dismiss this Head with this Humble Prayer, that if I have erred in my Notion of That Eternal Omnipotent Being, or expressed any Thing derogatory to his Divine Nature, or sinful, That that Infinite *Power of all Powers* would be pleased to forgive me, and by the Spirit of his Wisdom rectifie my Erroneous Understanding, if it conceives things amiss. And this Remark I have farther to add, That I think no Notion like that of *Power* is so suitable to the Divine Nature of the Trinity, and tends better to make Man capable to Understand how *Three can be One, and One Three*. But *manum de Tabula*, and from this hint in this short Treatise let others build if they please.

Suppose it be false, That God is an *Immaterial Substance*, cannot he create *Angels, Devils, and Human Souls* such?

Answ. in the opinion of all those you may call *Gross-Thinkers*, especially Men untainted with Philosophical Doctrines, *He cannot*; because such an Existence im-

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plies a *Contradiction* and seems to them to be as much as *Immaterial Matter*, and I think is so proved in the premises. But I know the *Refined Thinkers* of the World believe it not only possible, but the only Notion we can ground a true Idea of the Nature of Spirit on, and altho' it be very difficult, if not impossible for Human Understanding to form a True Idea of God, Which shall not admit of great Controversie and just exceptions, his Nature so transcendently surpassing the Reach of It: yet, say they, we may with very good Reason believe *Angels, Demons, and Human Souls*, if not *Brutal* also, to be *Immaterial Substances*. which I as positively, and upon better Reason, I hope, may justly deny. Because,

I. I lay this down for a Truth, *That where Reveal'd Religion gives us the certain Proof of any Things Nature and Existence, there we ought to lay aside the best Philosophical Conjecture Imaginable, and more especialy if we can have no certainty at all but from scripture of the Existence and Nature of those Beings we seek after. According to Reg. 6. before mention'd.* Now the Nature and Existence of Angels is that

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that we endeavour to find out, and if we take *Substance* capable of existing without those Attributes said to belong to Matter abovemention'd, as the *Refined Thinkers* of the World imagine, we may have grounds enough to build on it a fine *Metaphysical Romance*, but no solid Reason. Because,

2 I take it to be little less than a contradiction, or tantamount to require a Man to believe the Existence of *Substance*, so denudated of all those Properties by which we must Prove and Believe it to Exist. Therefore if this be Angelick Nature, to be a *Substance void of all Materiality*, yet to have all affections usually attributed to Matter, a Man must of Necessity be driven to form in his Thoughts a contradictory Idea or Notion of Angels. Now besides the Reason of this opinion of the Materiality of Angels we have,

3. The authority of the Primitive Fathers to back us, recited in part pag. 13 of this Treatise; and you may read more at large in Dr. Burnet's *Archæologia Philosophica*. *Ex antiquis multi λεγόντες τα Σώματα tenuia corpora, non crassa, ut nobis, Angelis attribuunt.* 302. and in the same place, He quotes *Act. 5. Consil. Nicen. 2d.*

De Angelis, & Archangelis & Eorum potestatibus, Quibus & nostras Animas adjungo, Ipsa Catholica Ecclesia sic sentit: Esse quidem intelligibiles sed non omnino corporis expertes, & Invisibiles ut vos Gentiles dicitis: verum tenui corpore præditos, aërio sive igneo: sicuti facit Deus Angelos suos, Spiritus, & Ministros, Ignem urentem. — Sic multos sanctorum Patrum sensisse cognovimus, quorum est Basilii cognomento magnus. B. Athanasius, Methodius & qui stant ab illis &c. In the same Page he recites several of the Primitive Fathers of the Church who hold Angels to have Corpora eorum similia quæ habituri sumus cum erimus ἰσὺν ἁγγέλων and then concludes page 303. *neceſſe eſt aſſerant Angelos habere corpora ſuæ naturæ propria, & cognata.* But here Dr Burnett ſuperadds in my opinion an Unwarrantable excuſe, *Patres non id volunt, Angelos eſſe corpora, ſed habere corpora ſicut Animæ habent Humanæ.* Becauſe the very words of the Fathers are ſo poſitive and Expreſſive — *sunt Angeli & omnes Virtutes corporeæ, licet non ſubſiſtant in carne.* Angels, and all Heavenly Powers are corporeal, altho' they ſubſiſt, and abide not in the fleſh: becauſe St Paul tells us, *Fleſh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.* 1 Cor 15.

4. Next to the Authority of the Fathers

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thers is that of the Scripture : where by the by I premise the Truth of Reg. 6. to be considered. *That a Suppositious existence of the same thing different from such Existence, which to the evidence of our Senses and Reason appears manifestly real, ought to be looked upon as False and an Imposture.* Now that all Angels, which ever did appear to mankind, did appear *Bodily*, and were invested with all those Qualities, or Properties belonging to Matter, no Man can deny, Those Angels which appeared to Abraham did eat Gen. 18. v. 8. The Angel wrestled with Jacob and touched. 32. 24. sate under an Oak Judg. 6. v. 21. Put forth the end of his staff, ascended in a flame, &c. Judg. 13. 20. All Angels, in short, appeared in the Similitude of Man, with the Affections belonging to *Body*, and consequently must have Bodies, if God Almighty hath not given up all Mankind to (as I said before) believe a lye, or lying representation , ordaining them , in so high a concern as this, to live in a continued Delusion. Those who have been raised from the Dead and ascended into Heaven, ascended and Exist *Bodily* there, as the learned and judicious Dr Hody has proved plain, in his Treatise about

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the Resurrection of the same *Human body*, and That our Saviour himself was taken up into Heaven in *the Flesh*, sits at the right hand of God in *the Flesh*, (as very many sober and highly learned Authors, besides Bishop Pearson, believe, and own) is in no wise to be question'd. All which citations of his from various Authors not only endeavour to prove, what he designs, That the Bodies to which our Souls are to be united in the next life, will be numerically the same, as it is in his Language, or that our *Living Bodies* will be the same *living Bodies* at the Resurrection as now, but gives this ground of Argument farther. That our Saviour and those Saints being exalted into Heaven *Bodily* could not be thought fit for the Society of *Unbodied Immaterial Substances*, if Angels were such, by reason of the incongruity of Natures. And I believe all the World must own such Glorified Men, to put on wholly an Angelick Nature, especially our Saviour, when advanced amongst the Number and blessed company of Angels. That these Angels and Saints which appear *Bodily*, cannot upon any good Ground be *Spirits wrap'd up in Bodies*, Ple consider by and by.

5. That

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5. That Angels may be *Spiritual Beings*, or *Substances*, tho' not *Immaterial* ones, is suitable enough to the Doctrine of the Holy Scriptures. For there is a great difference between *Spiritual* and *Immaterial*, as has been before hinted, the former being applicable to Body. 1 Cor. 15. 44. and the latter not. Therefore when Angels are called *spirits*, or *spiritual Beings*, they are meant to be *Bodies* endowed with a *supereminent Power*, to enable them to act under certain limitations from the *Supreme Power* of all, above the *Power* of *Human Nature*, which I elsewhere define to be *Spirit*, Thus the Holy Prophets and Apostles may be and are called *spiritual*, as endowed with a *Power from Above* to do several supernatural things upon Earth, but they were ordained to see Death, and not made able *always upon all occasions* to carry themselves up into the Air, mount up *Bodily* to Heaven, or walk upon the Water, yet upon *special occasions*, they had even this *Power* given them ; as to Philip, who baptized the Eunuch, and was caught up by the *spirit* and found at Azotus Acts. 8. 39. as Enoch and our Saviour ascended to Heaven, and St Peter walked on the Water.

Con.

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Contrary to the Reasons asserted for the Corporeity of Angels, there are three Objections even against the Evidences of our Senses usually urged. As

1. They are Spirits which can Penetrate Matter, *i. e.* pierce a Mountain or an Adamant, and not divide it, nor augment the Bulk of any Substance they so penetrate, which a Material Body cannot possibly do.

2. Tho' they appear visible and tangible &c. yet it is by assuming *Bodies or Cloathing themselves in Aerial Vehicles* in order to be discovered to Mankind.

3. That They being the Messengers of God, require more swiftness of Motion to ascend to that incredible height and distance, as it is from the Earth to the Heaven of Heavens, than any Material Substance is capable of doing, to give an account of their Embassies and Dispatch.

As to the first Objection the Philosopher brings, In order to understand it, you ought to recollect what is meant by *penetration*, which pag. 3. I have described *an union of two Substances in one and the same*

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same Bulk and Place without Augmentation, or Extension of the Bulk by their conjunction. Now that Matter also may be so united naturally is consonant to Experience vid pag. 12 of this Treatise: But here comes a nice Philosophical Scrutator, and tells me, that the same Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, or the same Dimensions, cannot belong to two Bodies united, but may to Spirit, and Matter united. Hold a little; By what Reason doth that appear? Or where Resides Spirit he talks so much of? Reason, or Religion never suggest any Spirit absolutely so, but God himself, Invisible &c. Never united or coextended with any Material Being, so He must talk idly if he insists this upon the Spirituality of the Godhead. In the next place, Angels, Devils and Men, I'll prove all Material, so that where such penetrable Spirits reside, except in the Brain as meer Phantasmata, I cannot undertake to tell. But suppose what is urged by the Philosopher to be to him incapable to be solved, viz. How Matter should Penetrate Matter; yet if the Christian be required to give an account of his Faith by Revelation, He may say, our Saviour entred the Room when the Doors were shut, John 20. v. 19. (upon which
Text

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Text see the Author's Treatise of *Second Thoughts concerning Human Soul. cap. ult.*) This passage Dr. Hody canvasses as a strong Objection against his opinion, if the Doors (says the Objector in his words) were really then shut, and Christ's Body were truly of the Nature of Man's, how was it possible for him to enter into the Room? In Answer to this, says He, I ask another Question How was it possible for our Saviour to walk on the Water, and to make St *Peter* do the like? Was not that contrary to the Nature of an Human Body? and concludes, I shall not pretend to prescribe a way to the Almighty, but this I am sure of, it was easy for Omnipotence to effect that Miracle several ways. He might open a passage into the Room which the Disciples did not see, or Rarefie his Body for that present Moment. *vid pag. 125.* So that this worthy Gentleman seems to throw of *Immaterial Substance* to our Saviour risen from the Dead, to make him capable of penetrating Matter, but wisely has devised a probable way of explaining to us, how Angels may do by that super eminent Power God has given them, the same thing upon the like occasion, without recurring to a *penetration of Dimensions*
by

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by the Immateriality of their substance. Besides, what have we more than the bare assertion of a Philosopher for this Penetration of Dimensions? I would gladly know how such an Union is possible to be discovered? For my part I believe an Angel can by the assistance of Omnipotence, divide the strongest Stone wall nay Iron-wall, if any such were part of a Building, enter at that division, keep the building unmolested, and not in the least damaged all the while, and pass out again, the breach being unknown and unperceived by any Person in the Room. This I believe possible, because a medium may be altered, and several other ways by a Divine Power, Mens eyes may be held, as not to know, vid. Luke. 24 v. 16. what is done in their presence.

2 Tho' our Saviour must be own'd to be visible, tangible, &c. after He was risen from the Dead in his *Human Body*, as being *flesh and Bones*, and consequently Material, yet he seems in the very place to appeal to his Disciples *to feel and see him*, because He was *Body* not *Spirit* i.e. That he might be touched and seen, which a spirit cannot. And Spirits, if they do appear; must assume Bodies, there
fore

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fore to be seen and touched. Upon which account the Apostles, thought they had seen a Spirit when they saw our Saviour walking on the Water, *Mat. 14. v. 26.* This Objection may be brought well enough by such who interpret this Text, *Luke 24. 39,* to mean by *Flesh and Bones* the same as *Material Body*, which I take to be a gross mistake, and wrong Interpretation. For our Saviour did not urge this as a proof that He was not *Material*, but that it was the same *Body of flesh and Blood* that was raised from the Dead. *Behold it is I myself,* says He. So that a Spirit may be *Material*, *tho not Flesh and Bones*; therefore it's Impossible by this Text to conclude a *Spirit an Immaterial Substance*. Well! but the Text says, the Disciples supposed *They had seen a Spirit*, which could not be done unless it assumed Body. That I grant, if *Spirit* were that *Immaterial Substance* some contend it to be, but it's plain by the very fright they were in, that the Jews had a Notion, That *spirits were visible*, without the adjunct of Body: Nay I am apt to think they believed them, as most plain meaning People do now to be thin *Bodies, like Air, or Fires* (as before mentioned) not *Immaterial Substances*, which they could not well appre-

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prehend. Therefore the Notion of Angels *assuming Bodies* in all Appearances, or *Aerial Vehicles*, is but a Philosophic Fable, and has no warrant from Scripture: For if Angels had no such Bodily Organs whereby they could Go, Walk, Speak &c. before they assumed or crept into such *Aerial Vehicles*, their Being so inclosed, would look like a Juggle put upon Mankind to make the Messengers of God appear really, what They are not. And says St Hierom, *noli potentiam Domini Magorum præstigijs adæquare, ut videatur fuisse, quod non fuit, & putetur comedisse sine dentibus, ambulasse sine pedibus, fregisse panem sine manibus, loquutum esse sine lingua. &c.* which tho' he spoke in reality of our Saviour himself appearing *bodily* to his Disciples, is very applicable in all points to the Apparition of Good Angels themselves. Again, How can we possibly discover this *movent Body*, so assumed, to be informed by an Angel? Or if by one, how Know we it to be a Good or Bad Angel that appears to us? May not the Devil play a juggling trick and put on the shape of an Angel of Light? Nay how is it possible for me to distinguish, suppose Moses and Elias appeared, the one from the other by the *Bodies* they have assumed.

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med. All this would seem nothing but a strong Delusion put upon Our Senses, if God suffered the representation of Things to be otherwise made to us, than they are in themselves.

3. That Angels, if they were *corporeal* could not convey their dispatch to Heaven under several Hundred years time: So slow must be even the quickest motion of every Material Substance, to so prodigious a distance, as is the Heaven of Heavens, or *cælorum suprema*. This I own to be an Objection but this seems to be grounded, on a false foundation as if Angels were sent of necessity to inform an all-wise Creator of the Messages they deliver to his Saints on Earth. But how can *Omniscience* require this? or *Omnipresence* want Information of Things done on the Earth? God has indeed dispatched his Angels to *Abraham*, *Isaack*, the *Virgin Mary*, &c. before whom they have appeared *personally*, and that such a dispatch may be made by an Omnipotent Power in an instant of time must be own'd feasible, if we will own *Omnipotence*; for it includes no contradiction, tho' unconceivable, as to the *modus*, by Human Understanding. But to give my Reader by way of Digression a par-

parallel Case, I will calculate the Motion of the Sun by the *Ptolemaic System of Astronomy*, and make some comparative Observations of the incredible Motion thereof to that of Angelic Bodies.

That Angels, tho' Material, may in an incredible Minute or space of Time, by the Power God has implanted in them, move themselves to an incredible distance of place by Successive Motion, is plain by the comparative swiftness of Motion implanted by God in the Sun and fixed Stars, for whose Immateriality I suppose no one will contend. This Calculation of the Motion of the Sun round the Globe of the Earth according to the *Ptolemaic Hypothesis*, I find Dr. *Wittie* in his *ἡρανονομία* by the help of Mr. *Street*, that famous Astronomer of his time, and Author of the *Astronomia Carolina*, has calculated in whole Numbers, by rejecting Fractions, very nicely, upon this supposition that the Sun is distant from the Earth 13755 Semidiameters of the Earth, reckoning 4182 English Miles to every Semidiameter. So that the Sun must be according to this calculation 57 Millions 530 Thousand 287 Miles distant from the Earth, if Mr. *Streets*, and Dr.

H

Wittie's

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Wittie's calculation of the distance by so many Semidiameters of the Earth be right, tho'I find the same confirmed so to be by *Christopher Huygens*, in a Treatise call'd the *Cælestial Worlds discovered*, where he tells you, That this Calculation has been made, by the best Telescopes could be got, and by some of the best Astronomers in the World, as *Cassini*, in France, Mr. *Flamstead* in England, &c. Notwithstanding other former Astronomers, as *Gassendus*, *Tycho Brahe*, *Lansbergius* never exceeded 1500 Semidiameters at most, to allow the Earth and Sun to be distant from each other. However, to keep to my Calculation by the most Modern improved Astronomers, the Earth is reputed 57 Million 530 Thousand 287 Miles distant from the Sun; now this Sun being at so great a distance, and moving visibly round the terrestrial Globe in 24 Hours space, must of Necessity move *prodigiously swift* beyond our conception, to pass round so great a Circumference, and according to Dr. *Wittie's* Calculation aforesaid, making an Estimate of the Circumference by the distance, measured and computed from different Parallaxes, The Sun must move 15 Millions 61 Thou-

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Thousand, 725 Miles in an Hour, which is 251 Thousand 29 Miles every Minute : In which space of time, if that great Body of the Sun can move by Power of Omnipotence, in less than 4 Hours time an Angelick Body may move up to the Sun, tho' it be so many Millions of Miles distant from the Earth, which is an unconceivable Motion to Human Understanding, yet not above that Faith which relies on and believes Omnipotence.

There is another Calculation made according to the *Copernican Hypothesis*, which makes the Earth move round the Sun as a fixed Center, which by reason of that unconceivable and incredible Motion of the Sun (and of the fixed Stars it must be 100000 times swifter) seems to be more rational to build on, than the former. And is thus made out.

By the Motion of the Earth is measured in 24 Hours so many Degrees upon its Superficies, reckoning about 73 Miles for each Degree, as amount to 26280 Miles for the whole circumference of the Earth. *i.e.* Six Semidi-

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ameters of the Earths Superficies, accounting 4182 Miles for each Semidiameter. This Motion is no more than 1095 Miles in an Hour, and about $18\frac{1}{2}$ Miles in a Minute. Which had I not Calculated the former, would have been reputed an extraordinary swift Motion too, and by Mr. *Huygens*, and Dr. *Wittie* also, it is adjudged to be as swift as a Bullet shot out of a Gun. Which Bullet notwithstanding such incredible swiftness to us apparent, would be according to Mr. *Huygens*'s computation 25 Years before it would arrive at the Sun, if it were possible to continue its Motion thither, by the same degree of celerity. Now how shall we state the celerity of an Angelic Body? Truly by no Standard of Human Reason, that I know of: For if I visibly see a Ray of the Sun descend to me and strike my Visive Organs, notwithstanding the vast distance of Medium it must, and doth pass, I can easily believe the same Power can make an Angelic Body move, if it please, in as swift a time, as a Ray of the Sun; but whether it has ordain'd that incredible Motion of those vast Bodies of the fixed Stars, and the Sun, as the Vulgar believe,

lieve, or to the Earth, as the learned; I leave it *adhuc sub judice litem*.

3. The next Beings call'd *Immaterial Substances* (because call'd *Spirits*) are the *Devil and his Angels*; whom I no more doubt to be Material, than a Stock or a Stone: This may be rationally enough supposed,

1. Because, materiality implies an Imperfection, according to all the Spiritualists in the World, therefore the Devil and his Angels having forfeited that Blessed and Glorious Nature Angelic Beings may be granted to have, may rationally enough be concluded to be divested of all Spirituality whatever; because that is a perfection fit only for Good Angels. 2. That their Knowledge, as well as Power is very much streightned and limited by God Almighty, as an Addition to their Punishment, therefore the Devil as he is the Father of Lyes, so his Prophecies, or Guessees are false, as in the Case of Job, That he would curse God to his Face: So the lying Spirit in the Mouth of Ahab's Prophets did not know, that Ahab would go up to Ramath Gilead,

and be slain there, but God permitted that lying Spirit to go and perswade him to go up, and told him Ahab should be slain there. *Accessit illis* (says St. Augustine *de civit. Dei lib 9.*) *propter peccatum aliquod tenebrarum, & proinde tenebræ appellantur, & in tenebris esse dicuntur, Cælesti luce destituti, & ad locum caliginosum præcipitati.* Thus Devils are said to be cast down to Hell, and delivered into Chains of Darkness, 2 Pet. c. 2. v. 4. Satan is sayd to go to and fro in the Earth, Job. 2. All which imply local Motion, and indeed it is reasonable enough to suppose that Satan is not *Essentially present* every where, to tempt Mankind, that is the Attribute of God only. But when man is tempted and drawn away of his own lusts, James 1. 4. He is undoubtedly ready to instigate such communicable influence of his diabolic Nature. By this Power allowed him from the Omnipotent, he produces Possessions (as they are called in the Gospel) in Men by Evil Spirits, or Evil Spirits are said to enter into Men, and handle them with Violence, as if a real Devil was actuating their Bodies, which expressions of entering into, and walking about, after they are ejected, and being cast out, are

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only such *ἀνθρώπων αἰσὶς ad captum humanum*, spoke suitable to the Capacity of the Jews whom Dr. Burnet calls *populum hebetem, & ignarum*, p. 121. Archæol. Philos. And therefore our Saviour uses plain Similitudes oft, and Parables adapted to their Understanding to instruct them by. Now the reason of this my Assertion, That the Devil never Substantially but by a Diabolick Power, possesses Men is, 1. Because even Diseases are called evil Spirits, as *The Dumb Spirit took the Man so that he foamed and gnashed with his Teeth*, Mark 9. v. 18. Luke 9. v. 39. Mark 9. 20. By which Symptom of foaming, it seemeth to be an *Epilepsie*, which no sober Man can call an Union of a *Diabolick Substance* to Human Nature, unless they grant the Devil Ubiquity (as I before hinted) to be actually present in so many Bodies, as he is said to possess. 2. Because God has granted evil Spirits this Power of doing mischief, as we see by the Lying Spirit, who was permitted to influence *Ahab*, 1 Kings 22. 21. 2 Chron. 18. v. 20. 21. Upon this Account the Devil, is call'd the *Prince of the Power of the Air*, which undoubtedly he may envenom with such *Noxious Qualities*, as may

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Operate on the Animal Spirits to cause, what we call *Possessions* to execute God's Vengeance on the Wicked, thus he is said to *work in the Children of Disobedience*, Ephes. 2.2. *by the working of Satan with all Power, signs and lying wonders*, 2 Thes. 2.9. Now if Satan be permitted to have so much Power, as to work *Wonders*, tho' false, he has undoubtedly permission upon special Cases to communicate his Satanic Power to Human Nature. Nay even his Substance too (if that were requisite) as much as Fumes of a Volatile Spirit can be to the Brain, and whole System of the Nerves, to produce Convulsions, which experience convinces us frequently to be actually done. These evil Affections, and devilish Inclinations bent the Children of *Israel* toward Idolatry, which is called the *Power of Satan*, Acts 26. 18. And an Idolater is said to be *turned after Satan*, 1 Tim. 5. 15. So that the entring in of evil *Spirits*, and possessing them, as if they were Devils *really and substantially* united to Human Bodies, are but Expressions *ad captum vulgi*, and not to be literally received, as was said before of the Influence of the Holy Ghost.

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Having thus searched, as far as I am able, into the true Nature of *God, Angels and Devils*, as called *Immaterial Substances*, tho' precariously so asserted, and not warranted by the Principles of the Christian, or Jewish Religion, I come now in the next place to examine the Existence of that Latent, Undiscovered, *Immaterial Substance*, called *Human Soul*, in Man.

This is such a Riddle of a *Spirit*, or *Spiritual Substance*, as became the proper handle for Crafty Philosophers to use to impose upon the World, either for Good or Bad Ends; still it was a *collusion* at least, if the Word *impose* seem too harsh, when they made use of it to Good Ends. If the Author of *Second Thoughts concerning Human Soul*, had not been somewhat Remiss in his search, or perhaps had not the benefit of a good Library, he might with more plainness and easiness, than he doth, have traced that Original of *Human Souls* *seperate Existence*, from the Heathen Philosophers and no other. And to consult one for all, an indefatigable Scrutator of Antiquity, and a Man able by His Learning and Parts to be a competent Judge in this

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this case Dr. Burnet in his *Archæology. Philos.* Some Hundred of Years in all probability before ever Moses was born, much less the Bible wrote (sayes he) the most Ancient Nations addicted to Learning, vere the *Æthiopians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, Indians, Arabians*, and all other Eastern Nations, *Sed unde suam hñuserint Philosophiam, non adeò facile est explicatũ* pag. 190. *Alij Dicunt suapte ingenio inventam: Alij a Mose, Alij ab Abrahamo, omnium ut volunt scientiarum Principibus. Sed his egre assentior.* p. 191. which indeed he had very good Reason not to approve of, because *Discipulus potius quam Doctor Gentis [Ægyptiacæ] literatæ videtur Moses. juxta text. Act. 7. v. 22.* pag. 193. and he insists upon the prejudices of the Jewish Nation, *Qui sibi deberi volunt, & a se derivari quicquid est inter Homines Divini aut Eximii.* 196. Nor doth he consent with *Flavius Josephus* that *Abraham* could be the Authour of those many Sciences amongst the *Chaldæans* or *Philosophica dogmata*, because neither Divine, nor prophane History says one word of it. And, *Qui potuit infra biennium Peregrinus homo, Sermonies alieni Gentem instruere scientiis ut volunt, Naturalibus* &

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& Mathematicis earum antea ignaram, & in assuetam? Quamobrem propriam Gentem, filiore & nepotes non prius instruxit. Neque scientia Naturali neque Mathematica celebres fuerê Hebrei. 195. Nay the Jews were looked upon so far from being Skilled in any Philosophical Learning that, says he, *miratur Lactantius lib. 4. cap. 2. Institut. Quod Pythagoras, Plato, aliiq; celebres Philosophi ad Ægyptios veritatis indagandæ causâ, non ad Judæos pertransiverint, p. 43. Judæi nihil celebre habent præter Legem, & Cabalam, p. 67.* So that the Jews cannot by reason of their Ignorance in Philosophical Learning be supposed to be the Original of that Belief of an *Immaterial Substance*, or *Substantial Spirit* in Man, but the Ægyptians may, as being a very nice point of Philosophical Learning, *quia Ægyptios omnium Philosophiæ Disciplinarum Parentes, atque solos rerum Divinarum conscios nuncupabant.* So says *Macrobius*, recited *Archæol. Philos. pag. 72. Et Ægyptus cæteris omnibus gens Philosophica, sapientior habita, 78.* However altho' learning flourished most in Ægypt, yet in respect of time *Æthiopes præcessere literis Ægyptios & multo altius temporibus Mosi, Assyriorum, Chaldæorum, Babylonio-*
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orum Observationes ascendunt. Sicut & Magorum apud Bactrianos, si fides Justino, 195. And in another place speaking of the Barbarian Philosophers, he says, Brachmanorum in India, Gymnosophistarum in Æthiopia, Druidarum apud Celtas nemo novi antiquitatem; sed calculis Chronologorum statui solent ante Tempora Trojana, p. 116.

Having thus stated the Antiquity of Learning amongst all the Oriental Nations, it next comes to be considered what points of Learning those were, which were Coævous with those ancient Heathen Nations, so long before Moses, the principal of which were these,
 1. *Mundi futura conflagratio est dogma perantiquum.* 2. *Doctrina μετεμψύχωσης* sive de Præexistentia & Revolutione Animarum per vetusta & Universalis siqua alia, cum non tantum per Orientem ubique, sed etiam in occidente apud Druidas & Pythagoreos obtinuerit. Hæc, inquam, Doctrina, quasi cælo demissa, ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀμυντῶς ἀγενεαλόγηται & totum terrarum Orbem pervagata est; nec dum probare possumus rationibus Physicis Animas, Præexistere corporibus aut in eadem sæpius reverti, p. 192. Again constat quidem preter Ritus Sacros, & jura publica, Physiologiæ Druidas operam dedisse, sed præter illud

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illud de animorum & Mundi rediviva sorte & utriusque revolutionibus, seu Παλιγενεβια nullum dogma superesse reperio, p. 8. In communi omnium istius ævi Phylosophorum sententiâ conveniebant [scythæ cum Pythagoricis] de Animæ Immortalitate, & transmigratione, p. 6. Next, this Antiquity of the *Druids* mentioned by *Dr. Burnet*, one passage cited by *Helvicus* in his *Chronology* testifie them to have flourished as a Colledge in Germany 226 Years before *Moses* was Born. *Hermionis tempore Collegium Druidarom viguit. Which is reputed to be An. Mund. 2148 in the time of Esau, when he married his two Wives of the Gentiles, Gen. cap. 27. About 484 Years after the Flood.* How is it possible for any Man to conceive from the aforementioned Authorities of so judicious Antiquaries but that the Notion of *Human Soul*, as we now conceive it a *Distinct Spirit* from the *Body*, must be a pure *Heathenish Invention*, and not grounded on the Writings of *Moses*? If the *Druids*, *Æthiopians*, &c. held a *Transmigration* of *Souls*, that *Transmigration* must infer that they held it to be a *Spirit* before it could pass from *Body* to *Body*. *Moses* could never instruct those *Heathens* in such a *Doctrine*,
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- because it's proved to be a Doctrine for many hundred Years before he was born ; nay *viguit Collegium Druidarum*, who held this *Transmigration* which was 226 Years before *Moses's Birth*) and God knows how long it might be received as a Doctrine before the College or Society flourished in Germany, a Nation that never convers'd with the Jews at that time as we read of, therefore Dr. Burnet call'd it a Doctrine without Father, or Mother, Pedigree or Genealogy, like that of *Melchizedec*, Heb. 7. 3. As if sent from Heaven. So he calls it *pervetusta Opinio*, a very ancient and universal Opinion in the very infancy of time, both in the East, and Western parts of the World, and shews you demonstratively, I think, that neither *Abraham*, or *Moses* could in all human probability convey Sciences to those Heathen Nations. Why, what shall we say now ? The *Chaldeans*, *Aegyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Æthiopians*, *Indians*, *Arabians*, and all the Oriental Nations own'd this Doctrine of a *Metempsychosis*, or *Transmigration of the Soul*, then it is impossible to make the Jews the Original Authours of the Notion of that Spirit which must transmigrate; it favouring too much of Knowledge for these
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dull People to invent. Therefore there is but two ways by which he can suppose those Ancients to have got their Knowledge, which is, *aut Suapte Ingenio* either by their own Natural Wit, and Parts, or a *Noachidis derivatam*. -- derived from the Sons of Noah—for sayes Dr. Burnet. *Facile credo Omnes Gentes Antiquissimas tam Naturalis Scientiæ, quam Religionis quædam semina a Noachidis derivasse. p. 7.* And in another place, *Quidni credamus ab hoc fonte ab hoc viro Originario, i. e. Noah, descendisse ad suos posteros, ad homines nempe post-Diluvianos, ea Theologiæ, & Philosophiæ capita, quæ apud gentes antiquo-barbaros reperiuntur. Suis liberis, & Nepotibus fertur Noachus tradidisse præcepta moralia, quæ præcepta Noachidarum dici solent, quidni etiam Dogmata Philosophica? p. 196.* To which he subjoyns, *Æquam est credere Patres Antediluvianos non esse stipites, insulsos, & scientiarum expertes, quorum Hæres fuit Noah, pag. 197.* In answer to which I say:

1. That altho' it be probable enough that the Sons of Noah taught their Posterity several things, yet it doth not appear that they taught this Doctrine of Human

man Soul, but that it was *suapte ingenio inventa*, rather, For a *facile credo*, and a *Quidni credamus* never amount to a proof. Especially when a far greater probability lyes on the contrary side. That *Man*, tho' not of the Holy seed, was endowed with Reason, must be granted, altho' he might not have by that Reason so true an Idea of Religion, as those had to whom it was peculiarly revealed, as to *Abraham Isaac*, and *Jacob*, and the rest of the Holy Patriarchs. If so, the main and first Act of Reason, in a People endeavouring after Knowledg, is an Enquiry into a Mans own Existence; *How came I here. And to be a Living Substance on Earth?* Why? then it is a Natural consequence, that the answer to himself will be, *from his Parents*. But then, whence came, *That first Parent of all?* this can never be answered, but by recurring to an *Infinite Increated Power*, to form and make him such, because an eternal, or an Increated Creature is a Contradiction. This made the World that then was, conceive some Idea of that *Increated Power* which was the Author of every single Creatures Existence, and from contemplating that Author fell to Worshipping of him; but having little more than the
 Light

Light of Nature to Guide them erred often in misplacing their Worship upon such a true Object, as they ought to do. Hence sprang very Early Idolatry, almost coævous with the true Worship of God. As we find it in the case of Laban, *wherefore hast thou stol'n my Gods?* Gen. 31. 30. my *Teraphims*, or Household Gods which *Heathens* us'd to Worship (made in the form of a Man) and consult in case of futurity, to foretel what might happen to them, who Worshiped them. Thus the Mariners in *Jonah's* Ship cryed every one to their Gods. *Jonah*. 5. 4. *awakne d Jonah to call upon his God.* The *Arabians* perceiving the Insufficiency of one God, Erected Altars, as did the *Athenians*, *Ignoto Deo*. Act. 17. 23. vid *Godwins* Jewish Antiq. l. 4. c. 1. Thus they learned by *Tradition* that the *Sun* *Moon* and *Stars* had a Kind of Lordship over Men, and therefore Worshiped them as Gods. I suppose this Tradition came so Early from the *Chaldeans*, who were Originally mightily addicted to *Astronomy*, and tainted all the Race of Mankind, except the Holy Seed with the same Idolatry; and *Job*, who was before *Moses*, speaks of the same in several places: Nay *Ur* of the *Chaldeans*, which
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signifies *Fire* or *Light*, mentioned *Gen. 11. 31.* just after the Building of *Babel*, is thought to be the very *God* of the *Chaldeans* (*vid* *Godwin ibid*) and that City to have taken its name from the *Idol*, called likewise the *God* of *Nabor* *Gen. 31. 53.* Now whether is it not more probable that those *Chaldeans* should *Invent* amongst themselves *Idolatry* rather than receive any thing like it from the *Sons of Noah*? I as verily believe they invented in their own Notion that *Worship*, as I can be sure of their *Learning* and skill in *Astronomy*, and this Notion of *Human Soul's* being *snatch'd up into the circumlucid Region of the Moon*, *wrap'd in an Ætherial Vehicle*, sent down from hence to serve in *Mortal Bodies*, to operate therein for a certain time, to dwell in several *Zones of the World* amongst the *Zoned Gods*, to descend down to the *Earth* with *flagging Wings*, &c. Is so consonant to an *Astronomick Superstitious, Religious Science*, that it seems to make up a great part of it. Why may then not they in more probability *invent* it, than receive it from any other Nation? *Idolatry* is almost as *Old* as the *World*, and a *Metempsychosis* is coævous with it, both practis'd

etis'd in the beginning of the World, and believed by *all Nations* for a time, especially such Nations who were addicted to Astronomic learning, as the *Chaldeans*, and *Ægyptians* in a peculiar manner. Therefore it is more probable that this Doctrine was the offspring of *Heathenish, Idolatrous, Superstition*, than delivered by the Sons of *Noah*. Because

2. Why must the World, which then was, be taught all things by the *Noachides*? The *Præcepta Moralia Noæ* gain but a Traditional Faith, not well grounded so as to be believed equally with the H. Scriptures. We read of *Tubalcain* to be an *instructor in every Artificer in Brass and Iron*. Gen. 4. v. 22. *Jabal* a Tent-maker, v. 20. *Jubal*, Father of such as Handle the Harp and Organ. v. 21. These were Trades before the flood, and after, scarce supposable to be taught us by *Noah's Sons*, but *Invented Humano Ingenio*, Why then must the *Noachides* be the fountain of all *antiquo-barbaræ Theologiæ & Philosophiæ*? Musick is a Science of great Curiosity, and requires a Good Judgment to attain to a perfect Knowledg in it, now whether those

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Antediluvians play'd well, on the Harp, or Organ (for by the word *Father*, I apprehend, the *First* and *Chief* in that Art) I will not controvert, but that it was an *Invention* of their own, I have no Reason to doubt. Upon the whole, those who first devised a *Metempsychosis*, must devise a *Spirit* in *Man* first, before its consequent *passing into the Body*; Now that the Sons of *Noah* or *Abraham* never spoke one word of this *Spirit*; yet that it was a Doctrine before ever *Moses* was born, evidently Demonstrates, I think, its Original to be *Heathenish*, and not owing of right to the Books of *Moses*, as before I have endeavour'd to prove upon the same head.

As they Devis'd the Existence of this *Spirit*, so the first *Immortality* they gave it, seems to be no other than a perpetual living in the Bodies of some Men or other unto the Words end, therefore it is conjoyn'd p. 6. of Dr. Burnet, before recited, *In communi omnium Philosophorum sententia conveniebant de Animæ Immortalitate & Transmigratione*, not asserting *Elysiums*, or *Tartarus's* for the Souls of the Just and the Wicked, but They served in mortal Bodies as a Punishment.

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ment. This done the Græcian Philosophers began, and Orpheus *primus Inferos cecinit, camposq; Elysios, Impiorum & Beatorum Sedes, præmia & pænas post mortem,* & μετὰ τὴν τε Βίῃ Τελευτὴν εὐδαιμονίαν promissit, quod sacrosanctum arcanum Divinus Moses vix ausus est suis recludere Hebræis, Archæol p. 121. 122. 126. And again, *His affinis est sententia Essenorum, neq; aliunde opinor desumpta, [quam ab Homero aut Virgilio] ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀνιδῶσσι τῶν κατὰ σαρξὰ δεσμῶν &c.* Cum fuerint [Animæ] è carnis vinculis exolutæ, quasi de longa servitute liberatas, ita illicò lætari Illos, sublimesq; ferri: Et quidem bonas (concinentes in hac re Græcorum sententiis) pronunciant ultra Oceanum vitam agere in regione quæ neq; Nivibus, neq; Imbribus, neq; æstu aggravatur. Sed quam lenis Zephyrus ab Oceano Spirans semper demulcet. pag. 264. Virgilius imitari Platonem — Circulum Lunarem Paradisum esse plures a Patribus Christianis asseruerunt — 265. Esseni dogmata Physica non plura suppetunt Authores, &c. modo ea adjunxerit de Animarum Immortalitate & futuris Paradisis p. 70. And wherein consisted this Immortality of the Soul? Truly they Believed it as the Brachmans, the Indian Priests, believed, by Transmigration,

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gration,

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gration it became *Immortal*: This makes our Authour say ——— *Reliqua Essenorum dogmata quærenda sunt apud Brachmannos cum illorum esse Propaginem Essenos ex Clearcho notarit Josephus: 70.* This Opinion of the *Essenes* a considerable Sect of the Jews, see very curtly abbreviated by Dr. Hody, pag. 55. in a *Treatise* of the Resurrection of the same Body. See also the *Essenes*, and *Pythagoreans* compared Chap xii. lib. 1. *Godwin's Jewish Antiquities*. The next Sect of the Jews were the *Pharises*, who taught that the Souls of evil Men deceased, presently departed into everlasting Punishment, but the Soul's of good Men passed by a *Metempsychosis* into other good Mens Bodies, as is delivered by Commentators on *Mat. 16. v. 14.* The *Sadduces* denied Angels, and Spirit, and asserted *Human Soul* Annihilated at Death. These are the three Principal Sects of the Jews, and from which of them can we derive the Notion of Mans Soul being a *Spirit*? If from the *Essenes*, or *Pharises*, they both own'd a *Metempsychosis*, it is plain, which is a pure *Heathenish corrupt Doctrine*, and the *Pharises* to add to their Error, gave a more probable Immortality to Wicked Souls, than to the Just. From what

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what Fountain amongst the *Jews* shall we now derive this Original of *Human Soul*? From what Spring flows its Immortality? certainly from no other but that of a *Metempsychosis* Invented by Heathens, but Rejected by some of the Greek Philosophers, and a present *Elysium*, and a *Tartarum* in the Room of it, was devised, and erected to receive those *Imaginary Spirits* immediately upon their Separation from the Body. See the continuation of this History by the Author, of *Second Thoughts concerning Human Soul*.

Having compleated what was defective in the History of Human Soul, by way of Preface, as it were, I will proceed to examine upon what Grounds, Men must have this *Substantial Spirit* in them, to be as is said, the Original of all Actions, otherwise inexplicable, by Human Nature produced. That the Original of Man's being made up of two Parts, *Soul and Body*, was a Device of the *Heathens* is evidently plain, because they own a passage of it into other Bodies, which must argue of Necessity a real distinction; so that point, I look upon to be proved, and now let us make

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a Scrutiny into those Actions, or Properties which belong to Man, as *Animæ necessariae propagines* (as I may call them) and they are,

1. Thought : Because it is impossible for Matter to think, Man must have an Immaterial Substance or Spirit, to produce Thoughts.
2. Self-Motion : The *Stimulus* of which is said to be Thought, but yet sometimes a Man moves himself without a previous Thought (as some imagine.)
3. Sensation : Which others also resolve into *Meer Thought* ; because Man makes a Judgment of the Degrees of Pleasure, and Pain by an Estimate of the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness to his Soul.

First, as to Thought in Man, *For God's Thoughts are not as our Thoughts*, nor do my Adversaries the Spiritualists, believe Angelic or Diabolic Spirits think after the manner of Men, but they have an *Intuitive Knowledge*, as the Philosophers call it : That is, they think and
know

know all at one view, and in the same Moment as it were, and require no Collection or Chain of Causes and Effects to be examined into to produce Knowledge, which Men must necessarily do. If Philosophers have here rightly guessed the true Nature of Angelic Knowledge, which I very much doubt, It is plain tho' they differ from Man in the *modus concipiendi Res*, yet they may think (tho' not as we do) and Mr. Broughton is in the right in his Position p.68. *We cannot conceive how an Immaterial Being thinks, yet we conceive that it can think, had the Reason he subjoyns been good, viz. Because we are conscious of our own thinking.* He might as well have said, Angels have Guts and Brains, because Man is conscious that he has such Intestines. A consciousness of our own Power to think no more infers a necessity to believe Angels think, as we do, than it doth, That they breath as we do. For if their Essence be different, their Knowledge, and Proprieties must be different likewise; but of this in its due place. Here I shall presume to prove this Assertion. — *That Matter is absolutely required to be the Subject of Thought in Man: Because,*

I. Most

1. Most of these Essential properties above mentioned, belonging to Matter, Affect Man, both in Respect of his *Body*, as well as *Soul*, or *Immaterial Substance*. Even Thought in Man requires, or implies Succession of time and place, an Affection belonging to Matter, as is before proved. No Man can think *by one Thought* of two things at the same Instant, but he must think of one Thing first, and then another, tho' the Succession of this Thought upon Thought be very unconceivably quick and agile, *v. g.* I think of going a Journey to *London*, I cannot possibly at the same Moment think of not going at all, or of going to another place, but my Mind may alter and a revolution of Thoughts may instantaneously succeed so soon as to divert me from going at all, or turn my purpose of my Journey to *Cambridge*, or some other place. This I conceive always to be the Nature of *Thought*, and experimentally find it so in my self, and therefore believe it to be so in all others under the same Species with my self, and perhaps in Brutes. Now were the product of this Thought from an *Immaterial Substance*, and what they ascribe to the Nature of such a Substance, That it can Essentially

entially pass *ab uno extremo ad alterum non pertransito medio*, this Succession of Thought would never be required, and Mans *Immaterial Substance*, tho' it could not, by Reason of the clog of the Body, (as some are pleased to talk) mount into a fixed Star by a Thought, yet it might think of mounting up thither without the Thought or Conception of some great distance of time and space through which he isto pass. Now I appeal to the most Refined Thinker in the World, if he think at one Thought to mount up to a Star, whether another doth not presently Succeed, and he estimate the distance of space within himself, and Calculate the time in which he will be moving to so high a Sphære. Now that an *Immaterial Substance* is necessitated to do this, to whom Philosophers have given that agility, must be denied; for that it may move without consideration of that Medium, which he must pass, must undeniably be granted, for why should he consider of a Medium through which he doth not pass? But,

2. How comes it to pass that *Thought* must be made the Characteristic Distinction of an *Immaterial Substance* in Man,

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Man, when as it seems to be nothing else (if I am able to comprehend, and define Thought) but a continual circulation or rotation, as it were, of Ideas in the Brain, and not a result of Immateriality, Philosophically speaking? There is its Seat, there is it Circumscribed, or Limited, and a Man can no more move himself a Yard distant from his place by Thought only, than he can move a Mountain with his Finger. Our Saviour to show the Vanity of the Over-careful Worldling, puts the Question, *which of you by taking thought can add to his stature one cubit*, Which altho' our Saviour urged to shew the Vanity of Over-carefulness in worldly Matters, yet there is evidently couched under it a Philosophical Reason to show the insufficiency of Thought working beyond its own Sphære, and that it is but a folly to expect it should. This I mention, because the great Admirers of the *Thinking faculty* in Man cry out, *What is so swift as Thought? How is it possible that Matter can produce Thought*, which is in Heaven, in Hell, at the *Indies*, &c. in a moment, and returns as quick, the next? No *Material Thing* can possibly produce any thing so swift, no, it must be the Result

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sult of an *Immaterial*. But why say I? For like *Davus* in *Terence*, *interturbo omnia, quia rationi non consona*. What think you of the Motion of Rays from the Sun to the Eye, on the Earth, which is calculated already to be so many Millions of Miles distant, altho' it be not quite so swift as Thought, yet considering it is a real Body moved, it is more to be admired, than the Imaginary swiftness of Thought. Those who have been curious to measure the Motion of Light, tell us that it requires time to pass from one place to another, and doth it not in an Instant (which proves it to be Body) and is of all *Motions the quickest*. For the experiment of proving this we are obliged to *Mons. Romer*, who has demonstrated *beyond all contradiction*, from the Observations of the Immersions and Emerfions of the Satellites of *Jupiter*, *That Light requires the time of one Second* (which is the sixtieth part of a Minute) *to move the space of 3000 Leagues, or 9000 Miles, which is near the Earths Diameter*. He that requires a farther Account hereof may consult the *Journal de Scavans*, 1676. Dec. 7. *Philos. Transactions*, Numb. 136. Or *Mr. Newton's Incomparable piece of Philosophiæ Natur. Princ. Mathem. lib. 1. Schol.*

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Schol. Prop. 96. Where it is asserted that light requires about 10 Minutes time to come from the Sun to the Earth. And to shew this Calculation exact, the Ingenious *William Molyneux* of *Dublin*, Esq; in his *Treatise of Dioptricks* sets his Sign of approbation to it, telling us, That this part of *Astronomy* is the most accurately determined, as well as the most useful of all others, pag. 199. And for a farther confirmation appeals to the Labours of the Ingenious *Mr. Flamsteed*, and *Mr. Halley*, to whom the learned World is for ever obliged by their advancements of *Astronomy*. The distance therefore thro' which *Light* passes, according to the Calculation of the distance of the Earth, from the Sun beforementioned, being 57 Millions 530 Thousand 287 Miles, how little doth the Motion thereof differ from Thought? nay, suppose *Thought* could be made a real motion out of the Brain I very much doubt, whether it could move so quick, tho' an *Immaterial Substance*, as that doth. As to our Conceptions from the Representations of things made at never so great a distance upon Earth, Do not the Rays of a Globe of *Light*, not *Immaterial* I hope, strike the Organs of Sight in the

the very 1000. Part of a Minute, if time be so Divisible, as soon as It becomes Visible? tho' 1000 Mile, nay 100000. Distant ! Yet I hope no *Immaterial Substance* sends them forth. Therefore for *Quickness of Motion*, I think *Light* is equal in some cases to *Thought*, and being a real Action, or Motion, and the other but an Imaginary one, therefore the more to be amended. Again, Notwithstanding those Glorious Encomiums upon *Thought*, and *Consciousness* made by some Men, to make it the true criterion of *Immateriality*, doth not *thought Work* within it's own cell of the Skull, as I may say? has it any Bounds to extend itself to beyond the Compass of the Brain ? There the Ambitious Man feigns Imaginary Worlds to conquer, and there the Poor is fed with a perpetual dreaming to be Rich, when as really neither of them are one jot the Richer, or Greater. 5. That instead of *Thought* going to Heaven, Hell, the Indies &c. It's all a Mistake, It's lodg'd within the Skull, and *Ideas* of several things perpetually roll about the Brain, and that's all can be properly said of it. Experience tells us that even by *Thoughts* we may be tired, and long
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Study, has so affected sometimes the Animal Spirits, as that we Grow weary with *Invention*, and want refreshment to supply matter, for the production of *New Thought*. And what can all this be? can we tire an *Immaterial Substance*, whose very Essence is said to be *Thought*, and the Body not in the least concern'd in it? Sure I am, this argues *Passiveness* to the highest degree, which is another Propriety peculiar to *Matter*. And because I have here undertaken to prove that *Man could not Think at all, had he not Body*, I will give you a full Philosophical Essay concerning the Production of *Thought*, which perhaps may please the Curious, tho' some may dislike the verity of it.

Whoever shall see the Brain of a Man whose Scull is Trefined or Trepann'd, for a great fracture, may see it move like a Bed of Worms, or almost like boiling Lead, and it is interwoven with divers subtle Nerves and Arteries, covered with a very thin Tegument or Membrane, call'd by Anatomists the *Pia Mater*. This Motion, together with the Animal Heat, causes several Effluvia perpetually to Issue forth, and fill the cavity of the Scull, through which they
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can't all exhale, altho' the Scull is porous, and has divers Sutures thorough which it is Possible *some of them* may exhale. Having thus in short described the apparent Motion, and production of Effluviiums in the center of the Brain, why may I not reasonably define *Thought* to be the result of certain *Effluviiums* from the Brain, raised and continued by a perpetual Circulation, or Rotation of Ideas thereon impressed, as by God Originally so Ordained. which last clause I have added because I think it impossible for any Man in the World, by meer Philosophy to explain *How Material or Immaterial Substances* either are able to Think, the *modus* is as Unconceivable in one as the other, as Mr. Broughton rightly observes, and an Atom can no more Think, as to Human conception, than an whole Congeries of them, but that Man by the power of God doth think, and that the Brain is the only seat of *Thought*, and is ordained by God to produce the same *quatenus. Material*, these following Reasons incline me to believe.

- I. From their variableness in respect of Health, Diseases, or Wounds affecting

ing the Brain, or any other causes which do the same upon the Animal *Spirits*, which are there Generated and Elaborated. In a Natural firm state of Health, the motion of the Animal *Spirits*, are not only quick and Agile, but Regular in their Nature, so long as the Brain is unhurt and untouch'd, whereupon whilst they are so Kept in due Bounds, Man *Thinks well. i.e.* His *Thoughts and Actions* are conform, which gives them the Denomination of *Rational Actions*, and the more conformity they have, one Man is said to Act more *Wisely* or discreetly than Another. But if these motions of the Animal *Spirits* be perverted, as by a *Mania*, or an *Hydrophobia* especially, where the Disease guides the *Thoughts* by the Impressions, the Poyson from the Mad Dog communicates to Them, or be hurried on by too great Violence, as by Drunkenness, and Feavours, (Things, I hope, not capable of affecting an *Immaterial Substance*) Man *Thinks he Knows not what*, all Regulation of Thought is lost, and the Rational Agent becomes no more, and Acts no better than a Violent Engine driven on by Involuntary Motion. 2. The Variableness of Thought arises suitable

table to the Diseases Men groan under; nay the very conformity of the Scull itself, is very oft the indication of a Natural Fool, according to the Disproportion and Irregularity of its make: When the Animal Spirits are depressed with Melancholy, or the like Diseases, and the Brain loaded, and clog'd with gross Humours, intermixing in the Circulation of the Blood, such as repress the regular fermentation thereof, Man thinks not with the usual activity, or Briskness he was want to do, but his Understanding is *Clouded*, and he feels a *load upon his Spirits*, as we usually say; inso-much that he cares not whether he exerts *Thought* at all, tho' that he cannot but do; For were the Whole Systrasis of the Animal Spirits are totally depressed, Man must Dye, and *then all his Thoughts perish*. Yet this makes him sit generally (allowing some exceptions of Melancholy diseas'd Persons) like an Heavy unactive Lump, as unweildy now, even in his very Thoughts, as Body; And if he doth vouchsafe us some signs of his Thought, and Intentions, they discover so much incoherency, and inconsistency frequently with Rational Actions that it is *Impossible* they should be the product

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duct of any *Immaterial Substance*. But now say You.

How is it possible that the Animal Spirits, being Matter can supply so vast a Supplement to Men, as Thought requires? How can the Ideas, or Images of Things be received or impress'd on Matter so continually in Motion, as to cause a regularity of Thought? How is it possible for us to conceive, but that a very studious Thinking Man should presently exhaust the totum cogitandi penu by the continual drain of Thought, which must be even in Sleep, as well as waking? How comes Thought to be compatible with extension? can a Man have an Inch of Thought, or an Ell of Contemplation? vid. Mr. Broughton. Sect. v. pag. 25.

Wise and Knoty Interrogatories on my Word! To each of which I thus answer. 1. Where Matter is pent and Lock'd up as it were in certain limits or Boundaries, so that it cannot exhale but in very inconsiderable Degrees altho' agitated by violent Motion, the duration of the Motion of those Particles will not be soon terminated, nor the matter be quickly exhausted or evaporated, but

but the same particles will very often change their Site, and Place, and by a Kind of a circulatory Revolution return into the same Channels from whence they were driven. This appears evidently, in Pyrotecnical preparations of Spirit of Wine, which altho' highly Rectified, yet if it be contained closely in a Circulatory Vessel, or Bolt-head Hermetically Sealed, shall not appear to have wasted, or exhaled the 100. Part by the agitation of the Fire. Thus the Scull, and exterior Ligaments of it, wrap up, and so envelop the Brain that but very few Animal Spirits exhale through the Porosities of it, so as to make any considerable *dispendium*, or loss, but they pass, and repass by a continual Circulation of the Blood, and when so exhaled by Perspiration as to cause a *Weariness*, or Weakness, they are, and may be renewed by fresh Aliments, and especially Spirituous Drinks (to whose Nature the Animal Spirits are somewhat Analogous) and then Man will be able to carry on his Invention with new vigour, and activity. This I take to be plain Matter of fact, and confirm'd by the experience of every Man, the manner of whose Life is studious, and more

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occupy'd in *Thoughts*, than *Actions*. Now let us compare this Agitation of Fire on highly rectified Spirits of Wine, with that of the Motion of the Animal Spirits, which they receive from and by the Impressions flowing from Divers Objects. There is a common *maxim* in Philosophy, *Nihil est in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*. There is nothing in the Understanding, which was not (either *eminenter*, or *directe* as Philosophers talk) convey'd thither by the Senses, which *maxim*, *how and with what limitations* its proved true, I will not here *pro* and *con* examine, but only make this inference, that almost all the Ideas of things which make an Impression on the Brain and Animal Spirits make some Impression, first on the *Sensoria*, which Impressions if too violent, hurt and disturb the Brain: As the violence of the direct Rays of the Sun on the Eye, strong smells fumed up the Nostrils, poynant Pains affecting the Nerves by Touch or Taste, and too great sounds disturb the hearing. All this we know to be evidently true, and therefore those Impressions, which excite *Thought* in us (when that Thought has its Original *ab extra*) are usually gentle and soft, when

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when they cause pleasurable desires ; but when they cause terrible and dangerous representations of Objects quite different. This makes us sometimes stupid under great and calamitous Misfortunes as *curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent*, the motion and briskness of the Animal Spirits are crusht and depressed at once, and a Man doth for a time almost lose his whole *faculty of Thinking*, whereupon I conclude that where matter is not violently agitated, as it will not be by the Impressions from *pleasing Objects*, I mean, will not *ordinarily* be so, (for there may be and are as violent extraordinary Emotions toward Pleasure, as pain caused among the Animal Spirits, by strange desires of Lust, and Revenge) because Men frequently covet to enjoy long the pleasant Idea of any Object in their Minds, and it makes them not uneasy to enjoy it even in *Thought*, nor hurries their Spirits into various conturbations, if they are sure, they enjoy all the Pleasure that desirable Object affords ; where Matter, I say, is not violently agitated it will last very long in Motion, and if it be violently agitated, if pent, and lock'd up, as it were, in close confinement, it can never consume, unless there be

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some porosities, or little cavernules, whereby it may exhale, and evaporate. Therefore the Impressions of various Ideas can never waste the Animal Spirits *totally*, but that they do thorough the Senses affect them in different Degrees, and cause various Thoughts, is as evident as the Sun-shine, which even the rankest Sceptick cannot deny. But say, You there are Thoughts in Man *Independant* of the Senses, and the Understanding is the first Parent of them, what shall cause their Original Emotions? What causes Dreams, when all the Senses are locked up, and no Impressions can be made to excite us to desire, or avoid what seems to appear to us in Sleep? *Answ.* Dreams proceed as the Wise Man observes, *Ecl. 5. 2. From a multitude of Business,* or from Divine, or Diabolick Impressions, or from various perturbations in Digestion, and Concoction, all which Act on the Animal Spirits, tho' the Senses are locked up, yet even then the Representations made are usually of some Figure, or Shape, or Quality, belonging to something or other that once occurred to our Senses, and a Man, tho' he can conjoyn in his Fancy, things incompatible in their Natures,

tures, yet he never can form an Image of any thing he never heard, saw, &c. but he must add some Similitude of something he has seen or heard of, so that still the Senses are the Primary, or original Conveyers of all Ideas to the Understanding. And this I take to be the Reason, Because a Man can never form any Idea of *nothing*, and what has never some way or other, either in part, or in the whole, occurred to his Senses, in real Existence or Similitude, is *nothing* to that Man who thinks. Therefore eminently the Original of all Thought must be from sensible Ideas, and those Ideas acting but as I may say, *modo Immateriali*, on the Animal Spirits, can never destroy them, for I allow several Things, but not *Substances*, may be *Immaterial*.

2. This Matter, or Animal Spirit which is the Basis of Thought (for I do not mean *Matter*, and *Thought* to be one and the same, or *Thoughts* to be *Material*) may be, and I have reason to believe, is refined in its Nature to the highest Degree imaginable; and where Matter is so ultimately rarified, or Volatiliz'd, we know into what an Infinity of Particles, as it were, it is reasonable, every one of which are as undoubtedly capable

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ble of *Thought*, by the Power of God, as the whole. I say, by the Power of God, else neither is it conceivable, how any *Immaterial Substance* should think, or Material either. For what Idea can we possibly form of Impressions from Material Beings on *Immaterial Ones*? If a sensible Object affect an *Immaterial Substance* is it not *Passion*, that propriety of matter, in the highest Degree? But suppose *Cogitation* to be the Essence of that *Immaterial Substance* so cryed up, and it sprang from it as Light from the Sun, this runs us but into the same plunge we were in before: Because, the *Bodily Affections* (as I before hinted) have frequently such a force on our *Immaterial Soul*, as that it is determined in it's *Thought*, by Pain or Pleasure from the *Extranea Sensibilia*, which were *Thought* the Result only of our *Immaterial Substance*, and were that Substance such a Noble Spirit, as we talk of it might easily avert either Pain or Pleasure, and altho' it should feel either of 'em, I would exert a *Thought* belonging to either. And this I not only would, but could do, because my *Soul* is a free Agent, and can *Think* as it please. But all this we know to be impossible, for if a Man feels pain, he will think of Pain, and if he

he feels Pleasure, he will *Think* of it, if he be Flesh and Blood, notwithstanding some Men may bear pain, as if never in the least affected with it to show an undaunted Bravery and Courage. And whereas I have above mentioned, that by Reason of the great Refinedness of Matter, in the Animal Spirits, Infinity of Thought may be supplied by an Infinite number of Particles, I mean, only vast varieties of numberless Thoughts, would have as numberless Bases to support them. The Parallels I have above made between *Light* and *Thought* in respect of its swiftness of Motion, may here not unfitly be repeated in respect of its diffusive Nature also. Who can tell to what a vast circumference the Effluvias of matter are able to spread themselves? it is very Wonderful, and prodigious to conceive how the Light of a small Candle in a Dark Night, shall by its Rayes illuminate so vast a Portion of the *Atmosphære quæqua versum* so as to be seen several Miles round by any spectator, and not be Exhausted too, for several Hours tho' expos'd to the open Air. If those Storyes are true, which some Authours deliver concerning Burning Lamps found in Urns, which must have

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have lasted several Hundrd Years in some Cases, we may Reasonable enough conclude, by way of a parallel Argument, that where matter is lock'd, pent up, and not Exhalable, tho' agitated by a violent Motion of Particles (as that from these of Fire must be) it will have an exceeding long duration, therefore these Objections brought from *Thought*, that it would not have a sufficient Supplement from matter to support it, but the *totum cogitandi Penu*, The whole store of Materiality would be quickly exhausted, are sufficiently answered. Thus I hope the Reader is fully satisfied, as far at least as *Thought* can be explained by Philosophy, That *Matter* may be the *Basis of Thought*; Nay according to those Essential ptoperties, before recited, belonging to Matter, nothing else can be conceivable to think in the way Man performs thinking, *i.e.* By certain Ideas Impress'd on the Brain, and Animal Spirits, and by a succession of time and place, which must necessarily accompany *Mans Thoughts*. Tho' it may not those of Spirits, or Angels, nay cannot, if they are *Immaterial Substances*. But,

How can the Ideas, or Images of things be received or impress'd on Matter in continual

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tinual Motion, so as to cause a regularity of Thought? You may as well conceive an Impression to stick on Water, or Ideas to be inhærent in the Air, as on the Animal Spirits. This I must confess seems almost an insuperable Difficulty, because it requires me to explain the *Modus* of things, how *Thought* is made by Impressions on Matter continually changing.

Ans. The quickness, and nimble variety of Thought passing from one Object to another seems to be most adapted to Matter in continual flux, rather than fixed, therefore this can be no reasonable Objection, but a farther explanation rather of the *Modus operandi* in the production of *Thoughts*. And those Objections taken from the Air and Water being in continual Motion, are of as little validity, for if the Species, Images, and representations of Things may be made on Water, and in the Air, so as they evidently may, as to continue on them *apparently* in the very same place: So the violent current of either the Motion of the Material Animal Spirits cannot ever alter, or vary the outward visible Image, or Representation of an Object impress'd on them, but Man will judge of the same,

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as before, notwithstanding a continued successive flux of new Animal Spirits receive the Idea. Here perhaps you Philosophise right, but must there not be something in Man to judge of these Images, or Ideas impress'd on the Animal Spirits, call'd by some, our *Immaterial Soul*? I answer, No; 1. Because, its existence, has never been yet fully proved. 2. Because I take it to be an evident Truth, that God *both, can, and may make Matter capable of Thinking*, when he pleases; and if so, capable also in it self, of *judging* (which is but a *Modus of Thought*) of those Ideas, which are impressed on different small particles of Matter, call'd the Animal Spirits of the whole Man. 3. Because, tho' it might be true, that we had such an *Immaterial Substance* it is both inexplicable, and unconceivable how the Animal Spirits with the Ideas, they bear, could any wise affect *Immateriality*. But now for an *Inch of Reason*, or *Thought*, and an *Ell of Contemplation*. This Gentleman, I presume, never thought of any other Quantity than bare *Quantitas Molis*, as Dr. Glisson's Phrase is, or *Continuū*, with which *Thought* was incompatible, and therefore those Expressions
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are absurd. But if he had read about Discrete Quantity, as *Time*, *Place* and *Motion*, he would have found no absurdity in *length of Time*, or *Place*, and it would not have been any incongruity of Speech to move an *Inch* or an *Ell* farther. The Sun moved ten Degrees backward, which Word *Degrees* argues Length, and Length, Extension, I make no Question, and its no absurdity to say *Degrees* contain both Inches and Ells, and also measure our Time. Altho' the propriety of our Speech cannot be justified strictly no more than a *dram of Reason* to weigh your Argument with, yet the *Substance of the Expression* is the same, and my *Thought may be long and tedious*, tho' not extended like a *Continuum* or Body, without the absurdity of an *Inch* or *Ell of them measured out*. It is time (as measured by Motion) that measures our Thoughts, which is contained under Discrete, tho' not under Continued Quantity, therefore he that argues thus, must argue by *proper Measures*, or else it is but like the Stork in the Fable, who invited the Fox to drink out of a Bottle, that is, He will endeavour to reduce his Adversary *ad absurdum* by a Medium as absurd as the Consequence he proves. Thus

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a Man may be said to make a *long*, or *short Discourse*, and proper too, yet an Inch or Ell of Discourse, would be as ridiculous as an Inch of Reason, or an Ell of Contemplation. Do you not think it possible that a Man may *spin out a Thought* (as we say, and I add) *to carry on the Thread of Discourse*? Tho' the Expressions are figurative, yet they couch under them plainly the whole Work of *Invention*, and signifie as much as that a Man must measure his Thoughts by *Time*, as he doth his Cloath by the *Ell* or *Yard*, to make a compleat Discourse. But say you, a *single Thought* cannot be measured, tho' *many Thoughts* following one another require *Time*. Nor indeed if we argue the Parallel, an instant of time cannot also be measured (say I) by Motion, yet no Man will deny but that if he argue according to the Rules of Wisdom, *That length of days are in her Right Hand*, otherwise *His Thoughts are but as a Shadow*. Job 19, 7. One thing I have passed by, which ought, as I humbly conceive, to be answered, *viz*: Why Man doth not always think, even in Sleep, seing the Animal Spirits being in continual motion, Sleeping and Waking, are by me made the Subject of *Thought*. To
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side in, and exert themselves. For as he has appointed the Outward Senses to be lockt up for a while, so has he given a power to Man to lay aside *Thought* for a Time, if it be True, what has been just now asserted, *That Man is Ordained to enjoy vicissitudes &c.* And this I endeavour to prove True, because it is conformable to God's Wisdom, and Providential care of the World, expressed largely *Psalms 104. Who appointeth the Moon for Seasons: The Sun knoweth his going down. Thou makest Darkness, and it is Night, wherein all the Beasts of the forests do creep forth.* This is the Time appointed for them to seek after their Prey. *v. 19, 20. The Sun riseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their Dens. And then Man goeth forth to his Work, and unto his labour until the Evening. v. 22, 23.* This is the Time appointed for Rest, which a continual Production of *Thought* would hinder; and as *Death* is call'd a *Sleep* figuratively, so they who dye in the Lord Rest from their Labours. *Revel. 14. 13.* and in the Grave *the Weary are at rest. Job. 3, 17.* Therefore *Thought* in sleep is no more necessary, tho' the Animal Spirits be in motion, than that all motion should be Progressive, or Rectilinear. Now if this

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Answer, satisfie not the curious Inquisitive Philosopher, because of the Words, *God has Ordained*, and I prove that Ordination too; let my Adversary but give me half such a plausible Reason (as all Reasons here from bare Philosophy are no better) for the *Union of Mans Immaterial Distinct Substance* to his Body, for its *Passiveness* caused by Body, and the like, and *clypeum projiciam*; for, as I before mentioned, it is impossible without recurring in some cases to the *Power of God*, to explain the various Phænomena's in Nature, especially *how Matter is capable of Thought at all*. Nor should I have attempted to show the possibility thereof, if I saw not such trifling Reasons, and almost plain whimsies brought as Arguments to support the Existence of a Substance, which its impossible for us to conceive to Exist, without believing Contradictions to be true. Nay when we have framed to our selves an imaginary Existence of that *Substance*, call'd *Immaterial*, yet we find it as unconceivable or more to explain *how it Thinks* as Matter it self. Therefore to say *Matter Thinks by the Power of God*, can neither tend to Atheism, or Irreligion, and consequently may be a Philosophy no sober Man ought to be ashamed

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of; as he might be, if perswaded to believe Contradictions.'

I shall add but little concerning the *Union*, and *Loco-motion* (a propriety belonging to Matter) of this *Immaterial Substance* in Man. For that it must be conceived *United to the Body*, if it be really such, as we are taught, is evidently plain, but how such a Conception is possible to be formed by Human Understanding, I challenge all the World to tell me and seeing its no Article of Faith, I think I may term it no better than a Philosophic Imposture. And when my Adversaries come to explain, at least endeavour to explain this Riddle, they gravely tell us; 1. What they *do not* mean by *Union in this Case*; and, 2. What they do mean by it. When as to any one who shall examine nicely into such their attempts of Explications, *What they do mean, and what they do not*, amounts to the very same thing, and the Reader is left as unsatisfied as ever. He that would see a Specimen of this Nature, may read Mr. Broughton's 9th Chapt. of his *Psychologia*, who has there managed the point to admiration by singular turns of unintelligible Explications. Thus when
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its *Coexistence* seems to be utterly Impossible, its *separate Existence* must apparently be much more Impossible in my apprehension, in as much as it will then be destitute of any thing real to support it. That this *Immaterial Substance* in Man, moves with his Body, as *Res contenta cum continente*, is so Self-evident to our Reason, that our Senses must be allow'd to be impos'd upon in every thing we see, hear, feel or tast, if it be not readily granted. Wherefore I pass on to consider after *Thought*, the next general Argument drawn from Self-motion.

2. *Self-motion*. This Argument I think sufficiently proved, nay demonstratively too in Brutes, who have an *Autogenon* a Self-motion, as well as Man. However I'll say something more to it, because the Reverend Mr. Broughton, tells the World, *That it is an old Argument, and he likes it the better*, p. 5. *Præf.* And so should I, did it carry the Face of Truth with it. For where Truth has Antiquity to back it, it's like Beauty in a young Woman well dress'd, which makes her a grateful Spectacle to every Body, and a more than ordinary Charm to her Admirers: But if a Lye be obtruded upon us *ab antiquo*, I

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look upon it to be like an old Decrepit Woman, dressed in fine Cloaths, whom at a distance you may admire for the glittering of her Habit, but when you draw near to view her Face, the surprising Hagg adds another Wonder to your Eyes, and you stand amazed at the Reason of so misplacing your first admiration. Such Tricks have Philosophers play'd with us, and often with speciousness of Truths derived from Antiquity deluded our Understanding, especially in Matters relating to the Nature of *Human Soul*, concerning which both ancient Jews and Heathens have formed such horrid, strange, odd and uncouth Notions, as would make a Man break out into that passionate pretty answer of Dr. Burnet, when he makes it an Objection why the *Ægyptians*, a Wise and Learned Nation should be deluded into Idolatry of Dogs, Onions, &c. *Uti Divina sapientia, ita Humana Stultitia est imperscrutabilis. Archæolog. Philos.* Mans Folly is so great that it is past finding out. *vid. Dr. Hody* of the Resurrection of the same Body. However let us try whether this *av Tolonac* proves any thing for an *Immaterial Substance*, either in Man or Beast.

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The first Impression of a Body-movent which strikes the Senses, is *Motion*, without any farther Inquisition into the Principle of that Motion, whether it proceed from *Internal*, or *External Principle*, Material or Immaterial. The Second thing that occurs to our Thoughts is a *disquisition* about this Principle of Motion, whence it arises, and then if it appear a Self-movent Body, we necessarily conclude it to have an *Internal Principle* of Motion, and in Man, no other than an *Immaterial active Substance*, called *Soul*. This I take to be the whole Chain, and foundation of such Argumentation, grounded upon this *Maxim*. — *That Matter cannot move it self*. — To which I answer:

1. That if any Body visibly move, or seem to move it self, that it is no necessary consequence that it has in it an *Immaterial Substance* the principle or Spring of that Motion. For suppose the *Earth* moves, and as far as we can discern has an *Internal principle* of Motion, can we call it therefore an *Immaterial Substance*, which hurries it so fast round its Axis in 24 hours? Look out sharp for an *Anima Mundi Platonica* if you give any credit to such an Opinion. But I

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suppose you will rejoyne, *That God gave the Earth this Regular Original Motion in the first Creation. Ab Externo; Bid it move and it moved, and so shall unto the Worlds end.* All this I grant true, yet this is a concession, that a Body may be made Originally self-movent without an *Immaterial Substance* implanted in it.

So say you, *it may, but no Living Body can have self-motion without an Immaterial Substance* united to it, we never Read that God gave *Man or Brutes* an Original self-movent faculty, as they were *Material Bodies*, but as they were Endowed with vigorous Active Souls, or *Immaterial Substances*, as we now call them. How? Let the Waters bring forth abundantly the moving Creature that hath Life Gen. i. v. 20. God created every living Creature that moveth, and the Waters brought forth abundantly after their Kind. v. 21. call'd again v. 24. the Living Creature of his Kind. And v. 25. the same. Now I would gladly ask my Antagonist, whether God created not the first moving Creatures self-movent, by the Principle of Life only? If they generated their Kind, whether they

they beget not Creatues *self-movent* also,
*As Adan begat Sons and Daughters in
his likeness, or after his own Similitude.*
i. e. *Living self-movent* Creatures, without
an *Immaterial Substance* unless *Life* be
such, which I doubt my Antagonist will
never grant? See more of this in the
Author of *Second Thoughts*; and all that
I shall add here at present is to make this
conclusive inference, *That if God has or-
dained the Globe of the Earth to move it
self by the first Impression to the Worlds
end, we have a better Reason to suppose
God gave Man ability to communicate all
these Powers, he endowed the first Man
with, to his succeeding Generarions. i. e.
Life, Reasoning and self-motion.* But,

2. Suppose this Principle *Matter can-
not move it self* be false, as I have
Reason so to believe it, for excepting
the Original Motion at the first Creation
of *Chaos* out of nothing, I assert that
*God has given all Matter, as now created,
and informed, a Power to move it self,* and
were there not some latent and unknown
Reasons of the Divine Wisdom concealed
from us, it should always exert that Power.
But perhaps to preserve the Order and
Frame of the Universe, which, should
all

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all Matter start up into Self-motion, would necessarily be destroy'd, God has thought fit to restrain it. You may perhaps think this an odd piece of Philosophy, yet it looks so like Truth, that I cannot disbelieve it. The whole *Benedicite* applying it self to *Storms, Hail, Fire, Thunder, Clouds, &c.* to praise the Lord, seems to be a perfect Demonstration of an Innate Power lodged in them to exert the Will of the Almighty, when commanded. And in the Gospel, *The Winds and the Sea* Obey'd our Saviour, *Mat. 8. 27.* or ceased upon his rebuking them to exert the Power of Violence God had endowed them with. Nay not only supernatural Effects wherein the Divine Power is immediately concern'd, but even Natural causes seem to confirm this as an evident Truth. For when God was pleased to exert the Power of his Vengeance over the Earth by a general Deluge, *The fountains of the great deep were broke up, and the Windows or Floodgates of Heaven were opened, Gen. 7. 11.* Insomuch that the Mountains were covered with Water fifteen Cubits high, *v. 20.* When Moses stretched out his Hand and divided the Red Sea, and when the Soles of the feet of the Priests
who

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who bare the Ark of the Covenant, rested in the Water of Jordan, the Waters of Jordan were cut off from the Waters that came down from above, Jos. 3. 13. When Mountains at the presence of God shall rent in sunder, and the Earth melt away before him, it seems to be more Philosophically explained by God Almighty's permitting matter to exert itself by some Innate Power of Self-motion, to produce those stupendous Effects by the determination of his Almighty Nod, as the Fathers express it, to break the Frame and Bounds of Nature for a time, for a Punishment of the Sins of Men by Deluges and Earthquakes, and bring it to the State of its Primitive *Chaos*, a lump of Matter without Form and Void, hurled every way by Discordant Principles.

—*Rudis indigestaq; moles.*

*Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners, congestaq;
eodem,*

*Non bene junctarum discordia semina
rerum.*

Ovid. Metamorph. Lib. 1.

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I say it seems more like a Philosopher to explain these Supernatural miraculous effects by asserting Gods giving the Waters a power of *self-motion* to overflow all Boundaries whatever, unless the Almighty please to say, *hitherto thou shalt go and no farther*. To make the Waters of *Jordan Divide themselves*, as well as the Red Sea, because neither the *Stretching out of Moses hand*, or the *trampling of the Priests feet*, can ever be suppos'd, which way soever supernaturally endow'd to be fit instruments to Divide the Sea, *so as to be a Wall* on each side the *Israelites*, or make the Waters of *Jordan stand on each side on heaps*, or to divide and rend a Mountain into pieces by an Earthquake. For suppose God sends his Angels to produce these wonderful effects, pray what Rational Idea can you conceive of that Angel, whom you make an *Immaterial Substance* (consider that well) thrusting up and driving before him, as it were, a vast Abyss of Waters from the caverns of the Earth to overflow the superficies of it; or of other Angels, standing with their Barriers to hinder the Union of the Sea or *Jordan*; *Immaterial Substance* barricadoing with I know not what material *Obices* (if they can use

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use them) the conflux of Waters,
Ec.

Sure I am, it is better Philosophy to suppose an *αὐτοκίνητος* in all matter Originally given, than to suppose Created and Informed matter not able to move it self. Thus again in the General Conflagration, *The Powers of Heaven shall be shaken, Mark 13, 29. For by God all Powers consist, Coloss. 1, 17. and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat, 2. Pet. 3, 12.* and even in the Preservation and course of the frame of Nature that now is, God commands, and raises up the stormy Winds which lifteth up the Waves of the Sea, *Pf. 107, 25,* and again *He maketh the Storm a Calm, so that the Waters thereof are still. v. 29.* As all these and several other places denote the Omnipotence of God in working wonderful effects by his Almighty Hand, so his Power in letting loose those Discordant Elements in matter to act according to his will by *their own power*, is better Philosophy than to aver, Matter cannot move it self, but it must be an *Immaterial Agent* that produces these wonderful Effects. But come a little nearer yet: The Flux and Reflux of the Sea, has
cau-

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caused a great debate amongst Philosophers concerning its Original Cause; whether the Influence of the Moon, or the bare Motion of the Earth can produce it: By the Mosaic Philosophy, the influence of the Moon seems not to be concerned any more, than as an Index or Sign of the Flux thereof; *For God said let there be lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night: and let them be for Signs and for Seasons and for Days and for Years. Gen. 1, 14.* However if other Philosophers assert the Moons Influence to cause a Flux and Reflux, they have not so good a Reason for it, (I aver) as I have *that God endowed it with an ἐντελὴν, at its original Creation; because the Flux in several Places falls not to be at the highest when the Moon is in its Meridian, tho' it doth in most places in the World, as vid. Varenij. Geogr. Gen. l. 1. Prop. 18.* Therefore the Inequality of its Influence, on the same Body is a just Reason to question whether it has any at all, *quid idem, quò idem, semper facit idem.* Furthermore, what is all the Generation of Metals; and Production of Plants and Trees, but a continued afflux of Matter by an Original Motion
it's

it's endowed with, uniting it self into one Mass, and one particular Form? If the Sun excite the Salts of the Earth to make a conflux of Matter to nourish a Tree or Plant, pray what excites the Production of Minerals perhaps 10 or 20 Fathom deep in the Bowels of the Earth, to which its Influence, I doubt, never can attain? Lastly to Conclude from one familiar Instance by way of Experiment. It is a maxim amongst all who own *Matter cannot move it self*, that if *Two quiescent Bodies be conjoynd*, neither can move the other, because they are both Matter. Now I think Powder of Coral, and Oyl of Vitriol, are in themselves two quiescent Bodies, yet if they are conjoynd, it is evident to our Senses that they will both move with great Violence and Ebullition. Pray which began this Motion? Not the Coral, for that is next to plain Dust? Nor the Oyl of Vitriol, for that is so very fixed a Matter, that even Fire it self cannot exalt it into a volatile active Body. Why? How then? O! that is easy to be solv'd; for the Particles of the Vitriol, having lodged in them several fermentative Particles of Fire, do corrode the Coral as soon as poured thereon,
and

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and in its cavities imbibe or absorb those of a contrary Nature, by which conjunction, a Motion or Ebullition is raised. Very Good! Pray what doth this prove, but that there is a Principle of *Self-Motion* in all Matter, if it be excited by a proper Subject? An Acid will not excite it but a meer *insipid quiescent Alkali* will, so that its plain *Matter may move Matter, altho' quiescent, per accidens* at least, which indeed is but an odd piece of Philosophy to an *Immaterialist*, yet its evidently true to our Senses. Therefore an *avTouveois* can never possibly be urged upon good Grounds for the proof of the Existence of any *Immaterial Substance*. However (say you) tho' Internal Motion may be in several Bodies, yet those Bodies have not Power *to move at their Pleasure* as Man has, but we find something in us which has that Power evidencing to us a Distinction of *Beings*, let the Word *Substance* alone. v. g. 'My 'Hands and my Feet move, or cease from 'moving, at my Will and Command, 'which shows that my *Organic Body* must 'have something within it, which is not 'Body, to exert this Motion, and cause 'this Cessation at Pleasure. For the
'Me-

‘*Movent* and *Mobile* cannot be the same. Furthermore the same time I talk, and discourse with you there must be something different in us (from Rational actions) to perform Inferiour and Natural Actions, as Concoction, Nutrition, &c. *vid.* Dr. Nicholl’s 5th Conference with a Theist.

Answ. I very much wonder any Immaterialist should bring such an Objection, yet plead for an *αιτιον* to be one of the Distinguishing Characteristics of an Immaterial Substance in Man: Because the Body cannot move it self, or cease from Motion at Pleasure, therefore it must have some Principle, which is not Body, distinct from it. If this consequence were good as to Man’s having in him something distinct, let *Substance* alone if you please, to move him at Pleasure, and cause his Body to *Rest* likewise at Pleasure, why are not Brutes upon the same level? They move and rest at Pleasure, as well as Man, yet I hope have no Immaterial Principles in them, different from those in Man. But again, pray what moves a *Spirit*? We believe a Spirit can move it self, and if so according to this way of Argumentation, it must have something distinct from it self, tho’ an Immaterial Substance,

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stance, to make it move or rest *ad libitum*, which I reckon very absurd. Besides, what have we lost our *Immaterial Substance*, which has all along been insisted on, and been the very foundation of those Erroneous Opinions about Human Soul? Then I doubt we shall quickly lose its existence in a *Separate State*, for accidents (to go on Philosophically with you) are *Beings*, come under the rank of *Entia*, and may be *Principles* of other *Beings* as Motion is of Fire, and and Cold of Ice, &c. Yet have no separate Existence assigned them in *rerum Natura*. Again, for a Body to be Self-movent, yet moved by something Internal *distinct from it*, looks like a Fallacy, if not a Contradiction, for the same Argument that proves it to be moved by another distinct Being, proves it not Self-movent. Powers, Properties, and Motion, tho' they are distinct Beings [*Aware Hawk Substances*] in the Conceptions of our Understanding, yet have no *distinct Existence* from the Subject in which they are, whilst they remain in it: But they make up the Being or Existence (as I call it) of that Subject under certain Limitations, tho' it remain one and the same Subject still: As the *Body-movent* is the very same

same thing in its Nature as the *Body Quiescent* only it acquires in our Mind a different Denomination, not an Essential distinction to be superadded. Thus Rationality a Property added to Man, adds no New Being to him, considered as a Living Creature, but only a Denomination, limited to the same Subject, as imagined to be living, by a Soul and Body united; tho' others say, by Life as a Power inherent in the Subject, *Body*.

But above all, I wonder how this Worthy Dr. should jump from Rational to Natural Operations in the Body, to prove thereby the Existence of an Immaterial Substance. For why? If the Animal Spirits, or any Spirituous Liquor, promote Concoction, and Nutrition, may not the same *Species of Spirits* be the Subject of my reasoning faculty? I hope he is not so bad a Philosopher, as not to know that the Animal Spirits are scattered and diffused over every part of the Body, and are ordained for different Offices, some to perform Digestion, others Sanguification, others Local Motion, &c. But the main difficulty lyes here, *How the Material Animal Spirits can be the Cause, or Original of Thought*, which I think I have given

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highly probable Reasons, and as demonstrative, as the Thing will bear, that according to the *Modus cogitandi* in Man, nothing but Matter can be conceived to be the *Original Foundation of Thought*. I must confess it is very exceeding difficult, tho' not impossible, for us to conceive, *How Matter can think*; because we conjoyn the Power of God to our own Natural Reason to render it possible; as we must do, if a Tree or a Block should supernaturally start up before us into the Form and Figure of a Man. But put the Ballance on the other side, and let us Conceive a *Modus* if we can, *of Thinking in an Immaterial Substance*, nay farther, How can it perform Digestion? How *Loco-motion* without Contact? These are far greater difficulties than the former; because the Existence of this Immaterial Substance is a Conception near to, if not a plain Contradiction, but the Notion of a Stock, or Stone being *able to think*, is easily admitted, when once we are convinced of the possibility of eithers Living or being endowed with Life.

The third and last grand Proof urged usually to prove the Existence of this
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Immaterial Substance in Man is *Sensation*. Having said already something of this Nature, I shall only here put that irrefragable Question, if it denote an *Immaterial Substance* in Man, why not in Brutes? Whom nothing but a *Lusus Ingenij* ever made mere *Automata*? The like to which, I take that Position to be, *That all Sensation is meer Thought*, and so I leave it to my Reader to judge whether he *Feels*, because he *Thinks* he doth, or whether the *Thoughts* of Pain are not subsequent to the Impressions made on him from any Subject or Object.

Thus I think I have untyed, not cut, the Gordian Knot of our *Immaterial Substance*, shown its incomprehensibility by Human Understanding, tho' no Article of Faith, which in any other Case almost would be a firm Foundation for our Disbelief of its Existence, if we were not able to comprehend it possible to exist; That it is not applicable upon warrantable Reasons to God, to Angels, to Evil Spirits, or to Man upon the Account of Cogitation, Self-Motion, or Sensation, all supposed to be the Results, or Effects] of an *Immaterial Substance*, call'd the Soul of Man. And now one

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would think I have said what is requisite on this Subject, but because some *Wise Virtuoso's* of this age have found out an *Immaterial Substance*, or *Spiritual Soul* in Brutes also, tho' perishable with it, as they yield, I will add some Remarks against that opinion also which may pass as arguments.

1. Because *Immaterial Substance*, if the *Souls* of Brutes are such, is not conceivable by the Human Understanding in Men, much less in Brutes to exist. Because,

2. The Reason for Brutes as for Men, to be endowed with *Souls*, call'd *Spiritual* or *Immaterial Substances* is vastly different. The Philosophers saw Man capable of the Highest Acts of Reason, Blessed with Speech, capable of Judging Good and Evil, of searching into the Nature of the whole Universe, able to devise Sciences and Schemes of Knowledge, &c. Therefore they not knowing the *Power of God*, might suppose Man unable to do such Wondrous Things without the Aid and Assistance of a *Spiritual Substance* united to his Body. But they never had the like Reason to attribute the same to *Brutes*, nor ever did that I meet with. But,

3. Suppose no Philosopher ever spake
of

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of it, and that a New discovery may be made in this Generation, yet we ought to have very good Reasons, all *Demonstrative* almost to convince us: If no Writer before us has never asserted it in part, or in the whole; or if it be a Doctrine only grounded upon the Opinion of *some few*, because the Parallel instances of the Operations of *Men and Brutes* cannot be otherwise solved without the Supposition of this *Immaterial Substance* in Brutes, as well as in Men. Those *few* also ought to give us better Reasons than those I have read, to prove the existence of such *Immaterial Substances* in Brutes, viz. That they are as salt to the Body, as if an *Immaterial Substance* were the fittest Pickle for a *Material* one, &c. vid. Dr. Nicholl's 5th Conference with the Theist. Now bare assertion without sufficient Authority or good Reason, can never pass for an Argument, and therefore such an Opinion ought to be rejected.

4. Immateriality relating to *Substance*, must infer Incorruptibility, inasmuch as it is not endowed with any Elementary Principles, which might cause a jarring, *lucta*, or tendency to Corruption, so that to make the Souls of *Brutes Imma-*

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terial, yet Corruptible, I look upon it to be a plain Contradiction in Philosophy. Then,

5. If *Brutes* have an *Immaterial*, and consequently an *Immortal Soul*, what can distinguish Man from Brutes in respect of the Religious End of Man's Creation? Immortal Life after Death is the Reward of the Just for good Works done, and shall we attribute this to Brutes? Because Forsooth, God may have some end in raising Brutes at the Resurrection which we do not know of, so he may give them Immortal Souls as well as us. These *May-be's* are such pretty Devices of late, that I think they require no other Answer, than what is common, when any thing is offered without ground of proof, *What May-be, may not be*, and we are sure from Revelation that *Immortal Life* will be the Reward of the Righteous in the next World, and that the Life even in this World is signally regarded by the Almighty Providence, *That whoever sheds Mans Blood, by Man should his Blood be shed*: But have not the least Word for Brutes *Living again* after Death from Divine Testimony, or that their *present Life* is, or ought to be valued, but they are ordained by God for the
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Sole use of Man, and may be killed at discretion to support his Nature, without being branded for Murder in the separation of the Spiritual from the Material Substance of Brutes.

How far Philosophy has impos'd upon the World by the Doctrine of ancient Heathens, and not after the *Rudiments of Christ*; I will comparatively in the last place consider, after I have made a kind of an *Anacæphalæosis*, or Recapitulation of the whole precedent Discourse, with some few Observations uncautiously before omitted. That all my prejudiced Adversaries may imitate the Noble Bereans, and if I speak Truth, *Embrace it with all readiness of Mind*, at least search the Scriptures daily whether these things, I insist on, are so. Acts 17. v. 11. The first point of which is, *That no Man is able to comprehend any thing above the Power or reach of his Understanding.* Upon this Principle I found my whole Argumentation against an *Immaterial Substance*, as being a Notion involving such variety of contrarieties, or Contradictions in it, That it is impossible for any Man to form a True and Adequate Conception of it, and consequently whoever pretends he

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he can do it, must be in the wrong, it being impossible in Nature, to form any Notion of the Truth of two contradictory Propositions, for herein, says Mr. Broughton, *lyes the very Nature of a Contradiction, that it is a thing impossible to be conceived*, pag. 27. This being granted (as it must be without harping unnecessarily upon the Words *Comprehend*, and *Conceive*, which I take leave to use here promiscuously for one and the same) the next thing that follows, will be to enquire, whether there are not some things in Nature *incomprehensible*, or *unconceivable* by us, yet infer no Contradiction, or manifest Inconsistency and Repugnancy in their own Natures, as to their Existence. To which I Answer, Yes, but then the Existence of these Beings fall not under the *reach of Human Understanding* as a rational faculty but are purely the *Objects of Faith*, as the Existence of God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Ghost in the Trinity, is wholly *Incomprehensible* by our weak Understanding, I mean as to their *Modus existendi* in the Trinity, not as to their simple Existences. This makes me abide by the tenth of the first Rule, *viz. That whenever there occurs an unintelligible Idea of*
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any Being, i. e. incomprehensible by our Understanding, the Existence of that Being must be wholly a Matter of Faith, and we can have no true Idea of it but from Divine Revelation. For that God doth exist, I think my Understanding is as capable of conceiving a *posteriori*, as of the Existence of any other thing in the World, and if I should say it was impossible to conceive his *Existence true and real*, I must at the same time declare infinite Wisdom to have laid command on Man to Worship, what he was not also to conceive should Exist, but in his own imagination, which is Unreasonable, Impious, and Absurd.

Hereupon I stated a 5th Rule, *That the difficulty of our Conception of the Existence of a Thing doth not necessarily infer the Non-Existence thereof*, but if it involve in it a Contradiction, &c.

Having thus by some general Rules examined into the common Notion of God, as conceived to be an *Immaterial Substance*, I have presumed (and I hope upon true and solid Grounds of Reason and Religion too, or else I should be heartily sorry for my Error) to deviate from
it,

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it, as not being compatible with the Divine Attributes of the Infinite, Omniscient God. Where by the By, I desire my Reader to Understand, that when I speak of the *Notion of God, Angels, Devils*, That I mean *Their Natures adapted to those Notions we are able to form of them suitable to other properties we must attribute to God, Angels, &c.* For I look upon that Man not to act according to the utmost degree of rational Prudence, who owns *this or that* to be true, or false, because he has been *taught such a Doctrine all his Life time*, and it is the concurrent Opinion of most of the Learned Men in the World: But he that tries whether he can form a right Idea in his Mind of the Truth, or falsity of what he is *bid* believe. Is it possible for me to conceive, what those learned Sages Dictate? Doth it imply no incompatibility in Nature or Contradiction? Is it the Object of my Faith or the Subject of my Reason? If you can satisfy your self in these points, you have done all that Human Understanding is able to perform, and if that you are after all this in an Error, it must be invincible, and consequently pardonable. As for Instance, most of the Learned World by Edu-

Education taught beyond Seas, bid you conceive *Bread to be Living Flesh*, or Christ's Body, and you answer, *I cannot*, because there is a manifest Incompatibility in Nature, and its not the Object of Faith, and therefore such a Conception is impossible, and meerly Chimerical. Now if such Questions are put in relation to the Existence of a God-head, as an *Infinite, Omnipresent Power*, the Notion of *Power* is adapted to the Nature of Infinity, and Omnipresence, nay and Eternity too (as before proved) and I can frame a right Idea of a *Boundless Power, existing every where essentially, at the same Minute*, when I cannot form such an Idea of *Substance*, but my Thoughts are apt to bend themselves to *Anthropomorphy*, or some ridiculous, and derogatory Conception of an Old Man sitting like a Mighty Prince, &c. Such is the frailty of Human Understanding, and such indeed it ought to be, whilst we are in the Flesh, else we should be able to form an Adequate Conception of an Incomprehensible Nature, which is impossible for us to do, and all I pretend to, and all that any Man in the World, even the most refined Thinker whatever, can offer at in relation to the Conception

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ception of the Divine Nature, is to pitch upon some Notion that comes the nearest to it that may be, tho' it must after all be imperfect, and inadequate, some way or other, yet it need not imply a Contradictory Nature, as I humbly conceive *Immaterial Substance* to do. But say you, if we conceive not God to be *Substance*, how can we conceive him to be the first *Person* in the Trinity, or second *Person*, &c. What Idea can we form of *One sitting on a Throne*, Revelat. of St. John 4. v 2. *To whom the four and twenty Elders bowed down, as he sate on the Throne*, v. 10. What I have already said in answer to this Objection pag. may be given here, viz. That such Expressions in H. S. are and must be made, and used to Mankind by Reason of the Weakness of Human Understanding, which is not able to comprehend the Essence, Nature, or *Modus Essendi* of God, by any Adequate conception whatever as is before granted. For when I Esteem God to be *Power*, I am not so vain to think I have formed a perfect and adequate Conception of the God-head, because the Notion of Self-subsistency necessarily attends my Thoughts at the same time,
and

and altho' I have satisfied for the Attributes of Æternity, Infinity, and Omnipresence, as far as Human Conceptions can do, yet the defect lies still here. How is it possible to conceive a *Self-subsistent Power* ? *vid. p.* answered in part, and here I superadd as a full Answer according to Reason, that ORIGINAL POWER must be, nay cannot possibly be otherways conceived than *Self-subsistent*, tho' I must deny that it doth *Substare cuilibet accidenti*, because it gives Being (which denotes *Power*) to it self, and every thing else : Therefore if ORIGINAL POWER did inhere in any Subject the same time it testified its Existence by its Operations in the said Subject, it could not be *Original*, but the Subject must have a priority of Existence, therefore if it has Existence, it must have *Self-subsistency*, as being Independent of any Subject whatever. Thus far by the Strength of Reason we are able to conceive the Existence of a *Self-subsisting Power* without involving in our Conceptions a Contradiction, or incompatible Idea of the Nature of God, tho' what that *Power* is, as to its Quiddity, or Essence, as Philosophers call it, is as unexplicable, unconceivable, and

and unscrutable as ever, and so it ought to be, if we have the right Idea of a God. But as to the Nature of Angels, the 6th Rule is an infallible Guide, both to comprehend them and also Evil Spirits, and all the rest refer to that *unintelligible Substantiality of Human Soul*; which I think needless here to repeat, I shall only superadd by way of Dialogue between *Philosophus* and *Theologus*, the contrarieties of Philosophy to the Holy Scriptures, *i. e.* where the Philosopher puts his Illusions upon us, and where the Scripture guides us by plain Words and Expressions to the contrary, yet we do distort them from their plain common meaning, and will not be undeceived.

Philos. What do you, Dear *Theologus*, take a *Spirit* to be? *Theolog.* Something, *that hath not Flesh and Bones*, Luke 24. 39. *Philos.* No, there you are out, for a Definition ought not to be Negative. *Theol.* What is it then say you? *Philos.* It is an *Immaterial Substance*. *Theol.* Is not *Immaterial* a Negation? *Philos.* Yes but we are forced to use such Expressions and Words as may best suit with Human Conceptions, and the Nature of the Thing we intend to define.
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For we cannot allow *Spirit*, and *Body* to be applicable to the same thing, and when we conceive the Idea of *Spirit*, we abstract from it all *Matter*, all *Extension*, all *Passion*, or *Passiveness*, all *Loco-motion* in succession of time or place. All *Inpenetrability* of *Dimensions*, all *Divisibility*, all *Visibility*, or *Tangibility* *per se*, and all *Insensation*, or *Insensibility*. *Theol.* Truly, this is a very hard thing indeed, but when you have taken away all these properties of *Matter*, you make a kind of a Devil of it, methinks, And pray what *Philosophical Ornaments* do you give it in the Room of them, our *St. Paul* says, *1 Cor. 15.* *There is a natural Body, and there is a spiritual Body*, which if he be in the right, as I believe he is, I doubt you play the Impostor. *Philos.* O no, no, your *St. Paul* talks not like a *Philosopher*, but like a *Christian Teacher* of some *New Doctrines* as he did at *Athens* when the *Epicurean Philosophers* derided him, as your own *Writers* tell you, *Acts 17. 19.* Now when we have abstracted all those properties belonging to *Matter*, we give the *Spirit* all *Sensation*, (if in the *Body*) and the *Eyes*, *Ears*, *Tongue*, &c. are but as *Instruments* to convey

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the Impressions from the Objects to the *Immaterial Substance*, united to Body, be that Union, an Union in Man, or an Union of an Angelick Spirit to Body, its all one. *Theol.* Very fine indeed! But pray, Sir, how doth this appear by the Holy Scriptures? There's not one Word of *Immaterial Substance*, nay no equivalent Sentence to it that I find, and wherever an Angel appeared he was as Visible, and as tangible as you and I: Besides, do you think God gave us Eyes, Ears, and other *Sensoria*, whereby we should receive Impressions, and be made sensible of Pain, or Pleasure by them, yet tell us they are but *Stupid, Insensible Materials or Instruments* for an *Invisible Immaterial Operator* to work with? Where's your Scripture, or Reason for this? *Philos.* Scripture? It is the Opinion of all the *Platonic Philosophers*, and that's Reason enough. *Theol.* To you it may be a sufficient Reason, but I am sure it ought not to me. It looks like a Trick and an Illusion upon my Senses, as well as Understanding. *Philos.* Pray, seeing you argue from Scripture, I'll Attack you with your own Weapon. Did not God the Father appear in a *Flame of Fire*, God the Son in the Shape of *Human Flesh*, and God the

the Holy Ghost in the Form of a Dove : God, I hope, is a Spirit in each Person of the Trinity, as you read and believe too, else your Faith is vain, and these Spirits all assumed Bodys. *Theol.* All this I believe, and confess in relation to the Appearance of the God-head to Human Eyes, and it is impossible he should be otherwise seen, because he is in his own Nature *Invisible*, 1 Tim. Cap. 1. 7. *And no Man hath seen the Father at any time but the Son*, 1 John 4. 12. John 1. 88. But there is no Necessity that an *Angel* should have such a Power, because it is not revealed to us by our Religion, that by Nature he is an *Invisible Being*, but clearly the contrary. Besides this Appearance of the God-head in those Shapes was visible only to the *Eyes of Faith*, not to *Bodily Eyes*. They thought it a *Real Fire*, a *Real Man* only, a *Real Dove*; but that Power which so appeared gave them *Faith to believe* the Existence of the *Omnipotence*, represented more *immediately* present at that time by a *Fire*, a *Dove*, and the *Shape of Man*: when you bring revealed Religion to back your *Immaterial Substance* coexisting with Body, in Angels, Devils, or Man, then

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I'll side with you also, But till then
 I'll deem it no other than a Philosophic
 Cheat. *Philos.* Well but was not this
 home put, and like a Philosopher?
Theol. Truly so it was, and had not the
 Scriptures call'd the Son the *Images* of the
Invisible God, *Colos.* 1. 15. And told us
 that *who so seeth God face to face must*
die, but an Angel may be seen, *Acts*
 11. 13. And God when he is said to
 appear by *his Angels* may likewise be
 seen as *Gen.* 32. 30. Your Objection
 had been irrefragable; and even now
 must be granted true in relation to God
 Almighty's Appearance to Men either
 by *Fire*, by a *Voice*, by *Angels*, &c.
 but of no *Spirit Created*: For the
 Appearance of God *Visibly* no mor-
 tal Creature can bear, but of Angels,
 or Devils undoubtedly he may, without
 recurring to their assuming of Bodily
 Shapes, if such a thing as *Spiritual*
Bodys be allowable. *Philos.* This may
 be good Divinity, but it is not good
 Philosophy. *Theol.* Perhaps not, but
 where Philosophy runs Counter to Di-
 vinity, I shall not conform to it.
 Nor indeed do you talk rational Phi-
 losophy about your *Immaterial Sub-*
stance, for if you once strip a Continu-

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um of *Extension*, you necessarily strip it also of all *Union*, and then pray, what doth your *Immaterial Substance* subsist by? Is it not a plain contradictory Idea to conceive a *disunited continuum*? as I hope you'll allow your *Immaterial Substance* to be a *Continuum* or nothing. If your *Substance* be a *Disunited* or *Discrete* quantity, it must be *Number*, or *Time*, or *Motion*, so no Substance in Human Apprehension; if not, it must Exist by *Union of Parts*. *Philos.* Truly, Sir, you put home too, as well as I, but I have this Advantage, that Men by *Education* will believe the first Impressions of Things before Secondary ones, and Philosophy has given all Mankind those first Impressions, so that you may talk your Heart out before you'll ever remove them. *Theol.* I am of your Mind that it is impossible to remove them *totally*, yet I do not despair of removing them out of the Minds of *some few* upon the Motives of Religion. *Philos.* Religion? Why should you hope that? Have not we invented all your Terms of Art and crouded them into Religious Matters by the help of Scholastic Divines, and

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other our Philosophic Emissaries? Are not *Aerial Vehicles*, *Intuitive Knowledge*, *Immaterial Substance*, *Entitative Extension*, *Penetrability*, *Amplitude*, *Indiscernibility*, *Impassibility*, &c. all Words of our Coynning purely to explain to you the Nature of a *Spirit*? *Theol.* I must own they are Words transplanted from the Garden of Philosophy into Religious Matters, but I hope in time they'll be weeded out. For a Man cannot talk plain English, but the Philosophers play such *Hocus Pocus* Tricks even from our Infancy, that as some Children hate Cheese because they sucked curdled Milk, so we hate good wholsom Doctrines, plain and evident from the Holy Scriptures, grounded upon Reason manifested to our Senses, purely by the Poyson of the first Rudiments of Philosophy. Thus all the World believes a Body can be in a Thousand places at once, either *Corporaliter* or *Realiter*, or *Sacramentaliter*, which are nothing but a *Farrago* of Terms to confound us. *Philos.* Hold! *Corporaliter* is not good Philosophy, but *Realiter* it may, and *Sacramentaliter* undoubtedly it may. *Theol.* I don't doubt but that it may so, but what has *Sacramentaliter* to do with
Ex-

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Existence ? is it any more than that a Body may be represented under certain Types or Signs in a Thousand several Places at the same time? *Philos.* Well, we Philosophers always talk so. *Theol.* I know ye do, and oft to the great prejudice of Religion, and therefore you talk of a Bodies *Real, i. e.* Its *Spiritual Existence* in a Thousand several Places at the same time, which I must tell you, is horrid absurd, and impossible, *even so meant, as to Human Conception.* For if it be *Body*, it can have no *Spirituality*; and if it be *Spiritual*, its impossible, *qua Body*, to have Ubiquity, or Omnipresence. *Philos.* Methinks you are very sharp, but what have we to do with these you hint at? *Theol.* Its no Matter whom I hint at, all are deluded by one Term or other, its plain, either to a Contradiction to Sense and Reason, or an Absurdity in Expression, as *Sacramentally to Exist* seems to any Man. *Philos.* Any Man! Why? What do you mean by *Man*? *Theol.* What another juggle? Why, I look upon Man to be a *Rational living Creature.* *Philos.* Now I find you are no Philosopher, you don't dive deep enough to search the Truth. *Theol.* What now? I am

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amazed at what you drive at. *Philos.* Then I'll tell you, its true, he is a *Rational Living Creature*, but how do you think he comes to *Live*? Not by *Life* given him from God, but by a *Spiritual or Immaterial Substance*, united to his Body. *Theol.* From what Place of Scripture do you prove this? *Philos.* I find it so in the third Chapter of *Plato de rebus Divinis*, Entitul'd *Φερδων η περι Ψυχης*, and in forty other places of his Works and several other Philosophers. *Theol.* That may be, but I am now arguing for *Divinity and Reason against Philosophy*, and I find no such thing in the Books of *Moses* when Man was made, but there it's said God breathed into Man the *Breath of Life*, *Gen. 2. 7.* I find no *Immaterial Substance* infused into Man. *Philos.* That's all one, we Philosophers say, that *Breath of Life* is a Man's *Immaterial Substance*, and he is made up of those two Things. *Theol.* If you will call it so, you will. I can be sensible, by all the Powers of my five Senses of nothing in Man but *Life and Substance or Body*, pray how do you discern it? *Philos.* How? not by any of my five Senses. You? You are a gross thinker,

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er, we discern it by the *Eyes of our Understanding*. *Philos.* Pray teach me that Art of discerning, will you? *Philos.* No, that I cannot do, you dwell too much on Scripture, and too little confide in Philosophy. *Theol.* Sure, Sir, if *Breath of Life* be an *Immaterial Substance* in Man. *Gen.* 2. 7. It must be so in Beasts, *Gen.* 7. 15, 22. *Philos.* Look you now, I thought you would recur to Scripture again. But I tell you that *Brutes have Breath of Life*. *Theol.* So I own, but not *Immaterial Substances*, I hope. *Philos.* Yes, but they have, they are lately new Christened with it. *Theol.* Is it possible a Man should be so deluded by Philosophy? Can it ever enter into the Heart of Man to believe flatly against common Expressions from the Evidence of revealed Religion, and his own Senses? How could Man come by this *Immaterial Substance*, but at the first Creation, and its plain there by express Words, that he was made no more than a *Living Creature*? *Philos.* You had as good throw your Cap into the Air, all the Heathen Philosophers preach'd up Man to be made of a *Soul*, call'd *Immaterial Substance*, and *Body*, and if you throw all the Old and New Testa-

Testament at that Doctrine, you'll never confound it, or convince its Believers to the contrary. No, we have them fast. And I can tell you more up-

on the same Head, notwithstanding all your Divinity. *Theol.* Pray do. *Philos.* If a Man Dies, he may be said to lose his *Life*, but he don't *die in earnest*. And he is said to *Sleep* in the Grave by a Figure, but he don't sleep one wink.

Theol. No, all this is rare indeed. How do you prove this by Scripture. *Philos.*

No, I don't pretend to prove it by plain Scripture, yet I can bring some Texts that seem to Prove it pretty plain too, but I can prove it as plain, as two and two makes four, out of *Plato*, and several Eminent Philosophers. *Theol.*

Their Authorities I value not, don't a *Man die if he lose his Life* ? *Philos.* No,

he doth die in his *Body*, but not in his *Soul*, for that *Lives* as well, if not better than it did in the *Body*. *Theol.* Not

one Word of this, or like it, do I find in the Bible, this is as much as to say,

A Man doth die, and he doth not die. Pray, what is meant by *dying in his Body*. *Philos.*

His *Material Body* dies. *Theol.* As far as I find, it never *Lived*, for it was the *Soul* lived all the while, and how can any thing die, which never lived ? *Phi-*

los.

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los. Its no matter *how*; it is so. The *Soul*, or *Immaterial Substance*, gave the *Body Life*, and now it is separated, the *Body* is dead. *Theol.* What Chapter and Verse for your *Immaterial Living Substance* in the Bible? *Philos.* I told you, you were always for Scripture, its so by Philosophy, that's enough; and so if a Man is said to *sleep in Death*, he is as *fully awake in his soul the next minute* of separation, as ever he was in his Life in this World. *Theol.* A pretty way of *sleeping* indeed. You Philosophers make us believe any thing. I'll be stigmatiz'd for a Fool all my Life time, if you can bring the like Case where so many absurdities without any Warrant from Scripture or common Reason are believed. *Philos.* What think you of *Eccles. 12. 7.* *The Spirit returns to God that gave it*. *Theol.* Why had I found Man created with *Immaterial Substance*, or *Spirit*, so meant, I must have yielded to the *literal Sense* of the Text, but finding *Spirit* generally not to mean *Substance* as Philosophers would have it, but *Power*, or *Energy*, I say *Life returns to God that was the fountain of it*. *Philos.* You talk now not like a Philosopher I am sure, how can an accident, *Life*, return to any place, or Person

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son without a Subject? There I have you. *Theol.* Away with your Sophistry; how comes the Word *Return* to signifie a *local transition*? If an Honour be Extinct, we say it *Returns* to the King, the Fountain of Honour again, so a *Power*, derived from a Commission granted by the King to a General of an Army, *Returns* to the King again, if that General be killed, or displaced, and I hope without any *local transition* of that *Power*. Thus *Life* being no more than a *Power* implanted in matter, may be very properly said to *Return to God* the Fountain of all Power, but if you will stick to the latter how can a *Spirit*, that has no *Loco-Motion* in succession of time and place, *Go upward or downward*? Yet the Preacher says so. *Eccles. 3. 21.* What can this mean any more, than that as God has given Man *Life*, so he can and doth take it away when he pleases, as the Psalmist. *He taketh away their Breath and they die and return to dust, 104. 29.* Nay in Man and Beast it's all the same. *As the one dyeth so dyeth the other, they have all one Breath, all go to one place, Eccles. 3. 19, 20.* And Job says plainer yet, *Man lyeth down, and riseth not till the Heavens be no more, Chap. 14. V. 12.* One would think these places

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ces so plain as to admit of no Contradiction. *Philos.* Job and all of 'em talk to *Vulgar Understandings*, who weigh'd not the Expressions nicely, but believed whole Man dyed, because they knew no better, but had he read the Philosophers about the Immortality of the Soul, they would undoubtedly not have told us what they did, but when they wrote such, they never dreamt of the Souls living immediately after Death. *Theol.* No indeed, I believe they never did, for the Jews dreamt of a Temporary Kingdom on Earth, and to reign with the Messiah here, not of gaining an Immortality of Soul because one principal Sect of the Sadduces, out of which they had High-Priests, denyed the Existence of Angels, and Spirits, or Souls; and the belief of the Soul's Immortality was not made a Term of Communion in the Jewish Church till several Years after Christ *vid.* Dr. Hody. *Philos.* Come let us give over this Controversy, for I must and will have the better of it in this Nation, as long as Philosophy is taught in it, and you had as good preach against Transubstantiation in a Popish Country, as to cry down and pretend to perswade the World, that Man has no Immaterial Substance. *Theol.* Truly you are in the right,
The

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The most Noise is the strongest Argument sometimes, and there is not one in fifty that understands the Controversy, yet all those follow a popular cry, and so qui volunt decipi, decipiantur. But pray answer me these three Questions, and I have done.

1. *Whither go the Souls of Christian Aborigines after Death?* *Philos.* What care I whither they go, they go somewhere, that's enough. *Theol.* Short Answers are best, and methinks you are pretty quick in them. But,

2. *How came this Immaterial Substance to be in any of us, seeing it is so manifestly plain that Adam the first Man, had only Breath of Life to make his Body a living Creature;* *Philos.* Why? That Breath of Life is undoubtedly an Immaterial Substance I told you so before, and if you will not be convinced, that it is so, how can I help it? *Theol.* You had as good tell me Motion, is a Bowl, or a Race-horse, because they visibly move. *Philos.* Ay, ay, I see you are too Obstinate a Scripturist to yield to the Consent of all the Philosophic World. *Theol.* Indeed so I am, and I value one plain evident Text in Scripture to ground a Belief on above all the nicety in Philosophy. But,

3. Sir,

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3. Sir, *Were these Souls or Spirits made at the first Creation, and do exist somewhere before they enter Bodys, or doth God create them at every Generation of any living Creature?* Philos. They præexist somewhere or other, no matter where, and therefore, *All our Knowledge is but reminiscence of things done in that state of præexistence, as the Divine Plato tells you.* Theol. Well, if it be so, it must beso: And I believe should I ask you after the *Place of their Subsistence after Death*, you would answer me, as Socrates did. *Why ask you me? I never was there nor ever spake with any that came from thence.* Philos. Truly, perhaps I might, and that's Answer sufficient to any but you. Theol. Then, Sir, This shall be mine to you, *That I search the Scriptures, and in Them, not from Philosophy, think I shall have Eternal Life, because they testify the Truth, John 5. 39. And the Scripture cannot be broken, therefore the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, being in no ways proved by the H. Scriptures, I look upon it no beter than a meer Philosophic Illusion, or Imposture:*

Philos. But hold, Sir, I han't done with you yet. Suppose that the Heathens, were the Original Inventors of that No-
tion

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tion of a *Metempsychosis* which necessarily infers a *Spirit able to Exist, Seperate, from Body*, yet may not these Heathens learn the true Notion of Spirit *traditionally* from some of the *Anti diluvian Patriarchs*, or *Noah's Race*, tho' they attributed to that *Spirit of Man* a *false kind of Immortality* by passing from Body to Body to the World's End? For we see Men frequently pervert the End, and uses of things, really Good, and Heathens often erred grossly in points of Religion, when the foundation of their Religious Dutys was really true, and good, *v. g.* They were taught Sacrifice, but they turned it into an Ill use, and offered up to Idols, and you cannot argue therefore, that Sacrifice is an Heathenish institution. Thus the Patriarchs *might* give them the right Idea of *Human Spirit*, or *Soul*, and the Heathen Nations, as *Chaldeans*, *Aegyptians*, &c. *might* by an easy turn corrupt the true Doctrine, delivered by the Patriarchs, and form a *Metempsychosis*. *Theol.* Indeed, you press home, with *Suppositions* and *May-be's*, but *Possibility* never is a firm Foundation of an Argument. But I'll give you my Reasons, why your *Probabilities* are weak, and insufficient, 1. Because the Holy Scriptures from the
Crea-

Creation to the Floud never say one Word of the *Spirit of a Man* or Beast, but all *Breath of Life*, as *Gen. 2. 7. Ch. 6. 7. Ch. 17. 15. 22.* So that *Moses* treating only of the most ancient Things done in the Patriarchal Age, and not speaking of so considerable a Doctrine, is a just ground to disbelieve it to be a Doctrine of that Age. 2. Because the most ancient *Traditional Doctrines* of *Noah* relate not one tittle to it, whose Precepts are said to be seven, and are now received and taught by the *Banians* of *Cambaia*, as *Mr. Wrag* in *Hacklulyit*, pag. 310. tells us, Law (says he) they hold none, but only seven Precepts which were given them from their Father *Noe*, not knowing *Abraham* or any other. 1. To Honour Father and Mother. 2. Not to steal. 3. Not to commit Adultry. 4. Not to kill any living thing. 5. Not to Eat anything living. 6. Not to cut their Hair. 7. To go bare-foot in their Churches. Where is now the Doctrine of any Seperate Existing Spirit of Man amongst these traditional Precepts of *Noah*? But. 3. This Doctrine is of so ancient a Date, as that whole Nations, who never heard of the Patriarchs, or Jews, believed a *Metempsychosis*, so that in probability those Heathens that

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devised *Transmigration*, devised the first Notion of that *Separate Existing Spirit*, which was so to transmigrate, without learning by Writing or Tradition one Word from a People they never heard of. *Ergo*. There is no probability this was a Doctrine in the Patriarchal Age, and from them derived to Heathens, but as Heathens had invented this Spirit in Man, so upon its separation from the Body, they were forced to devise another receptacle for it, wherein it should Subsist, and never talk'd of its going to *Elysium* or *Tartarum* until the time of *Orpheus*, which was several hundred Years after the settled Belief of a *Metempsychosis* in *Aegypt*, and other Nations. *Philos.* But had you not better trod in the Old Path of Philosophy, tho' Erroneous, than run the Risque of being accounted an Atheist, or a Teacher at least of such Doctrines that tend to Atheism, as the popular Cry says? *Theol.* None but Fools can be Atheists, and none but such can make this Doctrine tend to Atheism, seeing it denies not the General Judgment, which to the Dead is the very next Minute. But if there are Persons so wicked as to think, and will willingly believe they shall never rise again, because they will not in an

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Ordinary course of Providence rise from the Dead before the Resurrection, if the Scriptures be true, let the fault rest on themselves, not on the Author of this Doctrine, and you may as well conclude that the whole Scripture tends to Atheism, and Irreligion, because so many Sectaries have founded upon it so many vile, abominable, and blasphemous Doctrines, as ought not to be suffered in a Christian Common-wealth. As to a Popular Cry, it is commonly false, Malicious, and scandalous, a rattle of nine Days Wonder, and where I am confident that I have Reason and Religion, and consequently Truth, on my side, I am resolved never to value the belowings of Popularity against me. Had I but seen one tolerable answer to *Second Thoughts*, as to the main points in debate, I had not wrote this or any thing more indeed relating to this Subject : But finding all of them Carping either at Expressions, or common slips of a Writer, nay sometimes of the Printer, or proving Contradictions of their own finding out, and laying them on the Author, when it was not very Material, if so or not ; and finding others confuting by hard Names, or Descant upon his Learning, or using Logic Querks, or taxing him with

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with Atheism, or building Arguments upon a few Witticisms, and pretty reflecting similitudes or the like. And none touching the *Grand Material Points*, viz. The Proof of the Existence of this Immaterial Substance in Man, &c. as they are sum'd up together, pag. 131. 132. of *Farther Thoughts*: I say finding these to be the common Methods of answering Books, I look upon them not to be answered at all. For he that would rightly answer an Author, I advise him to select the Opinions or Doctrines of the said Writer, and then prove his own, which he must lay down *contrary*, to be true, and the others false, and then, and not till then, the Book is answered and the Author confuted. For whatever has or can be said on this Head either from Philosophy or Scripture, can never amount to an Argument, to confute or convince, unless it can be proved that *Adam* had this *Immaterial Substance* in him, Which I conclude *Impossible to prove Breath of Life* to be. And that he had nothing else, is plain by the Testimony of the Holy Scriptures, *Immaterial Substances*, and *Breath of Life*, being so vastly different in Expression, and meaning, that I account no Man of Reason can
have

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have any *tolerable Colour* to assert it to be the same. And if it be not the *same* at the Creation of the first Man, it cannot be so in any other derived from them, and consequently wherever the Word *Spirit*, or *Soul* occur in Scripture, as if it denoted a distinct Being, it must admit of some other Interpretation. *This I say, that we be no more Children, and tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of [Heathen Philosophic] Doctrine by the slight of Men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lye in wait to deceive, Ephes. 4. 14. This I say [again] therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the Vanity of their Minds. Having the Understanding darkned, being alienated from the Life of God, through the Ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their Heart. For we have not so learned Christ, V. 17, 18, 20.*

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A N

Epistolary Reply

T O T H E

Reverend Mr. *Broughton*,

Chaplain to his Grace the Duke
of *Malborough*, in Vindication
of *Second Thoughts* concerning
Human Soul, against his Pre-
tended Confutation, in a late
Treatise, call'd, *Psychologia*, &c.

May it please you Reverend Sir,

THat I presume to affix your Venerable
Name to a Discourse which I am sensi-
ble will fall much short of its Design in con-
vincing you; But in hopes that the At-
tempt will recommend this Discourse to your
perusal, and countenance several Readers
not to spare their pains in supervising,
or censuring it:

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The Immortality of the Soul is not the Debate in question, but the Immaterial Substance of some distinct Being in Man, &c. But hold, says my Reader, Where is the *Sense* of all this? Indeed, Sir, I must confess that I believe you did not aim at *sense*, or to be *safe*, as Mr. Dryden says, but to reach an Excellence : For

*Whoever servily creeps after Sense,
Is Safe, but ne'er shall reach an Excellence.*

Now because in your very first words of the Preface you have attained to that perfection, as to *soar above common Sense*, I believe you will be *safe* indeed from any Darts that come from my Shaft. For *En Rhodus! En Saltus!* I think a sufficient Answer to what you have wrote against the Author of *Second Thoughts concerning Humane Soul*. But because the rest of the World may not think as I do, and the Parent Ape may think his own Issue Beautiful, tho' ugly in the Opinion of every one else, I will endeavour to show you *very briefly*, the Defects, and Deformities that appear in your way of Reasoning. As to your first part of the *Psychologia*, or an Account of the Nature of the Rational Soul, I shall say but very little, as not so immediately relating

ting to *Estibius*; because it is an Introduction to the better confuting of him, and as you may perhaps imagine, seems to attack and batter the Outworks, or totally Blow them up, in order to make some inward Fortress more easie to be taken, I think, if I skirmish with you a little, and show you that by some, and those not numerous Sallies, I am able to repulle your mighty force of Argumentation against the Outworks, I shall have done what is requisite in Answer to the first Part; and if there you fail, I doubt your successes will be as little against the Inward Fortress it self. The whole (say you, Pref. p. 2.) of your Argumentation is built upon a foundation of Reason, which Answers *Estibius*, not in part only, but on every side, and is at the bottom of all the chief Arguments of your Book. And That one Reason, viz. *autonomous*, or Self-motion, runs through the greatest part of your Book, Pref. p. 4. The same Reason that inclined Heathen Philosophers to believe the Existence of a Soul, upon the account of Spontaneous motion; will, I presume, incline any Man to believe, God has created Spirit, as well as Body. Spirit is the Principle of Life and Sensation; Body of Mechanisme and local

Motion. Here we have four Positions some way or other, *in Words* relating to Reason, I hope I shall by some Argumentation or other, find them proved true *in Deed*: For as to a *Self-motion*, I think it already proved, to be no Characteristic of an Immaterial Substance, or Soul, (*vid.* the Ded. to *The Vindication of Reason and Religion*, and elsewhere in the same Tract) and consequently they that believe God has created Body and Spirit, upon the same foundation of Reason, and no other, build but on a very weak one I am sure. My Labour, in the same Tract, is already superseded, in proving Spirit the Principle of Sensation, and that it is incapable utterly in its own Nature of Local Motion, either from Trusion, or Suction, or any Mechanical Affection, or Modification (as you aver, Pref. p. 6.) therefore I thither refer my Reader. In the next place, I am to Answer the Charge of *Atheisme*, as you tell me, the course of your Argument led you so to do, Pref. p. 11. according to the Common opinion; and this you prove, because *Estibius* quotes a Philosophical Axiom, *Immateriale non agit in Materiale*, contrary to the Opinion, even of all Theists, who must maintain, That
there

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there is no motion of Matter in the Universe, but what proceeded as a real Effect, from the Acting of an Immaterial Agent upon it. *ibid.* This is a grand crime, on my Word; But where lies the Atheisme! Doth it deny a God? Whether God be an Immaterial Substance, may be much doubted: But whether He be an Immaterial Being, I think, no body doubts; therefore you mean nothing to the purpose, if you do not stick fast to the Word Substance; and understand the Author so, according to the subject Matter Disputed of, then pray tell me, whether *Immaterialis substantia possit agere in Materialem*? Substances (say you) both Material and Immaterial are Unknown Natures; Is it therefore Atheistical, to demand, *Whether an Unknown Nature can Act upon an Unknown Nature*? Is not this now a very pretty question? You may call it Nonsense, Stuff, and Trifling Jargon, (as Things are usually call'd, which cannot be Answer'd) tho' it's according to your own Definition of Substance, but not Atheisme. Again, A Philosophical Axiom quoted from Philosophy, is no more the Authors opinion in this point, than a *Privatione ad Habitum non datur Regressus* may in

one that believes the Resurrection, but yet may be recited, as Argumentative, and is really so, until solved by a Distinction, which very Distinction you your self find by mentioning, the *Power of God, and the Modes of his Omnipotence Acting in sundry Causes, &c.* yet tax the Man, not the old Philosophic Principle, with Atheisme. Sure you were not *led*, but *driven* by the Common Cry, into this Accusation. You cannot believe, I have that Charity for your Understanding, That I think that Axiom Universally true, because even Thought it self has Immateriality in it, I mean, is Immaterial in Essence, according to your Sentiments, and mine, yet is the *principle of Action* in Body very frequently, as experience tells us; Those very emotions in my Soul or Self, cause my Legs and Hands to move, yet cannot be call'd *Immaterial Substances*, but Motions flowing from an Immaterial Substance, (to go along with you in Words) which excite Motion in Material, therefore your *great building upon Reason*, you promis'd, must totter presently, if you find out no limitations to cramp up a loose Battering Axiom that assaults you. Alas! *Sir*, I expected greater things from you, than

than a little Calumniating Invidious Argument; But because you have cut out new work for me: (*Pref. pag. 21.*) I will pass on to examine the form, or fashion of it; and if I find neither, I shall be apt to say, you have rather made work for me to unravel, by reason of the Incoherency, Incongruity, and ill Shapes of it, than given me, as you promised, a foundation of Reason, to build a solid Discourse on. The first thing I meet with, is your odd, uncouth Definition of Substance, *pag. 2. viz. That, to us, unknown Nature, upon which all that know of the Nature of any Thing Depends, as to its Being; and which, as to its Essence in General, is Independent of every Thing but God.* How comes [Nature] a word of such latitude, and of so different a meaning, to be related to Substance? What odd expressions are these! — *A Nature upon which all that Men know of the Nature of!* — Do not many things depend upon Extension, as Form and Figure? and others on Union, as solidity of parts (tho' they may be said fundamentally to be supported by Substance) yet these are neither Substances, nor Unknown Natures, unless we resolve all in-

to Scepticism! We believe we know them, because they are properties of Material Substances; if we do not, then we know nothing at all. However, do but apply your Definition to God, considered as an *Immaterial Substance*, and what will it amount to then? Why, just to almost nonsense in the Expression, and unintelligibleness in the meaning; To say, that God is a *Nature, &c. as to his Essence, Independant of every thing but God, i. e. himself.* What means such a saying, *God is Independant of himself?* Besides, this definition is wholly false Philosophy, because *Self-subsistence*, and not *Independence*, as opposed to *Inherency*, is properly the Essence of Substance, and the Word *Dependancy* meant in relation to God, can signifie no more, than that all Substances created, are conserv'd in their Existence (not Essence) by the Power of God. So as the whole depends on God, so doth the part immediately on the whole, and the *Anima Bruti* depends as much upon the frame and texture of the Body, as the whole, joyntly consider'd, doth upon the conserving Power of God; Nay, all Substantial Forms (to speak in the Cant of the *Aristotelians*) depend on

on Matter, as to their Existence (if Essence be taken for *that*) and yet remain Substances still, in spite of your accurate Definition. Upon the Whole, suppose all false, I have urged; yet is this a Definition fit to be inserted in a Chapter of *Explications* of Terms? Doth not this trifling Puzzle arise only, Because we imagine *Substance* to be something, we know not what, as a *Res substrata* to the Demensions, viz. Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity? And this we are forced to do, because we would not confound *Immaterial Substance* with *Material*, i. e. We cannot think all Substances to be Matter. Now if we recurr to the *Atomists*, and joyn *Tangibility* (as *Lucretius* says)

Tangere enim & Tangi, nisi corpus, nulla
(*poteest Res,*

we should quickly get a plain, true, and right Idea of *Substance*, and never dispute whether *Corpus*, and *Substantia* were the the same. But to goon: But then (say you) Do us know nothing of *Substance*? Yes, we can distinguish one *Substance* from another, by their known different *Accidents*, which necessarily inferr a proportionable

proportionable Difference in the Substances to which they belong. Sect. 3. p. 9. From the Difference we find in the Nature of Accidents, we must conclude a like Difference in the Nature of those Substances to which they belong, *ibid*: For wherever a thing has Dependance, as to Being, There it must have its Dependance also, at to all the Modes of Existence. *Ibid*. So having proved God an Immaterial Substance, it's not incumbent on me to prove any Created Beings, such. p. 13. Here's Philosophy and Reason with a Vengeance: The Three common Differences are usually termed *Generical*, *Specific* and *Identical*; now which of these Differences can the Difference of *Accidents* make? Not *Generical*, or *Specific*, for sure there is more than an *Accidental* Difference between an Inanimate Being, and *Petrus*; or between a Rational and Irrational one, as they are contain'd under the Classe of Substances; I think the *Philosophers* call them *Essential* Differences, and a Stock or a Stone is as much distinguish'd from an Animal, as Fire and Water can possibly be; therefore, why you call the Distinction of these Substances, a Distinction *by their Accidents*, or an *Accidental* Distinction, I cannot tell. Indeed,

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deed, for an *Identical Distinction*, an *Accidental* one is sufficient, but then that comes not up to the Point; for Material, and Immaterial Substances, I doubt, you aver more than *accidentally* Distinct. But again, How can Accidents make a *Specific Distinction* in any Substance, the Distinction here meant? Is a White Globe distinguish'd *substantially* from another by whiteness or blackness? Or is melted Lead *substantially* distinct from solid Lead, by its being in Fusion; Or Flu'd for a Time? Nay, but suppose these Accidents *really distinguish'd* the Substances, How can you call this the *knowing any thing of a Substance*? You ate as much in the Dark as ever, and you can call it only a *Knowledge of two Sorts of Accidents*, belonging to two Things, whose Nature you know nothing of at all. This I think plain, and evident, and here the Sceptick must rest, that will know no more. However to go a little farther with you than common Accidents, I'll come to *Proprieties*, or such as may be call'd *Essential Accidents*, *Proprietates Quarto modo, quia conveniunt omni soli & semper*, as the *Logicians* say, which will necessarily infer a Distinction of Subject, or Substance, I own; but still then we
are

are in the same Plunge, *as to our Knowledge*, in which we were before, because the Distinction lies in the Proprieties only; and as we have no certain Knowledge of the Essence of that Substance to which they belong, so we cannot therefore infer the Necessity of a *Specific Distinction* in the Subjects. We certainly can infer two Sort of Properties not to agree, but are not sure, therefore they flow from two different Subjects; but the same Subject may blow Heat and Cold, *i. e.* have Two essential Properties contrary in it (tho' not at one and the same time) which is enough to make me give a wrong Judgment, and takes away the Necessity (as you insist on) of concluding thereupon the Distinction of two Substances, *v. g.* sensibility in an Animal, is an essential Property, and Insensibility, its contrary, is in the same Subject *quatenus* Matter; now these Properties belong to one and the same Subject, differently modified (as I may say) and no more infer a Distinction of Subjects or Substances, than That Animal can be said to be distinguish'd from his mortified Limbs, which are rendred insensible. It argues, indeed, that the same Subject is capable of two contrary Properties,

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Properties, at several times, and that's all that can be said of it. The same may be said of Heat and Cold, White and Black, Solid and Fluid, and the like; therefore such Differences do not presently infer a *Difference of Substances*, but a *different Modification of the same Subject*, only may be a sufficient Ground-work for us to build contrary *Essential* (as we are pleas'd falsely to call them sometimes) Properties upon. Furthermore, your Substance being, as I find, wholly in *In-cognito*; methinks you run head-long into down-right *Scepticisme*, and make us doubt whether there be any such thing as Substance in *rerum natura*. For seeing our Knowledge, as you say, is only bound up, as it were, and circumscribed by *Accidents*, we can have no assurance that what supports them is Substance, seeing, *we can know nothing of that Being* (say you) it may be something else, for ought we know, and not Substance, that supports those *Accidents* we do know and *comprehend*. Thus have you led us into a *Maze*, and bewilder our Understandings in Matters otherwise evidently plain, as I conceive. But one of the strangest things you insist on, is, *That it is not incumbent on you to prove Created Being,*

Being, an Immaterial Substance, seeing you prove God to be such, as you *Fancy* you have. Hold, I pray, Is it not the whole Ground of the Debate, whether Man is made up of Material and Immaterial Substance? Why, is it *not incumbent* on you to prove the Thing in Question? You tell me, *It's sufficient that the Existence of an Immaterial Substance implies no Contradiction*; p. 13, whether it doth, or no, let my Reader judge by the foregoing Treatise; but if it did not, methinks it is but a very odd Conclusion, *Therefore it exists*; Or it *may exist*, therefore it *doth exist in Man*. It implies no Contradiction that there are *Pigmies in rerum Natura*, or Gyants an Hundred Foot high: Is their Existence, therefore, proved thereby? Sure I shall find some better Consequences, by and by, than such as these; *God is an Immaterial Substance, and gives Motion primarily to every thing, ergo the Soul of Man is an Immaterial Substance, and moves the Body at Pleasure, and produces all Operations therein*: But this is *not incumbent* on me to prove, for one of the oddest Reasons I ever read of, *viz. because I do prove it to imply no Contradiction*. If you talk of a ridiculous Præfatory Discourse of Prejudice

judice, and the Grounds of Belief mention'd by *Estibias* fifty Pages long, I confess you have out-done him in Eight or Ten, by many Degrees, about your Notion of your *unknown unintelligible Substance*. Here you have gained a Point indeed, but now to your Second Reason or Proof.

Secondly, Extension and Cogitation are wholly inconsistent; So that *when we find any two Properties, which after a through Examination, are neither immediately connected themselves, nor mediately by any third Thing, we must conclude they belong to two different Natures and Essences*; Page 16. Wherefore the Idea of Cogitation and Extension, being wholly incompatible *per se*, or *mediante aliquo tertio*, we must have in us two Substances distinct, to make out the Ground of Thought: Here lies the Strength of the whole Argumentation, because this monstrous Absurdity would follow, *viz.* that we might obtain an *Inch of Reason, and an Ell of Contemplation*; Page 25.

Something I have already said to this in the foregoing Treatise, therefore shall briefly repeat it, and add farther, because this worthy Gentleman
measures

measures all things by a *continuum extended*; Pray what Measure's Time? If we bring Matters to a literal Expression, an *Inch of Time*, or an *Ell of Time*, is as ridiculous as that of *Thought*: Yet Time is measured by Motion, and Thought by Time: Neither Time or Motion being Substances, on which, Thought may inhere, and it agrees also with the *Material Soul* of a Brute (if you will now, in this refined Age, allow Brutes to have *Material Souls*) which because Material, must be by you supposed incompatible with Thought. So that in a Brute *Extension and Cogitation* must go together in his Soul, or else he must have an Immaterial one, as well as Man.

But again; as to Immaterial Beings, seeing their Motion is as quick as Thought, as 'tis said, What need they to think at all? If I can be at *London*, and move my self to *Canterbury*, as soon as I can think my self thither, Thought is but an useless Faculty to go with to any Place, if I can be *substantially actually present* there, as soon as I can think my self thither. But Thought, say you, must precede that very Notion, or else that Angel, or Immaterial Substance could never

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ver fly thither. But then this precedency is (say I) inconceivable by Humane Understanding : It may indeed be conceived to begin and end at the same Minute of Time, as that Immaterial Substance moves it self, that is, coævous with the Motion there ; but then this *infers Succession of either Time, or Motion* (tho' it amount to the 10000th. part of a Minute) *ri Angelick Natures*, which you cannot own. *vid. Pref. Pag. 6.* for Precedency necessarily inferrs Succession. However, what you urge seems to be not well grounded, because you seem to endeavour to prove *Thought cannot be made up of Extension*, which no Man ever asserted, neither is *Motion made up of Matter* ; yet it's plain they are consistent, tho' one be unactive, and the other wholly consists in Action. The main Debate therefore, is, whether God cannot make extended Matter think, so as Extension may be the Basis, not Part of the Thought ? It appears to us, Page 59. no less than a Contradiction, therefore God cannot do it. Pray wherein lies this Contradiction ? You do not deny the Power of God in changing, if it sees fit, every Particle of Matter in the Universe into so many thinking Immaterial Substances, *ibid.* But as
O long

long as Physical Extension, and Cogitation go together, in one Idea, it must be a Contradiction, Pag. 59, 60. *For every thinking Being is Immaterial.* Pag. 73. Here is the whole Scheme of your Argumentation to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, upon which you seem most stily to depend; those Arguments from Sensation, and Locomotion, being but consequent to *Thought*. Therefore to these briefly, with some short Remarks on the Union of Material and Immaterial Beings, and I have done with you first Part.

First then, I averr it to be *very difficult* to conceive *how* Matter may *think*, but not so difficult as it is to conceive *how* Immaterial Substances can think; neither doth it imply a Contradiction for God to make Matter able to think: I mean, we do not concieve a Contradictory, or impossible Idea in our Minds, by conceiving *thinking Matter*. These Propositions, I think, lye fairly against you, and the First of them I prove, because the Word *how* does not deny the Thing to be impossible by your own Concession, but only inferrs an Inconceivableness, as to the *Modus* Existence; therefore what *may* be, or is *possible* to be, cannot

not imply a Contradiction; we cannot, it's evidently plain, conceive the *Modus Operandi* of an Infinite Eternal Creator on these sublunary created Beings; yet I hope you will not be so bold, as to assert he doth not operate on them at all. This you own, Pag. 67, 68 saying *There is a wide Difference between the not conceiving the Manner how a Thing is done, and not conceiving that it can be done; We cannot conceive how an Immaterial Being thinks; yet we conceive that it can think,* 68 No, say I, not from your Manner of Reasoning, especially, because we *Think*, or are conscious of our *Thoughts*, therefore *Immaterial Beings may think, as we do*; for this is not conclusive in the least; you may argue, as well, that they *breathe*, void Excrements, and the like; for these Affections belong to living Creatures, and are as necessary for the Preservation of Man's *simple Being*, as Reason is for his *well Being*. But to talk of an *Immaterial Substance Breathing, &c.* I doubt, is as gross an Absurdity, as an Ell of Contemplation.

Secondly, It is an impossible Idea to conceive any Immaterial Substance *able to think*; as we do, else we lose the Force of the Argument, and contend *de lane capri-*

na, if we do not measure the Thoughts of these Immaterial Beings, by our own, because an Immaterial Being is divested of all those Properties, especially *Positiveness*, from whence we can imagine Thought in us to arise. It is capable of no Impression from Material, or Immaterial Objects, at least, we cannot conceive any Ideas (to come to your own way of arguing) capable of affecting Immateriality, or fixing, and lodging upon it; but we may foolishly (I may call it) conceive Ideas to pass through an Immaterial Substance, and not in the least affect it in its Passage. This I think must be the plain Nature of Immaterial Substances, if such did exist in *rerum Natura*, which I believe do not. Now what we cannot conceive to make capable of Pain (*Sensation being a Sort of a Thought*, as you say, Sect. vi.) or Pleasure, can have no such thing as Thought, any more than a Tree or a Stone; but it is unconceivable that any *Immaterial Substance*, void of all Affections that infer Pain or Pleasure, should be affected with Thoughts, which must be dolorous or pleasing: Therefore it is impossible for any *Immaterial Substance* to think, as we do: Nay, I may say, that is a Contradiction,

diction, because *The Nature of a Contradiction lies in this (you know) that it is a Thing impossible to be conceived.* Pag. 27.

This Argument, besides the other Arguments before recited, I ground upon this *Pestulatum*, That all Thoughts are in some Measure, pleasant, or dolorous; that is, They give us some Satisfaction and Content, or Dissatisfaction and Discontent, according to that Degree they affect us with. For altho' there are some Thoughts which may be call'd *Indifferent*, yet that very *Indifference*, is in some Measure a Pleasure; and the thinking Creature is still satisfied, that he has no troublesome Thoughts to vex him, which is accounted on all Hands, a *Kind of a Pleasure*, as you say, Sensation is a *Sort of Thinking*. Upon all which it follows, That if God did make every Material Atom, an *Immaterial Substance*, he would make it a Being *incapable of Thought*, in my Opinion, tho' I verily believe he would give it some superior Faculty, above that of Thought, to demonstrate the Perfection of its Nature, above Material Beings. Now if this be the Case in Immaterial Abstracted Beings, that such unaccountable Difficulties arise, how much greater far will they be,

when this Immaterial Substance is *suppos'd* to be conjoyn'd to Material; for upon the *Supposition* (say you, pag. 33.) of an Immaterial Substance united to our Material, and so united, as to be affected with all the various Motions the other receives; and so affected, upon a certain Degree of disorderly Motions of the Body, &c. we can easily account for the wide Difference of Sensation. Is not this a very fine Way of Arguing? When your Adversary tells you that *Cogitation and Extension are united in one Subject, Humane Nature*: You Reply, *This is begging the Question of him*, That would prove *Humane Nature to be made up of two Substances*, Pag. 17. Pray what do you beg, when you desire me to *SUPPOSE* what you say, to be true, and therefore it is true; for that is really the Result of your *Supposition of an Immaterial Substance, &c.* Let me but suppose, against your *Supposition*, that *living Matter thinks*, and then we have done troubling the World with our Thoughts; for mine are directly contrary to yours, because I believe every *Thinking Created Being must be Material*, and that God has made them so, *ab Origine*, and ordained them by different Ways to exist *such*, according

according to the All-wise Purposes of his Will. But put the Case yet farther: Suppose I *think*; How judge you this *Thought* not to proceed from *Living Man*, but from *his distinct Immaterial Substance*? Can Matter, which is incapable of Thought, convey this Thought to another? As it happens oft, that one Man guesses right, and knows anothers *Thought* by his Looks; (as we say) Or doth this *Thought* jump from my Immaterial Substance into anothers? I doubt neither of these ways will please any Rational Man, yet one way or other of these it must be done, if convey'd, or communicable. Besides, seeing you so insist on *Thought*, and *Extension*, as incompatible Natures, never to be conjoyn'd directly, and no Medium of their Conjunction, appears, to support Thought, pray, What think you of *Sound* and *Extension*? Do they not seem as directly opposite, as *Thought* and *Extension*? For Words can be no more conjoyn'd with Matter, than they can be frozen up under the North Pole; and no more can Immaterial speak, than it can whistle. Where is the *Tertium quid*, the Cement that makes them compatible with Extension? Yet it's evidently plain, that they

flow, and rebound as it were from extended Matter. Thus may God make *Living Man* capable of *Thought*, tho' Material, upon better Grounds of Reason, than by recurring to an Immaterial Substance to do it, where the Images, and Ideas of Things, may rebound from the Subject; it's a more Rational Conception, to infer, by their various Impressions, they may produce *Thought*, which is but a Kind of a Motion in the Brain, than where they can make no Impression imaginable; as Immaterial Substances must be conceiv'd utterly incapable of any. Thus much for *Thought*, producible in Matter, *by the Power of God*, where, I hope, I have shewn my Reader, That it is no Conception, of a Contradiction, to conceive *Thought* so producible; and I presume, he that well considers, that it is in the Power of God to make this Book, I now read, a Living Rational Creature, if he pleases, can have no Reason to deny, but that he can *super-add* *Thought* to that Creature, so produced, without the Union of an Immaterial Substance to it; which is the next Thing that I come to treat of, contain'd in your 11th. Chap.

Here

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Here (say you) I frankly own the Reason of this Union will resolve certainly into the sole Power, and Will of the Creator, p. 84. Next to this you put the Question, Whether you do not recurr to Omnipotence, to solve what others esteem a Contradiction, viz. the Conjunction of Material, with Immaterial, without finding out Tertium quid for a Cement. *ibid.* I am glad to find you brought to a Confession in one Part, that Omnipotence only can, and doth, unite these two unknown, to us, Natures, as you call Substances. Now if they are unknown, How can we tell the Union of two Things we don't know? For Material is as much unknown to us, as Immaterial, Pag. 19. Perhaps then there is no Union at all between them. I'll give you a Parallel Case, we know nothing of a North-East Passage to Tenduck or China; but we have a great Suspicion, that there is such a Passage: Now would you not think it a very ridiculous Thing for any Saylor to make a Journal of his Voyage, and describe the Hills, Trees, and unknown Towns lying under the Artick Pole, as he passed in his Imaginary Voyage, sure I am, you would esteem him no less than Crazy or Frantick; and thus it happens in your Description

scription of your Union of those two Substances in Man you boast of. It is plain, and evident to the Senses, that several Actions flow from Living Man; but that any one of these can be proved positively to flow from his Immaterial Substance, separately, and not from Living Man, I presume impossible for you, or any one else, to prove. But now let's trace this *Clew of Union* :

First, It's no Blending or Confusion of Substance to make one, but they reciprocally have Action and Passion on each other, Pag. 84. You must not, but I will enquire into the Modus of Reciprocal Action and Passion, between a Material, and Immaterial Substance; whether we can have any Idea of it, because we cannot; you know, a Thing impossible to be conceived, implies a Contradiction, Pag. 27.

Secondly, It is no Indissoluble Union, Pag. 85. nor is any Union else, that I ever heard of, especially where you recur to Omnipotence, to explain its Nature by; undoubtedly the same Omnipotence can dissolve that Union, either by his immediate Power, or by secondary Causes, according to the Rules of his Creation: So here you have made no great Discovery to enlighten our Understandings.

Thirdly,

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Thirdly, And lastly (for the the third and fourth Articles are but Repetitions of the former) *The highest Instance of this Union, is the Vital Congruity* (there you hit on't indeed!) *by which the Adherence and Sympathy, becomes Natural*, Pag. 85. If it be not uncivil pray, What do you mean by *Vital Congruity*? I confess, they are two very pretty Words, and so are *Homogeneous Heterodoxy* of a Joynture upon Marriage; but what do they explain to us? Even just as much as you do by the Definition of Substance, cap. 1. i. e. make it more perplex by your very Explications, contrary to the very Nature of a Definition. However, give me leave to guess, *Vital Congruity* in *English*, must be a *Living or lively Agreeableness*, *by which the Adherence and Sympathy becomes Natural*, between the Material, and Immaterial Substance of Man. I profess, Sir, as I am a Layman, I don't understand your Banter; you may as well tell me that a *Living agreeableness* makes my Cloaths sit easie and close to my Body, as to talk of such a *Vital Congruity*, which has indeed made good what *Estibius* says on the Point, *That all the Philosophers have devised to conjoyn Material and Immaterial, are but a Cement of Words,*
and

and Conglutination of Terms and Metaphysical Notions, Cap. 6. Pag. 176. and so I look upon it, and leave it to some better Expofitor. I fhall not fay any more relating to this Chapter, but in candour spare you in not expofing your Metaphysical Jargon about the Union of Soul and Body, efpecially feeing you your felf confefs all that you have faid to bear no Weight, and not to be otherwife accountable, than upon Suppofition of the Union, which in it felf you acknowledge to be altogether unaccountable. I find your Writings are intirely of a Piece: You began with a Sentence (vid. Ded. Pag. 1.) hardly Senfe, and a little after, aver The Immortality of the Soul to be a Common Principle of natural and revealed Religion, when as it is neither; but Jure Gentium, non Naturali probata. vid. Anfw. to Dr. Nicolls. But if that be not true, as I pofitively aver it is not; This Principle has given Rife to all thofe Great Actions, which make the moft agreeable Figure in Ancient History; Pag. 2. Ded. How fo? The Grecians and Romans fhamefully deserted it, fay you, yet made the greateft and moft agreeable Figure in the World, as muft be allowed on all hands, by their Heroic Vir-

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Virtues; so that this Principle, I fear, is not the true Foundation Heroes build on; but it is like your Union of Humane Soul, *some way accountable*, tho' in the very next Line, it is *altogether unaccountable*, Pag 90. What is this, but building up a fine Fabrick in the Air, *upon Supposition the Air will bear it*. Let but any Gentleman read that Chapter over, and it carries sufficient Confutation, in my weak Opinion, of all what the Author has before endeavoured to prove; and so much for the First Part of the Book.

PART II.

After all these Demonstrations, and Arguments about the Existence of *Immaterial Substance*, That Banter of *Humane Reason*, and Philosophic Imposture, One wou'd think there were no need of giving a *particular Answer* to which you have wrote against *Estibius*; But because you have the Reputation of a KNOTTY DISPUTANT, and seem a subtle *Splitter of Metaphysical Causes*, and Effects, I will return you some Answer to what seems material, or not to have been sufficiently answered already; so that it
must

must of necessity be very short, I doubt, and upon that Account, if upon no other, I am well satisfied it will please some, if not most of my Readers. This induces me to follow your own Method, as thus:

*Observations on the First Chapter of the
Second Part of Psychologia.*

The First Observation that I make in the General, is, *That some Men love Contradiction, because it is their Humour to disapprove what others write, or say.* And this I take to be the true Grounds of your fierce Argumentation against the two First Chapters of *Second Thoughts concerning Humane Soul*. But you know an extravagant Opinion of a Mans own Wisdom is apt to make him stiff, and tenacious of all his other Opinions, and Proof even against Demonstration sometimes, Pag. 140. Psycholog. Doth not this very first Step of yours shew a Prejudice of Education! Or is it out of Lust or Pride, or out of a Desire to be thought Wise, that your Adversary is at the first onset rank'd with Hobbs, Spinoza, Blount, Le Clerk, Lock and Toland? Truly, come it from which Principle you please, I am not ashamed

shamed of the Company of Men of Learning and Sense, altho' I cannot accompany them in all Particulars they avouch and assert. Let any invidious Character, upon which Principle you please, proceed from you, I value it not: The merit of the Cause is *that* I will insist on, and try how far your Second Part corresponds with your First.

Strong Impressions from Education, you allow to be a true Ground of *Prejudice*, and rightly accounted for; But that Men *contract Prejudices from a Desire of being Thought Wise*, you cannot, you will not grant so *Identically Evident*, Pag. 139. Methinks *Identically Evident*, are two pretty Words; and I, who creep after Sense, will call it, *Self-Evidence*, or have the *same Evidence*, the one as the other. For let me tell you, my Friend, I aim at no high Flights above common Sense, and *Identically Evident*, tho' it include good Sense, yet is hardly so in that Expression. It is not every Word we meet with, derived from Philosophy, will suit to another in *Conjunction*, as plain as it doth infer a proper Signification by it self. v. g. *Peter and Paul have the same Nature*, or *Wisdom* (suppose) is good Sense; but *Peter and Paul* are *Identically Natural*, or *Identically*

tically Wise, is hardly common *English*. But to pass over these Niceties, and little stumbling Blocks: Pray why is it not an Opinion, or *Mens Desire to be thought wise*, as Self-Evident a Ground of *Prejudice*, as Impressions from Education? Doth it not include *Pride, Affection, Ambition*, and a perfect *φιλαυτία*, the very Source of the most *inveterate Prejudice* imaginable? However an Answer sufficient to you is, That they are the two *Principle*, tho' not the *only* Grounds of *Prejudice*; and you can hardly find any strong riveted *Prejudice*, but what proceeds fundamentally from one or the other.

What you infer, Pag. 145. That if all our Knowledge must be conveyed by our Senses to the Understanding, according to *Estibius's* Opinion, we could have no Knowledge of a God; that God is, we know by our Christian Faith, and we must believe that he is, says the Apostle; now nothing of the Idea of God ever come in by the Senses, *ibid.* Ergo. We know God by the Understanding, immediately. Pray one Question? Are Faith and Knowledge the same things? Nay, are they not totally different? Suppose I believe there is a World in the Moon, Do I therefore know it? You think you have

have a sure Card, when you endeavour forceably to drive your Adversaries to absurdities concerning the Nature of God, which you ought to own not cognisable, *a priori*, by *Humane Reason*, the highest Power or Faculty Man is indowed with; tho' you call the *quitting Reason*, and *submitting to Revolution* in this Case, but a *Refuge*, 146. Pray learn to distinguish *Humane Knowledge*, from *Christian Faith*; and you'll fall into the Right quickly, and not cry, *It is impossible for God to reveal this Truth to us*, viz. **THAT HE IS**; unless our Understanding could comprehend what he is. This is a very wide Inference. indeed, to deduce a Parallel from such things as are purely the Object of Faith, to others that are the Subject of our Reason: Some things, say the Logicians, we may know, *a Priori*, others *a Posteriori*; and in this latter Sense we know as much of God, as to Existence, as is possible for Man to know, even by the Testimony of our Senses, as ——— *Monstrat quælibet herba Deum* ——— Nay, I scarce know such a demonstrative Proof of the Existence of several things in the World, as this amounts too. Soft and fair then; I assert we know God to exist, without the Necessity of sup-

posing a *Force upon the Understanding*, or *obtruding a forceable Belief*. Thus you see, even in the Knowledge of God, the Senses must be the Conveyers of it to your Understanding, else you could never say, *you know him*. Besides, the Knowledge you may pretend to have of God, *a priori*, if you can call it Knowledge, Doth it not arise originally from the Senses? Don't you first survey, as it were, by ocular Inspection all Qualities, or Attributes that belong to Material Substances, as *Extension, Passion, Divisibility, &c.* before your Understanding pretends to have any Idea, or Conception of a God? All the Platform of this Knowledge has its Rise as much from the Senses, as the Form of a Building contrived by the Inspection of many Particulars, is shap'd from, and by the Understanding of the Artificer. What other Knowledge you can reveal to us, I hope you will, when your *Thought can carry you up above the Regions of the fix'd Stars*; 'till then know that your Knowledge has the Boundaries of Reason, and your Faith supplies what your Reason cannot *comprehend*: What you have farther added, *jocularly*, to show a little Witticism now and then, diverts me; but I think
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requires no Answer, or Reply; any more than a suitable one, by telling you, *what you have wrote thus far is all a Jest*; and so let the infinite Divisibility of Quality, &c. alone. And now for Chap. 2.

Observations on Chap. 2. Part II. of Psychologia.

Having remark'd on your First Chapter, *That what you have wrote thus far, is all a Jest*. I come now to try how you correspond with your self in carrying the Jest on, *i. e.* in answering things you needed not have troubled your self to have answered; or Playing Booty (as we sometimes say) with your self, either by contradicting your self, or writing on my Side, tho' you design'd the Stroke of your Pen to be against me; but you fell, or rather *deviated* (as I may say) into Truth undesignedly. The first Jest I meet with is, That I recite the Opinions of some Philosophers, an *whole Clan of Atheists, who center in the Authors own Tenent of the Materiality of the Soul*. Pag, 155. I believe my Master would have whip'd me for a Lye, if I had quoted *Lylly's Grammar* for a faithful Narrative of the Victory at *Vigo*; and

to my Knowledge, *Estibius* says not one Word of the *Materiality* of the Soul, nor meant it; unless you call *Life Material*, or *Motion Material*. What you deserve for this positive *Asseveration*, without the least Ground, let the World judge. This is not fair, nor like a Scholar, but an Imposition on Mankind, to throw a malicious Charge from a parallel *Clan of Atheists* on *Estibius*, instead of a Confutation by solid Reason. But now, Secondly, to the next Jest. Are Brutes alive? If they are, they have a Soul too, *Pag.* 157. how comes it to pass, then, that *Juvenal* should say,

*Sensum a caelesti demissum traximus arte,
Cujus Egent prona.* —————

Now lets turn the Question, Do not Brutes live? If they do, They have Life. Is not this the Stress of this weighty Objection? But granted that Brutes have Reason, that *Sensum Demissum*, tho' I doubt it would Puzzle *Estibius* to demonstrate they have Sense, *Pag.* 184. How comes he to quote *Juvenal*, who tells you plainly, that Man has a Sense which Brutes have not? On my Word, that's home urg'd again; but I find he might questi-
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on whether they had *Life*, seeing you doubt whether they have *Sense*, and if no *Sense*, no *Soul*; so farewell to Self-Motion, which is apparent in Brutes, to be call'd one of the principal or fundamental Proofs of the Existence of Humane Soul, *vid.* your own Essay. However, if *Juvenal* believed, as the *Platonists* do, that Man is endow'd with a *Soul*; he might also differ from you in calling it a *Substance*, as well as I; and that is sufficient, it being brought as a Proof, that he own'd it not to be a *Substance*. That's true, say you, *He doth not assert the Soul to be a Substance*, Pag. 157. but *he doth assert it, as plainly as Words can express it, to be another Substance*, Pag. 158. and different from the Body, by the Words *Animus* & *Anima*. Now I think, I may safely say, *Juvenal* was out when he said, *Cujus Egent pro-na* — That your Contradictions against him are not reconcileable, neither can *Animus* or *Anima* be call'd *Substances*, any more than *Spiritus* can be said to relate to Animate Beings, I mean, your Rank of Animate Beings. —

—— *Globum Luna, Titaniaq; astra,*
—— *Cælum ac terras camposq; liquentes.*
Spiritus intus alit. Pag 150.

Thus my Reader may see your several Ways of Jestings; but I hope in our next Attempt, to meet you in Earnest.

As for your Defence of *Aristotle's* Definition, I only say, in your own Words, *That you have ventured to act the Aristotelian, and stand by your Distinction of Actus Substantialis & Accidētalīs*, pag. 162, meaning, by the former, That which has the Power of Action lodg'd in it, and by the Latter, the bare Action it self: This, on my Word, is a bold Venture indeed, to make *Aristotle* speak scarce Common Sense, and call a Power lodg'd in an Action, the Meaning of that Great Philosopher. You had better have turn'd him over to your own Party, and made him say, an *Unknown Power lodg'd in an unknown, to us, Nature; by which all that we know of the Nature of that unknown Power, &c.* as the Word *Substantialis* would well enough have bore you out. But pray, if it be an Action, Is it not past being a Power? And if it be a Power, Is it not antecedent to Action? Sure you *act the Aristotelian* but very indifferently, if you can act it no better, for you cannot but know that all Powers are the Foundation of Actions; and Actions are rather lodg'd in Powers, as
Motion

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Motion in the *Loco-motive* Faculty, than Powers in Actions, if *Aristotle* and Common Sense can be reconciled. If this does not appear absurd enough to the Reader at first Sight, 165. judge you.

After your next Defence of the Souls being *Tota in toto*, & *Tota in qualibet parte*, and the *Nullibist's* Opinion, your old Battery is again raised against *Estibius*, That if he believes not a *Virtual* Presence to be a real one, What thinks he of the *Omni* Presence of God? pag. 169. And pray, What think you? Is there any Comparison between the Real Existence of a God, and the Supposititious Existence of a distinct separate Soul? Arguments from Parity of Reason seldom are conclusive, especially where the inexplicable Nature of God is made one Part of the Argumentation. The next Remark is on that subtle Distinction of yours, That your Soul is really present in this Room, as your Body, but not *MODO CORPOREO*, *ibid.* Another Venture again, and you say as much to hit off the Objection, as is possible for one that designs to obtrude Words, and not Reason, on the World. Could you not have said, Immaterial Substance is as much in the Room as your Material, but

not *Modo Materiali*: i. e. Immaterial is not present in a Material Manner, or as a Material. What you mean by this, I doubt is pretty hard to guess; either that an Immaterial Substance is not a Material one, and there you are right indeed; or that it is not bounded with Material Extension belonging to its Immaterial Substantial Nature, and there you have it again; but, What is all this to the Purpose? Can you fancy an unbounded Extension of any Immaterial Substance that is supposed to be lodg'd in the Body of Living Man? Either prove this, or tell the World what you aim at by, *Modo Corporeo*, else that and your Grand Endeavours to vindicate the Pre-existence of Souls, must, and will, of Necessity, terminate in the Maxim of Tully, *That there is nothing so absurd, which some Philosophers, especially, if over opinionated of their own Parts, will not maintain.*
176.

*Observations on the Third Chapter of
Psychologia.*

The very first Attack here is, That *Estibius* cannot be less than an *Hobbist*, by maintaining such an Opinion; so if
that

that will not do his Work, you tell him, *That he seems not to owe his Religion to his Font, nor indeed to his God,* 181. This Bolt so soon shot, shews the Man full of many Words, and an empty shew of Learning and Elaborateness, as they are fitted to Men of such Perswasion, 196. But, What Force of Argument do they bear? When a Cause is weak, or a Man has not Parts sufficient to defend it, I generally observe, Railery to be the only Reason, obtruded on the World, and indeed, that seems to be the whole Foundation of your Argumentation in this Chapter; For after you have scattered Dirt thick, then you recurr to *Estibius's* Explication of that Text, *Luke 24. 29. as a Comment literally speaking, and of his own devising,* 180. In my Opinion, you had better have made a Comment of your own from your *Unknown Immaterial, and Unknown Material Substance*; and then What would the Argument have proved? Even just nothing, either to the Senses, or Understanding; because our Saviour would then have appeared according to your Notion of Substance, in a Form we could not possibly know any thing of, so that your Comment would make us suspect a Delusion; but I forbear — For What can

can be more plain, than that the Evidence of the Senses was the Appeal our Saviour made to his Disciples? What if he did not *Philosophically* design this Explanation, Can we therefore conclude that we have no grounds to apply it even *Philosophically* to our selves? You can, and do, do it your self, when you tell me, That the Argumentation Philosophers had about Rewards and Punishments in this World, &c. were retain'd in Christianity, and therefore could not be Heathenish, any more than that Application of St. Paul, Acts 17. for the Idolatry of the Heathens, to the Worship of a True God. (182.) Had you a distinguishing Head, you would not have not mis-interpreted the Author by a quaint Nicety or two, or a Jingle, to have meant by *Heathenish*, *IMMORAL*, or *IRRELIGIOUS*; but made an Enquiry whether that Opinion of the Nature of Humane Soul be not purely Heathenish, or has any Foundation from Morality, or any other Principles of Religion. — If you come not up to this Point, I must presume to tell you, that as yet you have said nothing to the Purpose.

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The next Attack is upon *Estibius's* Definition of Life, being an *Afflatus insensibili Materiae*, &c. *Ergo, Mors est Afflatus sensibili Materiae, &c. quo eadem insensibilis redditur*, 186. and why the Soul should, in a *strict Sence*, be call'd Breath, you know no Reason, 185. nor do I either, nor ever asserted it; so that this looks as if you wanted play, as Cats do; and therefore play with their own Tails. But again, Where is the Absurdity of your Definition of *Mors*, or Death, supposing it were not a meer Privation, but a positive Quality induced into the Subject? You may, perhaps, look on it, as absurd, but I cannot, for any other Reason, than because it come from your own Mother Wit. For had you not forgot your very Rudiments of Philosophy, you might have easily remembered that *Qualitas*, and all *Genus's* agree as well to the One contrary Nature as the Other; and Whiteness and Blackness are equally Qualities. Indeed, in a Privation, it will not do, because that is really *nothing*, but as unexplicable as your *simple Ideas*, *i. e.* such things as you are not able to explain. But pray, Where is the Absurdity? I may as well assert all your *simple Ideas* to be Absurdities, tho' I know several,

veral of them, I presume my self as able to explain, as you confess you are not, and therefore ought not to be accounted Absurdities, or simple Ideas: Again, your Idea, (I fear) of this Reason urg'd by *Estibius*, is even literally *Simple*, because the very Text, *Gen. 2. 7.* calls *Breath of Life* in Relation to Man's first Production, or Generation, that which God first breathed into *Adam*, to make him a living Creature; Why must it therefore follow, that *Breath of Death* (to adapt my self to your Argumentation) must be that Power God has ordained to destroy Man with? Had you a Text for *Breath of Death*, as I have several for *Breath of Life*, you should quickly be comply'd with in all your Demands: So bring your *Bible*, and perhaps you have a peculiar Divinity in it, and I'll become your Convert. But hold, say you, *Breath of God, is in its plain Sense, Power of God*, pag. 186. Ergo you must prove all that God created to be Power, not Substance. Pray, Why so? Neither your Text, or Reason, can justify the One or the Other. For *Breath*, in *Job 4. 9.* signifies *Anger*; and you have no Reason to charge *Estibius*, or to suppose, That if he own'd (as all the World must) that if God created

created Substance, he also created the Modes, and Affections belonging to that Substance. This is so plain, and necessary a Consequence, that none but a B—— can deny. Parallel to this weak Reasoning is, That knotty Argument, in Relation to Mans Generation, to prove it a Contradiction, viz. *Does not Man Propagate Life, then Life cannot be the only Power of an Omnipotent Power*, 188. Here I must say, you strangely want the Use of Logick, when you recurr to Life, propagated by Man, without distinguishing it from God's creating Originally Life in *Adam*; and so ordaining him to do; you should have took the whole, and then perhaps you would be very ready to answer, *Who propogated Life in Adam?* Indeed Sir, I have scarce patience to go through so many incoherent Arguments you have twisted together, so falsely and illogically to confound *Estibius's* Philosophy, and your Readers Reason together. However, I will now trace your Business of Abortives, *What becomes (urges Estibius) of the Rational Soul? And how came he hither on so trifling an Errand?* Say you, O that's easily answered by another Question; *What becomes of the Life of it? And Why did God*

God exert his Omnipotence to so little Purpose? *ibid.* Here I think you play Booty, because, pag. 190. you answer for *Estibius*, *The Abortive lived, and died by Divine Appointment*, and this I think to be true Christianity; but the Question is not about Life, but what becomes of his *Immaterial Substance*? Can you say, *That Immaterial Substance lived and died by Divine Appointment too*? If it died Christianized, or from the Loyns of a Christian, Why has it not Christian Burial? For what Reasons God ordains Abortives to perish, I pry not into; but if they have equally Souls (as Life necessary supposes a Spiritual Soul) they are undoubtedly Innocent, and in a State of Salvation, and therefore ought to have all the Works of the Christian Solemnities imaginable in the Burial of the Bodies; which if not practiz'd, and by you thought reasonable, you would do well to advise the Church to add a New Office in the Liturgy, or new Sense to your odd way of Reasoning. The last Thing I shall here remark is, your wise Saying retorted on *Estibius*, who, when he says, *Soul is the Life*, we understood his Meaning, which is in plain English, we live without a Soul, 194. One would think you had Capacity

ry enough to understand the Controversie, and not to feign such trivial Arguments in this Point; when as Soul, if meant an Immaterial Substance, we may, and do live without it, but we do not, nor can live without that Power, I call *Life* or Soul: So that what you have said here, and what elsewhere, seem but Repetition. So much for this Chapter, and as for the rest, I must be forced to be more Curt; and therefore I shall comprehend the Three following Chapters in One, to oblige my Reader, and not to trouble him with Tracing your signal Defects, both in Sense and Ratiocination.

*Observations on the 4th, 5th, and 6th.
Chapters of Psychologia.*

Ex pede Herculem, is a common and true Saying; so that by the Purport of the Three past Chapters, the Reader may guess what sort of Argumentation we are like to meet with in the Subsequent. The First Position this Worthy Author sets down, is, *That the Understanding is not Essential to the Soul*, pag. 199. but is only a Mode of Cogitation, and Cogitation not being Essential, &c.
Now

Now I would gladly know what you mean by the *Understanding being a Mode of Cogitation*, i. e. as I suppose, a *Way the Soul has to Think on*; if so, methinks you would have done well to have told the World how many *Ways of Thought* the Soul has, as you conceive; for as all others conceive, there is but one, and that is by the Understanding only, as a *Passive Faculty*, if you will, not a *Mode of Thinking*, implanted in Living Man, not in an imaginary Substance, or some *Substratum* to be the Support of its Existence: Keep but close to your Text, and you'll find you have not got the least Advantage over your Adversary, if your little *Witticisms*, now and then interspers'd, may not be taken for Arguments. But to come a little closer to you, How comes the *Understanding*, usually call'd the most Noble and Distinguishing Power or Faculty of the Soul, to be the *Mode* of an Accident, *Cogitation*? Man has a Loco-motive Faculty, as I told you before, and so have Brutes, each can exert it at Pleasure; Now will any Philosopher in his Wits call this Power, or Faculty, a *Mode of Motion*? Sure such Reasoning cannot come from your Understanding, as a
Rational

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Rational Faculty; if it doth, I am sure you have a *Way with you*, that scarce ever any Man had before you, and it seems to center in Arguing *without thinking at all*.

As for your quarelling with Des Cartes about *Actual Cogitation*, being the Essence of the Soul, I take it to be but a Copy of your Countenance only, because in another Place you can allow the Soul even in Dreams to be Thoughtful *sometimes*; because it would be else a grand Solacisme to assert the Soul Sleeps, at the same Time the Body Sleeps; that is, is totally unactive, and doth not enjoy it self, some way or other within it self, tho' the Living Creature be not conscious of it. However, Pray give me leave a little; Is Cogitation the Essence of any Part of Man? No, say you, But the Essence of the Soul consists in the Faculty of Thinking, not in Actual Thought; Very Good! But how do you distinguish this Faculty of Thinking from the Understanding? Truly, if I may determine for you, your Distinction is in Words, and not in Deed; for undoubtedly the Understanding is that Power or Faculty from whence all our Thoughts proceeds: Why therefore can-

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not the Understanding, as it is a *Mode of Cogitation*, be the *Essence* of the Soul in one Page, but in the very next Page, as it is a *Faculty of Thinking*, must unquestionably be the *Essence* thereof? Can these Two contradictory Assertions ever prove true? Well, but you deserve Commendation highly, because you have not deviated from the First Attempt after an Excellence, by servily creeping after Sense, as I in the Beginning observ'd--- so lets go on.--- But again, you deny *Understanding* to be *Essential* to the Soul; sure I hope upon good Grounds you do it, for if it were not the *Essence*, yet it may be *Essential*, and undoubtedly all People, besides your self, do allow it so to be; but whence sprung your New *Metaphysics* I know not. Pray is not Rationality *Essential* to the *Anima Rationalis*? If so, Why may not *Cogitation*, much more *Understanding* be said to be *Essential* to the Soul? Any young Logician would have told you the Difference between a Thing's being *Essential*, and a Thing's being the *Essence* of another, if you are not too old to learn. The next Point we are to argue is, *Whether the Understanding be perishable*, Pag. 202. Here I find you have a
Way

Way with you still; First, in denying Matter of Fact, That the Understanding never perishes, or decays: And Secondly, in charging *Estibius* with averring it to be utterly perish'd and extinct, when as he tells you plainly, That a *Partial Decay* (as in old Men, where the Impressions from the Ideas of Objects are frequently so weakly made, as they have no Force or Validity at all) is sufficient, to prove that Faculty perishable. Do we not by Experience find, that if we inculcate never so much to some old Men, Fools, and Mad-men, it doth not appear to us that they receive the least Impression from our Reasoning or Dictates? Now if it doth not, nor indeed cannot appear to us, that they have Sense of these Impressions, What can you urge to prove that they understand us? I think you may as well say, a Stock, or a Stone, receives the Impressions, as such Living Tools of Mankind. As for the Instance you mention, about a certain Person falling Mad, several Years, and recovering his Understanding again, seems to be an Argument against you (as God knows you have too many such, had I leisure to search all) for you say, *he had no Idea,*

or the least Image of any Thing done in that Hiatus, or Blank of his Life, pag. 202. if so, Then what Impressions do you guess, for you cannot say, know, that Passive Faculty of his Soul, his Understanding received? Where, or how, did the former Impressions or Ideas stick in his Immaterial Substance, all that Interval of his Crazy Life, so as to appear again, as it were, and he be render'd capable of judging Matters preceding that Great Chasme you mention? I fear these are too hard Questions to be answered, by you, or any Immaterialist whatever.

What has been said concerning the Soul's Dependence on the Body in *Esse, Fieri, & Operari*, pag. 204. you seem to answer by Cavil, rather than Reason, so I pass that by, and examine your Objections against *Estibius* his Reason's drawn from Generation. You say, it's not conceivable that Male and Female should communicate Part of their Life; nay, it's utterly impossible, by the Coition of senseless Particles, Sensation and Life should be produced, pag. 209. Right Roger! But is it impossible for sensible Particles to make up Life and Sensation? Or is it impossible for God to put Life and Sense into

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into Particles, and make those Particles the Subject of a Living Creature? In Matter communicable we see by ocular Demonstration, that v. g. Fire communicates its self to any combustible Matter, and one Candle enlightens another, Where then is the *unconceivableness* of Life, being communicated from a *Living Principle*? In short, all that I here find about *Generation*, is, That *Estibius* has (says you) been in the wrong, in every Point, because he will not own it to be an *Union of Soul and Body*, pag. 215. and it was a Damnable Gross Error to translate ἀσενν *Man*, because it signifies *Male*, in *Aristotle's* Works, which you are certainly in the Right of, but then you ought, also, to have told us that *Man* is not the *Male* to Woman, or else you had not argued close to the Point. For what if it be translated *Man*, he that can read *Greek* can easily understand what the Author means, which is sufficient, without a little nibbling at Words? In fine, the main Stress lies here; Can you prove the Existence of that your Immaterial Substance in Man to be a necessary Consequent of Generation? Can you prove by any tolerable colour,

or pretence the Union of this Immaterial Substance? If you can do neither of these, as I defie you to do it, the little trifling about Words shall be quickly laid aside. For Life to be generated in a Subject, suitable to convey it, as the *Semen* is, I am sure is consonant both to Reason and Philosophy, tho' that be an Accident; and it may be convey'd as well as Motion in the Body Movent, or Mobile: But for an *Immaterial Substance*, to be convey'd, *we know not how, nor when, or how united*, if we had even Faith to believe the Existence of such a Substance in Man, looks like such a Philosophical Riddle, that the best Spiritual *Oedipus* in the World can never solve. I think, I may say, without Vanity, that the Notion of Generation is hardly accountable for, by Philosophy, in any other way than what I have laid down; and when you have talk'd all you can about your *Union*, you so often put such a Stretch upon Reason to make it intelligible, as you promise to do, at least frequently attempt to do, That I presume no Rational Man can have any other Ground of such a Belief, but a *Credo quia Impossibile*; and so I pass on to your next Chapter, to consider the whole

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whole Clan of Witticisms and Arguments mustered up in that, as in the former.

The Considerations of these Two Chapters are very various, but I shall not come to particulars; if I did, it might make a good Play, but not be a Foundation to guide our Reason by, in so solid a Discourse as this was design'd to be. Indeed he calls his Book an *Essay*, &c. but he ought to have stiled it an *Intended Answer to Estibius*, &c. for I believe the honest Gentleman means well, tho' his Attempt fails, in every thing, but Railery. Good Sir, without Passion, do but consider how you have answered that Argument drawn from Eternal Life, being the Gift of God, *Ergo*, The Philosopher ought not give us an unwarrantable Immortality? This is the Substance of *Estibius's* Argument, too long here to be repeated. *Ans.* First, *Its a Superlative Gift to have an Immortal Soul*, Pag. 208. Secondly, *We know it from Scripture Revelation.* Thirdly, *LIFE denotes HAPPINESS in Scripture; so by a NEW AND FULL ASSURANCE, it is by Scripture become a NEW GIFT.* Fourthly, *The forfeited Title to this Happiness, was by the Gospel re-*

stored to Mankind. What is all this to the Purpose? If I say Immortality to M A N is a Superlative Gift, reveal'd from Scripture only; and this Immortality consists in an Happiness of Life after Death, which *Adam* forfeited, and *Christ* restored: Is not this as good Divinity as yours? Nay, I am sure yours has not that probability of Truth, as mine has; because your first Proposition is precarious, and groundless, unless you make it appear that God gave Man an Immortal Soul, at Creation; and mine has the whole reveal'd Religion of the Gospel to justify it. Sir, but one Question more! Is Immortal Life a Gift to an Immortal Being? Yes, say you, *Happiness* superadded to an *Immortal Life* is a Gift, and that is meant by Immortal Life in Scripture. Then, pray do you interpret the Scripture, if your Head can do it right, and tell us that *Christ* promised his *Believers* only *Happiness* superadded to our *Immortal Life* in the next World, for he knew that we had an *Immortal Life* in our Souls before. Can you with any Face, give Such a Gloss to the Scriptures? Is not the whole Intent and Purport of the Gospel to tell us, That altho' we had forfeited Eternal Life by *Adam's* Transgression;

gression; yet by Christ we should be restored to that again, who else would have dyed eternally? Doth he not first promise *Life*, which is his *first Gift* to a dead Lump of Earth, rotted in the Grave, after several Thousand Years, by which we are put into a State of being capable of Happiness? And after this Promise of Life, then, if you do well, you shall have *Happiness* super-added to it, as a *New Gift*? Away with your trifling with a Text: Is Life a Gift to a dead Carcase, or No? If it be, it is a Gift of God, and no Being else can possibly give it; if it be not the Gift of God, then the Scripture is vain, and *the Promise of none Effect*. For as to Happiness, or Misery, attending that Life, it is subsequent to it, and depends upon your self for the most part, to perform the Conditions of Obedience God has set before you. If you perform them, Happiness is of Course annex'd to Life; if not, Misery, call'd *Eternal Death* frequently in Scripture. To conclude therefore, this Chapter, in your own Words, *Some of the Arguments are true, but not to the Purpose; some to the Purpose, you design them, but not true; others neither true, nor to the Purpose*

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pose neither ; therefore what you say about *Brutes*, and *Dreams*, and the *Hypostatic Union*, in this Chapter, most evidently agree with the very Three Sentences abovemention'd. So I'll pass on to the 6th. Chapter.

The First Contest here, is, about the Etymology of the *Hebrew*, *Greek*, and *Latin* Words for *Soul* ; in which I thought you, and all the World, were already satisfy'd, when I publicly own in *Farther Thoughts*, that I never urged an Etymology for an Argument, but where it was back'd with other more Material Reasons to justify its Signification. So you might very well have spared your Pains to show that an Etymology ought not to be insisted on as Argumentative. But, pray Sir, if any Word has five, or six Significations, Why is the one preferable before another, unless it be because Contexts perhaps, or the same Signification, in another Place of the same Word, may be incompatible, or inconsistent with Reason, and other Texts of Scripture? Could you make it plain, that *Breath of Life*, Gen. 2. 7. was an *Immaterial Substance*, I would lay all Etymology aside, and come over to your Party ;

Party; but 'till then, you must excuse me, because I apprehend such a Signification of the Word *Soul*, so by you expounded, not to be reconcileable to the Principles of Reason, or Christianity. Well but one Remark I cannot pass by, That my *Adversaries* do deny justly enough, that *Life* is properly the *Soul* of *Man*; but not because *Life* is a Consequence of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it self; For that is *non Causa, pro Causa*; but because *Life*, and *Soul*, being in any Part of Scripture distinguish'd from each other in their *Natures* and *Properties*, proves effectually that they are not the same, Pag. 265. Why all this tedious Harangue? Doth not *Estibius* own Distinction enough, when he makes one an Accident, viz. *Life*, and will suppose the other a *Substance*, on which that *Life* depends? I find you mighty fond of *Properties*, and *Natures*, known, or unknown; so that a Man will but speak in your Terms and Language, it's sufficient. However, to comply with you a little, tell me but one Property that belongs to *Soul*, which distinguishes it from *Life* in Scripture, relating to Mans Production, or Composition, & *eris mihi*

mihi magnus Apollo? Provided you bring not *Life*, as it denotes a *State of Living*, not the *Act of Living*, usually call'd by the *Greeks* and *Latins*, *βίη & vita*, not *ψυχή* or *Anima*. I say, notwithstanding all those Volleys of Texts brought, pag. 249. to prove such a Distinction, had you read but any single Expofitor, you never would have so grossly erred in Misapplication of the several Texts there mention'd. But Good Luck is, they are sufficiently answered elsewhere.

The next Comment of yours that I intend to traverse, is the Case of *Martha*, and *Lazarus*, when raised from the Dead by our Saviour, as you recite it, pag. 252. where, say you, *tho' it may appear to me that the intermediate State had nothing to do in the whole Relation*, *ibid. Intermediate State?* What? Have we a Purgatory, or not? Truly, Sir, I thought you of the Church of *England* above all, would never have insinuated the least Doctrine that should have tended to the Erecting a Third Place, be it what it will, Purgatory, or something like it. Pray, What appears to you of an *Intermediate State* in the Case of *Lazarus*? You much

much insist, indeed, upon it, from the Case of *Dives* and *Lazarus*, Luk. 16. as being in a Place of Torment. I could not hardly possibly have thought you guilty of so much extravagant Ranting (to call it no better) to talk of a *Third Place*, plainly demonstrated from a Parable, to receive our Souls after Death? It is a known Maxim in Divinity, that *Scriptura Parabolica, non est Argumentativa*; and that in that very Parable our Saviour adapted himself to the Capacities of his Hearers, in the Language, and after the Manner of the Eastern Countries, must be granted on all Hands: Both which Considerations, had you well weigh'd, you never would have urg'd an *Intermediate State* from a Supposition, or Fable. O! But you believe none of our Saviours Parables to proceed upon impossible Suppositions, pag. 275. How do you mean impossible Suppositions? Are not many Parables impossible, or at least improbable Suppositions, tho' recited in the Scripture? What think you of the Discourse of a Bramble in the Parable of *Jotham*? What think you of Christ's being a *Vine*, or a *Door*? How is the Kingdom of Heaven like a Grain
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of Mustard Seed in Fact, tho' our Saviour grounds a Doctrine thereon, *Mat. 13. 31.* and explains it himself? How again is the Kingdom of Heaven like *Leaven*? Are not these improbable Suppositions, nay, impossible to be conceived any more than barely such, or Illustrations to instruct the *Jews* by? Yet *v. 33.* we find our Saviour made use of them; so for the Future, Good Sir, never bring a Parable to prove a *Third Place for the Reception of Souls*, when as they are only used for Doctrinal Illustrations. I dare swear your Brethren will never thank you for endeavouring to support a *Purgatory*, or a *Third Place* like it, notwithstanding you imagine you have clearly proved it.

Another Argument like the former, is in Relation to the Curse Denounced against *Adam*, *In the Day that thou eatest thereof (viz. The forbidden Fruit) Thou shalt die.* What sinned? Says *Estibius*, Soul, as well as Body; and therefore Both were liable to Death. But, say you, by way of a Nice Question, *What is to be understood by THOU?* Pag. 279. Answ. *The whole Man, or Person of Man.* Then say I, *whole Man died*; No, *Whole Man* may be as well understood

derstood for a Part, as a Part for the whole. This is rare Philosophy indeed! Whole Man died, therefore one half of him survived; who can ever bear such Reasoning without ridiculing it? But waving that, say you, supposing the Person of the Man does properly die, his Soul is not involved in the same Fate of Mortality? How then is it possible that whole Man should die, if his Soul be not involv'd in the same Fate? This is such a Riddle, as none but such an one as you is fit to propose. But now again for another of the same Stamp; What is Death? Why, a Separation of Soul and Body in your Sense, and of Life and Body in mine. Well then, Life must go to make up the whole Man? I protest, Sir, I grow weary of such trifling Argumentation; for How is it possible for any Man, pretending to Scholarship, to argue from the Union of a Substance and Accident to the same Parity of the Union of two supposed Substances? If Matter and Motion be in a Body movent, Ergo, Motion is one part of the Body movent: Don't you think this a very nice Touch, and worthy a serious Remark? I hope, if ever you come to a Second Edition,

Edition, y^e u will alter your Opinion, and Conform to *Second Thoughts* of your own, if not of mine, and then verifie the Maxim, That *Secunda Cogitationes sunt Sapientiores*; for on my Word such weak Reasoning will never support your Cause.

As to your Answer to those Arguments *Estibius* urges from the *Nature and End of the Resurrection*, and a *General Judgment*; I believe you foresaw them unanswerable, and therefore was forced to recurr to an *Intermediate State*, as you say *Estibius* was, to justifie his *Antecedent Resurrection of the Bodies of those Saints*, who may be term'd *The Favourites of Heaven*. This Dream of an *Intermediate State* has, indeed, reliev'd you one way, but then it presses you very hard on the *Confines of Purgatory*. For, for What End are Souls Reserv'd in that State? If Wicked, and in Torment, as *Dives* was, then it cannot be less than a *Purgatory*; if Righteous, and in Happiness, tho' but *Initial*, as you term it; then you answer not well for the *Justice of God*, who has, by such his Affligment, attested them to be so far Innocent, as to be in a State of *Certain Salvation*,

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Salvation, and *Certain Happiness*; yet that he still detains them from a *perfect Consummation and Bliss*, so many Thousand Years before a General Resurrection. If Man had for that space of Time *no Being at all*, as *Estibius* avers it, it is no *Injustice* to a Non-existent Man, because he is not capable of having *Injustice* done him in a State of Non-existence. Again, because the Scriptures every where, by the Particle **T H E N**, relating to a prefix'd Day of a General Judgment, seem plain to testify God's Ordination on my side. But for God to give our *Soul's Existence in an Intermediate State*, who know that they will have *certain Happiness, full and compleat in all Degrees*; yet to detain them from it so long, without your showing any Ordination of his, from Scriptures, to justify the Truth of your Opinion; by your good leave, I think, seems a grand Reflection, and Derogation, to Infinite Justice: For which Opinion, you deserve a *Lustration, or Purgatory*, at least.

Now, Sir, I shall take my leave of you, tho' there remain Four more Chapters to make Observations on;

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but they being so nicely penned, and speak so dubious, like an *Oracle*, that I cannot tell whether they make against me, or for me; I shall pass them over for your sake, not mine, least these Four should be made, like *Richard* against *Baxter*, to militate against all the preceding Part of your Book: For in Chap. 7th. your answer to *Estibius's* Objections are so kind, and soft, that he that runs may read, that you intended no hurt, but rather seemed to wrestle with your Adversary with a loving Embrace, than a real Endeavour to overthrow his Opinions. You have, as it were, bore your self up by an *intermediate State*, and defie all Combatants for ever, so long as that is your Support. Next to this, your Weapon of Defence and Offence, is the Word SOUL, or SPIRIT, wherever it accurs in Scripture, LITERALLY, or not so taken; else you would never have urged that Text of *Ezek. 18. 20.* *The Soul that sinneth it shall die*, to prove the *Immortality* thereof, pag. 249.

As for your 8th. Chap. concerning the Doctrine of the *Roman*, and also of the *Reform'd Churches*, I think your Basis of the same *Intermediate State*,

State, takes off all Grounds of Controversie between you and me. For if such a State be, you account for Prayers for the *Dead*, *Invocation of Saints*, *Purgatory*, and any thing, indeed, that we can conceive to be done, or suffered by those Beings, there residing; so that whether you are a *Romanist*, or of the *Reform'd Religion*, it matters not much, in Respect of Controversie, because you have a *Salvo* against all Objections brought against that Separate Existence of that Immaterial Substance of Man: And you can tell us what those Souls do, or suffer, in that State, and how their *Immateriality* stands affected, as I may say, in Relation to Punishments or Rewards. All this I can tell, as well as you, out of *Plato's Works* and several other *Heathen Philosophers*, but not one Word out of the Bible.

What you have advanced in your 9th. Chapter, I ought to thank you for, rather than resent it. For if *Estius* has been defective in his *History of Humane Soul*, you have made it good, by tracing it from *Homer*, who lived some hundred of Years before those little Fellows, *Thales*, *Phereaydes*, or

Pythagoras, whom other Men have look'd upon to be Inventers of this Doctrine. Now if it come from *Homer*, how say you, Sir (as the Country-man's Language is) Was he an Heathen, or a Christian? Oh! Perhaps he might learn this Christian Doctrine by Conversing with the *Primitive Fathers*, who lived One Thousand Five Hundred Years after his Death; or else he was a Christian in his Heart, or a Jew at least; and you know that's enough for Proof, that it was no *Heathenish Invention*. But to leave Jestings, Sir, take this Argument for all, as my Good *Antagonist* has summ'd it up, and reduced me, as he thinks, *ad absurdum*. The Church of England had it from the Church of Rome; The Church of Rome from the Primitive Fathers; They from the Philosophers, and those from the *Ægyptians*; and the *Ægyptians* from *Moses*, Pag. 386. Now you would have done very wisely, if you had but subjoyn'd the Reasons also; which is, First, Because *Estibius* tells you, that in all Probability, the Jews, from the *Ægyptians*, learn'd that Notion of Humane Soul, if they had the same Notion of it, as we now receive. Secondly, Because *Moses* wrote

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wrote several hundred Years, after this was a common received Doctrine in *Ægypt*, as has been proved, I presume, in the former Treatise. Had you but considered these two Reasons, you would have done Justice to *Estibius*, and not have obtruded a palpable Falsity on the World, as those Words — THE *ÆGYPTIANS* LEARNED IT FROM *MOSES* — imply, which ought to be. *And Moses, or the Hebrews, learned it from the Ægyptians, who were an Heathenish Nation, and not instructed in these Principles of Religion we now learn from the Holy Scriptures.* One Word of Advice to you, and I have done.

First, When ever you write again, get a Man of Solid Judgment, and Reading, to supervise your Papers, before they come *hastily* into the World, that your Expressions may *always be Sense*, if they bear little or no weight in Argumentation.

Secondly, Take such a Mans Judgment in Examining the Reasons you propose, as Demonstrative, and especially where you attempt to reduce the Adversary to own Absurdities, or to ridicule him.

him. As v. g. you harp twice or thrice on *Estibius's* POETICAL PHILOSOPHY, as if it were ridiculous; when as had you but ever read the *Minor Poets*, you would have found the First Philosophy in Greece, was *Poetical*; and therefore Dr. Burnet, in his Treatise call'd *Archæolog. Philos. ph.* calls the Philosophy of the First Date, *Poeticam Philosophiam*.

Thirdly, Never use Calumny, for Argument, by calling a Man *Atheist*, *Heretick*, *Irreligious*, &c. either by *Innuendo*, or Express Words: For it becomes such as are in your Station, and of your Function, to treat Men with Candour, and mildness of Temper (whatever Latitude a Lay-man may take) more peculiarly. This is a Breach of Good Manners, and give me leave to tell you, That when you presume to call one *Atheist*, and *Heret.* who is *known* constantly to frequent the Sacrament often, in the Year, and seldom fails Public Devotion, in the Week daies, in the Church of *England*; You, or any one else, do very ill to Brand such an one with *Atheisme*, or *Irreligion*, or a *Broacher of Heretical Opinions*. This I add here, to obviate the prejudic'd Opinion
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some Men, unknown to me, have, and others may, by *Mis-representation*, conceive of me.

Fourthly, To treat your Superiours with *Humanity* in your Writings, as well as in your Conversation. For I cannot forbear telling you, That as you are neither dignify'd or distinguish'd by any Character in the Church, but plain, Mr. J. B. A. M. my Lord's Chaplain, you talk frequently with a very Magisterial and Arrogant Style conjoyned with unworthy Reflections. Had you been my Superiour, and in a Station suitable to become my Monitor, I shou'd, with more Ease, have born your Reprimands, yet never have suffered your precious Balms to break my Head.

Fifthly, To argue Matters Philosophical without the Breach of Christian Charity, and *hawling* in every Point, as it were, in Controversie, to make Philosophy super-intendant of our Religion, and Religion buckle to Rules of Philosophy, whether it can or no. For to tell you the Truth, as to the End of Religion, seeing we both Center in a *Resurrection*, and a *General Judgment*; it matters not much which Opinion is true, yours or mine: But if some Parts of our Religion

Religion cannot be reconciled to your Philosophy, and the Primitive Fathers were in an Error : (as I hope they were not *infallible*) What hurt is there to try, by Argumentation on both sides, whether there be such an Error, or No? Which is no more, in short, than to know whether we ought to believe things true, or false, *with Reason, or without* ; Conform, or not Conform, to several Principles of the Christian Religion.

Lastly, As you have attack'd only one Axiom (of those several mention'd in *Farther Thoughts*) I advise you to keep close your Claws, and attempt at answering not one of the others, and then you will be safe, and no one will know the Errors of your Mind ; but that you may have also, what you wish to me, a

— *Mens sana in Corpore sano.*

F I N I S.

